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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Bills and Notes-Finance Companies-Holders in Due Course
The Negotiable Instruments Law expressly sets out the requirements
which one must meet in order to become a holder in due course of a
negotiable instrument. N. I. L. § 52 provides: "a holder in due course
is a holder who has taken the instrument under the following conditions:
... (3) that he took it in good faith and for value; (4) that at the time
it was negotiated to him he had no notice of any infirmity in the instru-
ment or defect in the title of the person negotiating it." The last of
these requirements is given fuller meaning by N. I. L. § 56 which pro-
vides: "To constitute notice of an infirmity in the instrument or defect
in the title of the person negotiating the same, the person to whom it is
negotiated must have had actual knowledge of the infirmity or defect, or
knowledge of such facts that his action in taking the instrument amount-
ed to bad faith."
In spite of the definiteness with which these requirements are set
out, the courts have experienced considerable difficulty, especially in re-
cent years, in applying them to a particular class of holders-finance
companies. This difficulty, and a resulting inconsistency in the decisions,
is not without cause. A brief analysis of the factual situation out of
which these cases arise and of several of the cases themselves will show
the source of this conflict.
The notes on which the finance companies seek to recover arise out
of a tri-partite transaction in which the buyer purchases certain goods
on credit from a dealer, executing his note and a conditional sales con-
tract to the dealer. The dealer, in accordance with previous arrange-
ments, immediately transfers the note and the conditional sales contract
to the finance company. As a part of this arrangement, the finance
company usually furnishes the dealer with blank forms for the notes and
the contracts, with tables from which to compute the amount of install-
ment and interest payments, and in other ways participates in the
transaction in varying degrees.
The problem resulting from the above course of dealings between
the finance company and the dealer was clearly pointed out by the Mary-
land court in Griffin v. Baltimore Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n,' where
the court said: "The conflict between the desire on the one hand
to protect the conditional vendee from abusive practices and the neces-
'204 Md. 154, 159, 102 A. 2d 804, 806 (1954).
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sity on the other hand of preserving the free negotiability of commercial
paper has given rise to a divergence of opinion on this point ... ." In
approaching this problem, courts have taken different positions with re-
spect to the conflict.
One view which denies the finance company the status of a holder
in due course and which seems to be gaining more support from the
courts is very strongly expressed in Buffalo Industrial Bank v. De
Marzio.3 There the New York court said that the finance companies
have become de facto departments of the businesses without which these
businesses could not operate, and that any idea of their being separate
organizations was a mere fiction. The court added: "To pretend that
they are separate and distinct enterprises is to draw the veil of fiction
over the face of fact.' 4 The more typical statement of this view is that
the finance company is so closely connected with the transaction that
it will not be heard to say that it is a holder in due course.
Probably the most influential case espousing this view is Commercial
Credit Co. v. Childs.6 In this case the note was attached to the con-
' It was unnecessary for this court to indicate its view as to the proper solution
of the conflict because of a Maryland statute which provides that when a note is
given as a part of an installment transaction, it is to refer to the agreement out of
which it arose and, in the hands of any subsequent holder, is to be subject to the
same defenses that the buyer could assert against the seller. Another case in which
a statutory provision was construed to prevent the finance company from being a
holder in due course is General Electric Contracts Corp. v. Heimstra, 69 S. D.
78, 6 N. W. 2d 445 (1942), where the statute defined "seller" as any person who
sells goods or "any legal successor in interest" of such person. These statutes seem
to represent a retreat from the strict "actual notice" and bad faith requirements
of the N. I. L. Also, it is interesting to note that the Uniform Commercial Code
has adopted less stringent requirements, under which these same results could
possibly be reached. It provides:
"Section 1-201. General Definitions.
(19) 'Good faith' means honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction con-
cerned.
(25) A person has 'notice' of a fact when
(a) he has actual knowledge of it; or
(b) he has received a notice or notification of it; or
(c) from all the facts and circumstances known to him at the time in
question he has reason to know that it exists.
"Section 3-302. Holder in Due Course.
(1) A holder in due course is a holder who takes the instrument
(b) in good faith including observance of the reasonable commercial
standards of any business in which the holder may be engaged; and
(c) without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored or of any
defense against or claim to it on the part of any person."
The above provisions would replace N. I. L. § 52 and N. I. L. § 56. The "has
reason to know" and "reasonable commercial standards" provisions of the above
sections would, seemingly, enable the courts more readily to deny the finance
company the position of a holder in due course. For a discussion of these pro-
visions and the "good faith rule" generally, see Note, 30 N. C. L. RLv. 395 (1952).
8 162 Misc. 742. 296 N. Y. Supp. 783 (City Ct. Buffalo 1937), rev'd on other
grounds, 6 N. Y. S. 2d 568 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
' Buffalo Industrial Bank v. De Marzio, 296 N. Y. Supp. 783, 785-786 (City Ct.
Buffalo 1937).
' 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S. W. 2d 260 (1940). This case is discussed in Notes, 53
HARv. L. REv. 1200 (1940), 20 U. oF CiN. L. Rrv. 123 (1951). Also see Note,
128 A. L. R. 729 (1940).
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tract, both were executed at the same time, and on the back of each
was a printed assignment to the finance company. Immediately after
the instruments were executed they were assigned to the finance com-
pany. The Arkansas court held that the finance company was so close-
ly connected with the transaction that it could not maintain that it was a
holder in due course; that for all intents and purposes the finance com-
pany was a party to the instrument from the beginning.(
Another case attracting considerable attention is Commercial Credit
Corp. v. Orange County Machine Works. 7 There the facts were similar
to those in the Childs case, but there was also evidence that the finance
company had been twice consulted by telephone as to the details of the
transactions. The California court in holding that the finance com-
pany was not a holder in due course said that it had actively participated
in the transaction from its inception.
In Mutual Finance Co. v. Martin,8 in addition to the facts that were
present in the Childs case, these further facts appeared: the finance
company's name was in bold print at the top and throughout the bodty
of the contract and the note, and its office was designated as the place
of payment. On the day before the sale took place, the finance com-
pany investigated the buyer's credit standing, approved the terms of both
instruments, and agreed to purchase them as soon as the transaction
was consummated. The Florida court also relied on the "close con-
nection" between the finance company and the dealer to deny the finance
company the position of a holder in due course.0
Another group of cases appear to be distinguishable from those
just considered in that they find an agency relationship to exist between
the finance company and the dealer, impute the agent's knowledge to
the principal, and thereby hold that the finance company is not a holder
in due course. Actually, however, in many of these cases this dis-
tinction appears to be one of labeling only, as the courts rely on the same
factors on which the cases previously considered relied, and place con-
' Here the finance company brought an action to recover possession of the goods,
It is usually held that in a suit to recover the goods, the buyer may assert any
defense that he has against the seller, even against the seller's transferee. 2
WILLISTON, SALES § 332 (Rev. ed. 1948). This possible distinction has apparently
been ignored by the courts following the Childs case. See Note, 152 A. L. R. 1222
(1944), where the writer attempts to weave a pattern of consistency into the cases
on the basis of this distinction.
"34 Cal. 2d 766, 214 P. 2d 819 (1950). This case is discussed in Notes, 28
NoRE DAME LAw. 257 (1952), 23 So. CALIF. L. REV. 580 (1950).
'63 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1953).
' Other cases den ying the finance company the status of a holder in due course
because of the close relationship between it and the dealer are Schuck v. Murdock
Acceptance Corp., 220 Ark. 56, 247 S. W. 2d 1 (1952) ; International Harvester
Co. of America v. Watkins, 127 Kan. 50, 272 P. 139 (1928); C. I. T. Corp. v.
Emmons, 197 So. 662 (La. 1940); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Swain,




siderable weight on the Childs case. Typical of this group of cases is
Palmer v. Associate Discount Corp.,'0 where the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in reaching the above
result, relied heavily on the printed forms used in carrying out the
transaction. It pointed out that the name of the finance company ap-
peared on the face of these forms in large type and that under five
different types of assignments, printed on the back, the dealer assumed
the obligation of repurchasing the automobile in case of default. These
assignments incorporated various agreements ranging from a full re-
purchase to the payment of a certain sum for a release. The court said
that the forms clearly showed that they were prepared for use in the
financing of automobile installment sales, that they revealed the dealer
and the finance company to be closely associated in the business, and
that the provisions in the printed assignments were particularly sug-
gestive of a close relationship between the dealer and the company.
The finance company, the court concluded, was acting as the dealer's
agent in demanding payment on the note."
The above cases illustrate that the courts have come to use "closely
connected," "active participation," or similar terms in describing varying
degrees of actual participation by the finance company in the original
transaction between the dealer and the purchaser. Some of these courts,
in so doing, have failed to examine the facts to determine whether there
was "actual notice" or bad faith as required by the N. I. L., but have
relied on this "closeness" in itself to infer such notice or bad faith.
Further, it appears that some of these courts have used this as a device
to arrive at results that are somewhat doubtful1 2 under the N. I. L., as
they, in justifying the results reached, look beyond the N. I. L. to policy
considerations. 13
124 F. 2d 225 (D. C. Cir. 1941).
'l Other cases where an agency relationship was found to exist are United
States v. Schaffer, 33 F. Supp. 547 (D. Md. 1940); Bastian-Blessing Co. v.
Stroope, 203 Ark. 116, 155 S. W. 2d 892 (1941); International Harvester Co. v.
Carruth, 23 So. 2d 473 (La. 1945).
12 In many of these cases there is nothing to indicate that such facts were
present as to charge the finance company with "actual notice" or bad faith, and
the courts relied on this "closeness" alone to deny the finance company the status
of a holder in due course.
13 These policy considerations relate mostly to the inequality in the bargaining
positions of the finance company and the buyer and the ability of the finance com-
pany to bear more readily any resulting loss. It is also contended that market-
ability is not seriously affected as the notes retain their negotiable quality in the
hands of persons beyond the finance company. This contention seems to ignore
the practical consideration that there must be some large primary market, as finance
companies, for these papers which are executed on a mass scale today, and that
by denying the finance companies the protection of being holders in due course, the
existence of such a market would be adversely affected. There would probably
be a reduction in the size of the market and an increase in the amount of financing
charges, both of which would limit the accessibility of this market to the public.
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A recent case14 taking a more discriminating approach to the prob-
lem deserves attention. There the finance company was founded by
certain dealers for the express purpose of providing financing services
solely to the members of a dealer association of which some of them were
members. The finance company, which had purchased notes from a par-
ticular dealer over a four year period, supplied blank forms containing
a printed assignment, furnished financial statement forms, and pur-
chased the instruments immediately upon the completion of the transac-
tion. The defendant purchaser contended that the finance company
was so closely associated with the transaction as to make it an original
party. In rejecting this contention the Wisconsin court expressly re-
fused to follow the Childs and Martin cases, which, actording to the
court, held that the supplying of forms by the finance company to the
dealer tended to establish direct participation by the finance company
in the transaction between the dealer and the purchaser.
The court then pointed out the following: a large segment of our
economy is dependent upon this source of credit. For the finance com-
pany to purchase these instruments executed on forms with which it is
not familiar necessitates either the delay of an investigation or the
taking of considerable risk by the finance company,, either of which
could seriously impair the usefulness of this method of financing. By
furnishing its own forms the finance company avoids both of these
dangers. The court concluded that it could see no reason why finance
companies supplying such forms should be held thereby to have made
the dealers their agents or to have participated in the sale.
Another case, in which the Louisiana court approaches the problem
with considerable frankness, is White System of New Orleans v. Hall.15
Here again the finance company furnished forms and installment tables
and agreed in advance to purchase the notes as soon as the sale was
completed. The court, in finding that the finance company was a holder
in due course, recognized that there was some justification in the view
that the finance company was using the N. I. L. as a shield to get an un-
fair advantage over the purchaser, but said that steps to correct this
would have to be taken by the legislature and not by the courts in view
of the clear provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Law.'0
" Implement Credit Corp. v. Elsinger, 268 Wis. 143, 66 N. W. 2d 657 (1954),
rehearing denied, 67 N. W. 2d 873 (1953).
" 219 La. 440, 53 So. 2d 227 (1951).
1" Other cases holding that the course of dealings between the finance company
and the dealer did not prevent the finance company from being a holder in due
course are Citizens & Southern National Bank v. Stepp, 126 F. Supp. 744 (N. D.
Fla. 1954. (The court distinguished this case from the Martin case, supra note
8, in that here the name of the finance company did not appear in the forms
furnished; other finance companies, as well as the plaintiff purchased these instru-
ments; and there was no participation in the transaction by the finance company.) ;
Allied Building Credits, Inc. v. Mathewson, 335 Mich. 270, 55 N. W. 2d 826
(1952) ; Mayer v. American Finance Corp. 172 Okla. 419, 45 P. 2d 497 (1935).
[Vol. 33
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If, in fact, there is present a situation so fraught with the possibility
of fraud or unfairness that the statutory provisions of the N. I. L. are
not adequate, then it seems that legislation is the only sound solution.
Nothing but uncertainty can arise out of an encroachment upon these
statutory provisions by judicial decisions. Undoubtedly this situation
presents a ripe opportunity for collusion between unscrupulous finance
companies and dealers to take unfair advantage of the buyer.' 7 Clearly
in some cases the finance company has actually participated in the trans-
action to such an extent that it cannot be a holder in due course within
the statutory provisions. But in other cases there is no evidence of such
direct participation in the transaction by the finance company as would
charge it with "actual notice" or bad faith as required by the N. I. L.
In the absence of additional legislation, it is submitted that innocent
finance companies that come within the definition of a holder in due
course under the existing statutes, should not be deprived of that posi-
tion because of a tendency of the courts to "catalogue" them in the same
class with unscrupulous companies by the indiscriminate or deliberate
use of such terms as "close connection." Such a result seems especially
unreasonable in the light of the fact that a certain amount of participa-
tion by the finance company, as pointed out earlier, is essential in order
to avoid unreasonable delay or risks.' 8
BOBBY G. BYRD.
State Tort Claims Act-Construction
In three recent cases' the question whether the North Carolina Tort
Claims Act 2 should be strictly or liberally construed has been presented
to the court. In Lyon & Sons v. Board of Education,3 the issue was
" In Davis v. Commercial Credit Corp., 87 Ohio 311, 94 N. E. 2d 710 (1950),
the court found that the finance company engaged in a conspiracy with the dealer
to defraud the buyer. But for something of a reversal of the usual situation see
Mutual Finance Corp. v. Dickinson, 123 N. J. L. 62, 7 A. 2d 859 (Sup. Ct. 1938)
and Motor Finance Corp. v. Huntsberger, 116 Ohio St. 317, 156 N. E. 111 (1927),
where the courts indicated that if any collusion existed, it was between the pur-
chaser and the dealer.
"8 Another problem which frequently arises is whether the simultaneous execu-
tion of the note with a conditional sales contract destroys its negotiability. Ac-
cording to the weight of authority it does not. 'Commercial Credit Corp. v. OrangeCounty Machine Works, 34 Cal. 2d 766, 214 P. 2d 819 (1950); Mutual Finance
Co. v. Martin, 63 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1953); Implement Credit Corp. v. Elsinger,268 Wis. 143, 66 N. W. 2d 657 (1954), rehearing denied, 67 N. W. 2d 873(1955) ; 2 WILLISTON, SALEs § 332, p. 291 (Rev. ed. 1948). But some cases have
held that negotiability is destroyed. Note, 98 U. OF PA. L. REv. 244 (1949).
'Floyd v. State Highway and Public Works Commission, 241 N. C. 461, 85
S. E. 2d 703 (1955) ; Alliance Co. v. State Hospital at Butner, 241 N. C. 329,85 S. E. 2d 386 (1955) ; Lyon & Sons v. Board of Education, 238 N. C. 24, 76
S. E. 2d 553 (1953).
2 N. C. GEx. STAT. § 143-291 et seq., as amended in 1953.
'238 N. C. 24, 76 S. E. 2d 553 (1953). Discussed in note, 32 N. C. L. REv.
242 (1954), as to subrogation.
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whether the right of subrogation existed under the act. In saying that
the right existed, Justice Parker stated that most statutes waiving a
government's immunity had been strictly construed, but that the cur-
rent trend of legislative policy and judicial thought is away from such
construction. In Alliance Co. v. State Hospital at Butner,4 a prisoner
detained at a state penal institution and negligently operating a hospital
truck was held not to be an employee within the meaning of the Tort
Claims Act. Justice Bobbitt, in a concurring opinion, argued that, if
immunity is to be waived beyond the provisions of the Act as strictly
construed, this is a matter for the General Assembly to decide. Then in
Floyd v. State Highway and Public Works Commission,5 plaintiff
claimed a maintenance supervisor of the State Highway and Public
Works Commission was negligent in failing to see that his instructions
were carried out with respect to the use of larger tile for a fill, after he
had notice that the fill had washed out once before. The fill again
washed out and plaintiff's intestate was killed when he drove his car
into the washout. In denying recovery, Justice Higgins, writing the
majority opinion, stated that since the Act is in derogation of sovereign
immunity, the sounder view is that it should be strictly construed.
Justice Parker dissented in the latter two cases, arguing against a strict
construction.
In discussing the construction of a statute waiving the immunity of a
state, certain established principles should be recalled. The North Caro-
lina court has repeatedy proclaimed that the state cannot be sued without
its consent ;6 this immunity is absolute and unqualified.7 Furthermore,
an agency of the state may be sued only when and as authorized by
statute, s and even if authority to use the agency is given, it does not
extend to actions for torts unless expressly provided. 9 The remedy
given to injured individuals before the State Tort Claims Act was a right
4241 N. C. 329, 85 S. E. 2d 386 (1955).1;241 N. C. 461, 85 S. E. 2d 703 (1955).
6 This is apparently based on the construction given the Eleventh Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890).
See also: Smith v. Hefner, 235 N. C. 1, 68 S. E. 2d 783 (1951) ; Dalton v. State
Highway and Public Works Commission, 223 N. C. 406, 27 S. E. 2d 1 (1943);
Prudential Insurance Co. v. Powell, 217 N. C. 495, 8 S. E. 2d 619 (1940).
" Schloss v. State Highway and Public Works Commission, 230 N; C. 489, 53
S. E. 2d 517 (1949); Dalton v. State Highway and Public Works Commission,
223 N. C. 406, 27 S. E. 2d 1 (1943).
8 Burgin v. Smith, 151 N. C. 561, 66 S. E. 607 (1909) ; Moody v. State Prison,
128 N. C. 12, 38 S. E. 131 (1901).
' "It was a hardship on plaintiff, but no legal wrong of the defendant. It
goes without saying that State authorities should exercise due care in the perform-
ance of governmental functions, but for the failure, in cases of this nature, no
liability attaches." Reeves v. Asheville Construction Co., 194 N. C. 817, 818, 140
S. E. 733, 734 (1927). See also: Carpenter v. Atlanta and Charlotte Air Line Ry.
Co., 184 N. C. 400, 114 S. E. 693 (1922); Jones v. Commissioners of Franklin
County, 130 N. C. 451, 42 S. E. 144 (1902).
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of action against the employees of the agency,' 0 or against officials of the
state in limited cases,". or on appeal to the legislature for an appropria-
tion.1
2
Most of the states which have passed acts allowing the state or its
agencies to be sued have construed such acts strictly.' 3  In at least
one case a constitutional provision allowing suits against the state has
been strictly construed.' 4 The reasons given for such construction are:
(1) since the acts are in derogation of common law, or in derogation of
sovereignty, it is elemental that they are to be strictly construed ;i5 (2)
actions against the state would impair respect for sovereignty and make
inroads upon the public revenue;"6 (3) there can be no legal rights
against the authority that makes the law upon which such rights de-
pend ;17 (4) suits against the state would subject it to manifold, in-
definite, and interminable liability;18 and (5) there would be crippling'
interferences with government if the acts were liberally construed.' 9
In those states in which statutes authorizing suits against the state
have been liberally construed, this result usually is obtained because such
statutes have been passed in furtherance of constitutional provisions. 20
Another reason given is that such statutes are mererly remedial and do
not create a new right of action.2 '
'It is gradually being recognized that states, through their officers and
agents, can and do commit tortious acts.22  States are making an un-
10 Miller v. Jones, 224 N. C. 783, 32 S. E. 2d 594 (1945) ; Carpenter v. Atlanta
and Charlotte Air Line Ry. Co., 184 N. C. 400, 114 S. E. 693 (1922).
"Wilkins v. Burton, 220 N. C. 13, 16 S. E. 2d 406 (1941); Old Fort v.
Harmon, 219 N. C. 241, 13 S. E. 2d 423 (1941). See note, 23 N. C. L. REv. 270
(1945), for discussion of distinction between liability for violation of discretionary
duties and liability for violation of ministerial duties.
12 Under Article IV, Section 9 of the North Carolina Constitution, the Su-
preme Court has original jurisdiction to hear claims against the state, but its
decisions shall be merely recommendatory. The General Assembly alone decides
whether a claim against the state is just and shall be paid. Rotan v. State, 195
N. C. 291, 141 S. E. 733 (1928).
1 For a summary by states of state tort claims acts, see Leflar and Kantrowitz,
Tort Liability of the States, 29 N. Y. U. L. REv. 1363 (1954).
"People v. Birch Securities, 86 Cal.2d 703, 196 P.2d 143 (1948).
12 Hailey v. City of Newark, 22 N.J. 139, 36 A.2d 210 (1944).
10 Quinton v. Board of Claims, 165 Tenn. 201, 54 S.W.2d 953 (1932).
'
7 Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U. S. 349 (1907); Arnold v. State, 48
N. M. 596, 154 P. 2d 257 (1944).
18 State v. Dickerson, 141 Tex. 475, 174 S.W.2d 244 (1943).
10 Harrison v. Wyoming Liquor Commission, 63 Wyo. 13, 177 P.2d 397 (1947).
But in Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47 (1944), it was held
that when authority to sue a sovereign is given, it is liberally construed to ac-
complish its purpose.
20 Construction of such statutes should not be so strict as to violate the legisla-
tive intent or reflect on dignity of the state. Lewis v. State, 207 La. 194, 20 So. 2d
917 (1945) ; Jackson v. State_ 261 N. Y. 134, 184 N. E. 735 (1933) ; Northwest-
ern and Pacific Bank v. State, 18 Wash. 73, 50 Pac. 586 (1897).
'Lewis v. State, 207 La. 194, 20 So. 2d 917 (1945).
" This is generally recognized by the mere enactment of tort claims acts by the
states. But the North Carolina court as late as 1949 said, as to the State High-
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precedented expansion into many fields of activity and subjecting their
citizens to increasing risks from "defective, negligent, perverse or
erroneous administration" 23 of these activities. Along with this ex-
pansion come acts such as the North Carolina Tort Claims Act,24 which
recognize the moral duty imposed by considerations of equity and
justice.2 5 When a state thus discards its mantle of sovereignty, it would
seem inconsistent to whittle the consent down by a strict construction.20
"The exemption of the sovereign from suit involves hardship enough
where consent has been withheld. We are not to add to its rigor by re-
finement of construction where consent has been announced."27
Some arguments that may be advanced in favor of a liberal construc-
tion of such statutes are: (1) they are intended to relieve the state legis-
latures from the pressure of private claims, so that the legislatures may
devote their time to matters of public concern ;28 (2) prerogatives of
governments should yield to needs of their citizens ;29 (3) when a state
consents to be sued, it should occupy the same position as a private citi-
zen and be entitled to no special privileges ;30 and (4) the courts should
not be concerned with the problem of financing the possible results of
suits against the state, but should leave it to the legislature to require
liability insurance. 31
Perhaps the question of strict construction because of sovereign im-
munity is best summed up by the Supreme Court of Arkansas in a de-
cision in 1851 :32
"A notion which might have been plausibly challenged, if the
question was an open one in the courts of this country, as a sickly
way and Public Works Commission: "It is as powerless to exceed its authority
as is a robot to act beyond the limitations imposed by its own mechanism. It can
commit no actionable wrong." Schloss v. State Highway and Public Works
Commission, 230 N.C. 489, 53 S.E.2d 517 (1949).
" Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L. J. 1, 129, 229 (1924-25).
Professor Borchard referred to the "unexampled expansion of the police power in
the United States." What about expansion from 1924 to 1955? See also Bor-
chard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 36 YALE L. J. 1, 757, 1039 (1926-27)
Anderson, Claims Against States, 7 VAND. L. REV. 234 (1954).
24 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 143-291 et seq., as amended in 1953.
25 Jackson v. State, 261 N. Y. 134, 184 N. E. 735 (1933).
2 United States v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co, 338 U. S. 366 (1949), citing
Anderson v. John L. Hayes Construction Co., 243 N. Y. 140, 153 N. E. 28 (1926).
See also Seavey, "Liberal Construction" and the Tort Liability of the Federal
Government, 67 HAgv. L. Rxv. 994 (1954).
' Cardozo, J., in Anderson v. John L. Hayes Construction Co., 243 N. Y. 140,
147, 153 N. E. 28, 29 (1926).
" See dissents by Parker, J., in Alliance Co. v. State Hospital, 241 N. C. 329,
334, 85 S. E. 2d 386, 390 (1955), and in Floyd v. State Highway and Public
Works Commission, 241 N. C. 461, 467, 85 S. E. 2d 703, 707 (1955).
21 United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U. S. 543 (1951).
20 State v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 190 S. W. 2d 510 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
"See Leflar and Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29 N. Y. U. L. REv.
1363 (1954), for a discussion of this possibility.
" State v. Curran, 12 Ark. 321, 345 (1851).
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exotic in American soil, where government is not prescribed to
the people by a superior power, but is merely the organ of their
own sovereignty and the creation of laws enacted by themselves,
and which derive all their obligatory force from the mutual con-
sent of those who are to render them obedience.
"The right of a citizen to sue a state, then is not derogatory
to common right, or subversive of the true principles of the com-
mon law, but is clearly in harmony with both. .. ."
North Carolina has consistently recognized that claims against the
state not only will be made,3 3 but that they should be compensated.
34
In saying that the State Tort Claims Act should be strictly construed,
it is submitted that the supreme court is- following an out of date doc-
trine of governmental immunity, and is refusing to recognize the ap-
parent legislative intent in passing such an act.
RICHARD 0. GAMrrLE.
Statutes-Determination of Moment at Which Newly Enacted Statute
Attains Force of Law
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recently refused to apply to a
tax statute the general rule that a day is regarded in the law as an
indivisible unit of time which begins with its first moment, and thus, a
statute is ordinarily deemed to take effect from the beginning of the day
on which it is enacted.- Decedent died at 11:55 a.m. on the morning
of 21 December, 1951. On the same day, the governor signed a bill
which increased the collateral inheritance tax rate from 10 per cent to
15 per cent, and which was to become effective immediately upon its final
enactment. There was no evidence as to the exact time of day when
the governor signed the bill, but the Commonwealth, relying on the gen-
eral rule, assumed the statute to have been operative from the firsf
moment of the day of its enactment, and therefore in effect at decedent's
death. The court held that the Commonwealth had failed to prove that
the new law was actually in effect at the time of decedent's death, and
that the lower court's verdict for a 10 per cent taxation was proper.
It added that the general rule relied on by the Commonwealth was a
legal fiction, and would be disregarded whenever its application would
unjustly impair personal or property rights. In such cases, the court
said that it would take cognizance of the actual hour or time of the
passage of the statute.
"' N. C. CoNsT. Art. IV, § 9: "The Supreme Court shall have original juris-
diction to hear claims against the State. .. ."
" Rotan v. State, 195 N. C. 291, 141 S. E. 733 (1928).
In re Grant's Estate, 377 Pa. 264, 105 A.2d 80 (1954).
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This line of reasoning, however, has not been followed in all cases
in the past.2  In fact, the general rule was advocated by many of the
earlier decisions, whch held that where no exact time is named as the
effective date of a statute, it will take effect from the date of its approval,
and when computation is to be made from an act done (e.g., the approval
of the statute), the day on which the act was done should be included ;'
and since the law does not recognize fractions of a day,4 the statute must
be deemed to have been in effect from the first moment of the day of its
approval.5
However, this general rule is by no means universal in its applica-
tion.6  A clear exception is in the field of criminal law. In Moree v.
State,7 defendant was convicted of having a distillery in his possession,
which was discovered on the same day an act was passed which made
the possession of such an apparatus illegal. The court, in reversing the
conviction, refused to hold the statute effective from the first moment
of the day of its passage. To consider the act in effect before it was
actually signed by the governor would make it an ex post facto law.
Even in those areas of the law in which the general rule of non-
divisibility of a day has been held applicable,8 courts have at times seemed
reluctant to apply it. In Arrowsmith v. Hantering, plaintiff filed a pe-
tition in error without permission from the court on the same day that an
act was passed which repealed the law allowing such petitions without
permission. Since no evidence was offered as to the exact time of
the passage of the repealing act or of plaintiff's filing of his petition, the
court presumed that the repealing act took effect from the first moment
of the day of its enactment, thereby antedating plainiff's petition. Even
2 Leidigh Carriage Co. v. Stengel, 95 Fed. 637 (6th Cir. 1899) ; it re Welman,
20 Vt. 653, 29 Fed. Cas. 681, No. 17,407 (D. Vt. 1844).
'Arnold v. U. S., 9 Cranch 104, 120 (U. S. 1815); Mallory & Co. v. Hiles,
61 Ky. (4 Metcalfe) 53 (1861).
'Turnipseed v. Jones, 101 Ala. 593, 14 So. 377 (1893) ; 86 C. J. S., Time § 16
at p. 900 (1954).
U. S. v. Norton, 97 U. S. 164 (1877); Lapeyre v. U. S., 17 Wall. 191 (U. S.
1872).
'Leavenworth Coal Co. v. Barber, 47 Kan. 29, 27 Pac. 114 (1891) - 82 C.J.S.,
Statutes § 406 at p. 976 (1953) ; 50 Air. Juta., Statutes § 510 at p. 523 (1944) ;
36 Cya 1198 (1910) : "As a general rule, the law does not take notice of fractions
of a day, and therefore a statute which takes effect from its passage, or approval,
relates back and becomes effective from the first moment of the day on which it is
passed, or approved, but this doctrine of relation is only a legal fiction, and when-
ever its application would cause injustice, the act will be given effect only from the
moment of its approval."
'7 130 Miss. 391, 94 So. 226 (1922).
'In re Boyce, 25 Wash. 612, 66 Pac. 54 (1901); In re Welman, 20 Vt. 653,
655, 29 Fed. Cas. 681, 682, No. 17,407 (D. Vt. 1844), where the court said: "But
though divisions of a day are allowed to make priorities in questions concerning
private acts and transactions, they are never allowed to make priorities in ques-
tions concerning public acts, such as legislative acts, or public laws, or such
judicial proceedings as are matters of record."
'39 Ohio St. 573 (1883).
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so, the court indicates that had plaintiff sustained the burden of proving
that the filing of his petition actually preceded the passage of the repeal-
ing act, the decision might have been in his favor.10 The Supreme Court
of North Carolina has said that in the absence of evidence or means of
proof of the exact time of enactment, a statute would be considered in
effect from the first moment of the day of its passage, but added that
the court would hear evidence and determine the precise hour at which
a statute was enacted whenever it became necessary in order to prevent
wrong or to assert a meritorious right.' It should be noted that the
act in question was to take effect "from and after its ratification."
Where no such time is set forth in the act, however, the time of its
taking effect is governed by statute in North Carolina.12
In many instances, as we have seen, courts have refused to apply
the general rule, and instead, have received evidence as to the exact time
of the passage of the act in question, and held it effective as of that
time. 13 It has been said that the general rule will not be followed in
cases where its application would defeat a vested right or otherwise work
"0 Id. at 577. The court said that "Whenever a question arises in a court of
law as to the time when a statute takes effect, appropriate proof may be resorted
to, to determine when the act took effect, that is, the exact time in the day.
"No such proof was offered in the case at bar. If the plaintiff in error relies
on the fact that his action was pending on the 18th before the actual time of the
passage of the statute in question, he must, in order to defeat the presumption that
it went into effect the first moment of that day, show that his petition was first
filed. This he has not done, and we are left to the presumption, that arises from
the date of the act."
See Fabien v. Grabow, j34 Mo. App. 193, 114 S. W. 80 (1908). Here, the
court says that the burden of proof rests on the party who asserts that an act or
event occurred prior to some other act, which happened on the same day, to
establish what he alleges.
1 Lloyd v. N. C. Railroad Co., 151 N. C. 536, 66 S. E. 604 (1909). Apparently
no such evidence was presented in this case, since the court held the statute in
question to have been in effect from the beginning of the day of its passage.
Accord, Croveno v. Atlantic Ave. Ry. Co., 150 N. Y. 225, 44 N. E. 968 (1896).
1" N. C. GEN. STAT. § 120-20 (1952) p1rovides, "Acts of the General Assembly
shall be in force only from and after thirty days after the adjournment of the
session in which they shall have been passed, unless the commencement of the
operation thereof be expressly otherwise directed." In determining when acts to
which this type of statute would apply should be considered in effect, the weight
of authority is that the time is computed by excluding the day of the event from
which time is to be computed (i.e., the day of adjournment) and including the
last day of the number constituting the specific period. In other words, if the
legislature adjourned on the first day of the month, then assuming the period to be
thirty days, the act would take effect on the thirty-first. It is generally held that
the act becomes effective as of the first moment of the last day in the period. A
case so holding, and in which the applicable laws were similar to our own N. C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 120-20 (1952) and 1-593 (1953), was Clingsmith v. Jackson Dairy
Co., 202 Iowa 773, 211 N. W. 413 (1921). Accord, Garcia v. J. C. Penney Co.,
52 N. M. 410, 200 P. 2d 372 (1948), citing SUtRERLAND ON STATUTORY CON-
STRUCTION § 111.
" In re Wynne, 30 Fed. Cas. No. 18,177 at 760 (C. C. D. Va. 1868) ; Kennedy
v. Palmer, 72 Mass. (6 Gray) 316 (1855); People ex rel. Campbell v. Clark,
1 Cal. 406 (1851).
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injuriously,' 4 or when public justice demands inquiry as to the time of
day an act was passed.15 Adherents to this school of thought hold that
the time of the approval of a statute by the executive is a fact which can
be ascertained and proved, and that in all cases where the rights of the
parties are in any way affected by the time of such approval, the exact
time of day at which the act of approval occurred may be shown. 10 This
eliminates the often undesirable retroactive aspect necessarily involved
whenever the presumption that a statute in question took effect from
the first moment of the day of its passage is adopted.' 7  Such retroac-
tivity can easily bring about unjust results when applied in situations
similar to that in the principal case.
The view that a statute should be considered in effect from the
moment of its passage was criticized in Parkinson v. Brandenburg'8 for
the reason that, while sound in theory, it is difficult to apply, since there
is frequently no satisfactory means of ascertaining the exact moment
at which an executive approves a given statute. In the Parkinson case,
the court held that the law in question would take effect at the begin-
ning of the day following its approval. The statute stated that it would
take effect "from and after its passage."
As to the solutions mentioned here and their respective merits, it can
easily be seen that all have their shortcomings. The general rule and
the Parkinson rule adopt presumptions as to the time when the statute
took effect which admittedly are not correct, technically speaking. They
do, however, provide measuring points which can be ascertained easily
and positively, arbitrary though they be. The measuring point which
the court professes to use in the principal case, while technically cor-
rect, is, as noted above, often impossible to determine exactly. Never-
theless, the court in the principal case shows a commendable willingness
to receive any available evidence as to the actual time of the passage
"Arrowsmith v. Hamering, 39 Ohio St. 573 (1883).
"People ex rel. Campbell v. Clark, 1 Cal. 406 (1851).
"Ibid.; cf. Township of Louisville v. Portsmouth Savings Bank, 104 U. S.
469 (1881), where the time of adoption of a constitutional provision by the voters
was decided to be the hour at which the polls closed.
" Moree v. State, 130 Miss. 341, 94 So. 226 (1922) ; cf. West v. State. 120
Tex. Crim. Rep. 280, 47 S. W. 2d 324 (1932); Monroe Loan Society of N. H.
v. Nute, 88 N. H. 13, 183 Atl. 703 (1932). Cf. Burgess v. Salmon, 97 U. S. 381(1878), where the Court refused to hold that an act which increased the tax on
tobacco sold was applicable during the entire day of its passage when it was ad-
mitted that plaintiff sold his tobacco before the statute was approved. The Court
said that since a criminal punishment (fine or imprisonment) was provided forfailure to pay the tax, it would, in effect, be subjecting plaintiff to the operation
of an ex post facto law if it held this law in effect from the first moment of the
day of its passage.
" 35 Minn. 294, 28 N. W. 919 (1886) ; accord, O'Connor v. City of Fond du
Lac, 109 Wis. 253, 85 N. W. 327 (1901); Mushel v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 152 Minn.
226, 188 N. W. 555 (1922). However, in the Mushel case, the court said that
the Parkinson rule was against the weight of authority.
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of the act in question, when circumstances warrant the receiving of such
evidence. Although this may never be established to the last second,
such hair-splitting is not always necessary in order to do justice. Fre-
quently, a showing that an act was approved in the morning or afternoon,
or before or after a certain hour, may be sufficient to establish the actual
priority of the events in question, 19 and thus lead to a verdict based
upon fact rather than presumption.
Finally, it is submitted that this was a proper case for the disregard-
ing of the general rule; that since the court properly placed upon the
Commonwealth the burden of proving that the statute was actually in
effect at the time of decedent's death, the court acted correctly in refusing
to apply the presumption of the general rule in the absence of any evi-
dence from the Commonwealth that the statute had been passed before
decedent's death.
BENNETT H. PERRY, JR.
Constitutional Law-Validity of Penalties Imposed by States on In-
terstate Carriers for Violation of Weight and Size Regulations
Extensive use of the public highways by intrastate and interstate
trucking has caused states to resort to regulation of weights and sizes of
trucks.' With the enactment of such legislation, both before and after
Congress acted on the subject, courts have been faced with two prob-
lems: (1) whether a state in the exercise of its police power can regu-
late interstate carriers, and (2) what penalties a state may impose on an
interstate carrier for violation of the state regulation.
In 1924, Mr. Justice Brandeis, in Buck v. Kitykendall,2 declared that
it' re Dreyfous, 28 Abb. N. Cas. 27, 18 N. Y. Supp. 767 (1892), is quite sim-
ilar to the principal case. A proceeding was brought to impose a tax of 1 per cent
on property bequeathed to the wife of deceased. The act under which the tax
was levied was approved on 20 April, 1891, after 8 o'clock. The decedent died
before 8 o'clock. It was held that the tax did not apply, since decedent's death
occurred before the passage of the act.
1 ALA. CODE tit. 36 §§ 89-94 (1940) ; IOWA CODE ANN. c. 321, §§ 321.452-321.481
(1949) ; N. C. GEN. SrAT. §§ 20-116, 20-118 (1953) ; N. Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFmC
LAW § 14; OHIO. REv. CODE c. 4513 (1954). Every state has enacted either
similar legislation or legislation accomplishing the same result.
2 267 U. S. 307, 315-316 (1924). Plaintiff desired to operate an auto stage
line exclusively in interstate commerce, from a city in one state to a city in
another. Oregon granted him a license, but Washington refused, saying the terri-
tory had been filled. In an action, to enjoin enforcement of the applicable Wash-
ington law, the Court declared the state action unconstitutional, saying, "Its pri-
mary purpose is not regulation with a view to safety or to conservation of the
highways, but the prohibition of competition. It determines, not the manner of
use, but the persons by whom the highways may be used. . . . Its effect upon
such commerce is not merely to burden, but to obstruct it. Such action is for-
bidden by the Commerce Clause." (It should be noted that this was before any
federal legislation on the subject of carriers in interstate commerce.) This has
been precedent for all subsequent cases where there has been the possibility of
discriminating against interstate commerce. See also: George W. Bush & Sons Co.
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a state could not discriminate against interstate carriers, and later in.
Morris v. Duby,3 the Supreme Court set forth generally, what a state
might do by saying, "An examination of the acts of Congress discloses
no provision, express or implied, by which there is withheld from the
state its ordinary police power to conserve the highways in the interest
of the public and to prescribe such reasonable regulations for their use
as may be wise to prevent injury and damage to them. In the absence
of national legislation, especially covering the subject of interstate com-
merce, the state may rightly prescribe uniform regulations adapted to
promote safety upon its highways and the conservation of their use, ap-
plicable alike to vehicles moving in interstate commerce and those of its
own citizens."
With the passage of the Federal Motor Carrier Act of 1935,4 the
question arose to to whether this national legislation preEmpted the field
from state regulation of weights and sizes of interstate trucks. Stateo
v. Maloy, 267 U. S. 317, 324-325 (1925). The Court there said: "The State
action in the Buck case was held to be unconstitutional not because the statute
prescribed an arbitrary test for the granting of permits, or because the director
of Public Works had exercised the power conferred arbitrarily or unreasonably,
but because the statute, as construed and applied, invaded a field reserved by the
Commerce Clause for federal regulation."
1274 U. S. 135, 143 (1927). (Action by motor carrier to restrain Oregon
officials from enforcing a highway commission order reducing maximum load
from 22,000 pounds to 16,500 pounds. The Court held that although the order
prevented competition, since the carrier could not caru. as much, such a considera-
tion was outweighed when competent authority deemed such weight injurious to
the highway for the use by the general public and unduly increased the cost of
maintenance and repair. The only way to attack this state action was to show
that it was arbitrary and unreasonable.) In Sproles v. Binford, 286 U. S. 374,
388-389 (1932) where carrier sought to restrain Texas state officials from enforcing
the weight and size limitations of the Motor Vehicle Act, the Court held the
statute constitutional, saying, "In exercising its authority over its highways, the
state is not limited to the raising of revenue for maintenance and reconstruction,
or to regulations as to the manner in which vehicles shall be operated, but the
state may also prevent the wear and hazards due to excessive size of vehicles
and weight of load. Limitations of tize and weight are manifestly subjects within
the broad range of legislative discretion. To make scientific precision a criterion of
constitutional power would be to subject the state to an intolerable supervision
hostile to the basic principles of our government and wholly beyond the protection
which the general clause of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to secure. When
the subject lies within the police power of the state, debatable questions as to
reasonableness are not for the cQurts but for the legislature, which is entitled to
form its own judgment, and its action within its range of discretion cannot be set
aside because compliance is burdensome." Plaintiff said this was unconstitutional
class legislation because passenger travel was treated differently, but the Court held
that the peculiar importance of transportation for persons to provide communities
with resources, both of employment and recreation, along with educational and
social interests, were sufficient to support this classification.
'49 STAT. 543, 49 U. S. C. § 301, et seq. (Supp. 1935), as amended, 54 STAT.
919 (1940), 49 U. S. C. § 301, et seq. (1952).
, Whitney v. Fife, 270 Ky. 434, 109 S. W. 2d 832 (1937) (Writ of prohibition
to restrain judge from issuing warrants of arrest and prosecuting plaintiffs for
violation of the weight limit law); Smithart v. State, 133 Tex. Crim. Rep. 145,
109 S. W. 2d 207 (1937) ; Johnson v. State, 133 Tex. Crim. Rep. 144, 109 S. W. 2d
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and federal courts,6 when confronted with the problem, held that it did
not. In 1938, the Supreme Court decided, in South Carolina Highway
Dept. v. Barnwell Bros. Inc.,7 that such state legislation was a proper
exercise of the police power. In reviewing the history of Section 225
of the federal act of 1935,8 concerning weights and sizes, the Court in,
Maurer v. Hamilton,9 declared that since Congress had not specifically
207 (1937) ; Morrison v. State, 133 Tex. Crim. Rep. 141, 109 S. W. 2d 205 (1937)
(where truck driver appealed from the imposition of a fine for violating the weight
load regulation).
'Werner Transportation Co. v. Hughes, 19 F. Supp. 425, 432 (N. D. Ill.
1937) (Suit by motor carriers to restrain Secretary of State of Illinois from en-
forcing state weight load limitations. The court, in denying the injunction, said:
"While of course, a state may not discriminate against interstate commerce in the
absence of national legislation, especially covering the subject, the state may rightly
prescribe uniform regulations adapted to promote safety upon its highways and
the conservation of their use, applicable alike to vehicles moving in interstate com-
merce and those of its own citizens." The fact that surrounding states had a
higher weight limit did not mean that the statute imposed an unreasonable burden
upon interstate commerce.).
1303 U. S. 177, 189-190, rehearing denied, 303 U. S. 667 (1938). Plaintiffs
sought to restrain state officials from enforcing the weight and size statute of South
Carolina contending that it violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, had been superseded by federal legislation, and imposed an unconsti-
tutional burden on interstate commerce. The South Carolina statute prescribed
a maximum width for vehicles of 90 inches, whereas other states normally allowed
96 inches. The Court reversed the district court's holding that this statute ex-
cessively burdened interstate commerce, saying, "so long as the state action does
not discriminate, the burden is one which the Constitution permits because it is
an inseparable incident of the exercise of a legislative authority, which, under the
Constitution, has been left to the states. . . . In the absence of such legislation
[Congressional] the judicial function, under the Commerce Clause as well as the
Fourteenth Amendment, stops with the inquiry whether the state legislature in
adopting regulations such as the present has acted within its province, and whether
the means of regulation chosen, are reasonably adapted to the end sought."
' Originally, at the time of Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U. S. 598 (1940), this
was section_225 of the Federal Motor Carrier Act. Substantially unchanged, today
it is in Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U. S. C. § 325, and reads: "The
Commission is authorized to investigate and report on the need for federal regula-
tion of the sizes and weight of motor vehicles and combinations of motor vehicles
and of the qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees of all motor
carriers and private carriers of property by motor vehicle and in such investiga-
tion the Commission shall avail itself of the assistance of all departments and
bureaus of the Government and of any organization of motor carriers having
special knowledge of any such matter."
' 309 U. S. 598 (1940). Plaintiffs, carriers of new autos by motortruck, sought
to restrain enforcement of Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code, contending the fed-
eral legislation superseded this state act. The Court interpreted Section 225 as
creating strictly an investigatory power and, without clear and specific legislation
on the subject, power to regulate was reserved to the states. Many cases have
followed this interpretation, and it stands today: Lattavo Bros., Inc. v. Hudock,
119 F. Suop. 587, 589 (W. D. Pa. 1953), aff'd, 347 U. S. 910 (1954) (Plaintiff
sought injunction restraining public official from enforcing weight limitations of
Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code, by which plaintiff was detained and required to
remove his excess load, and arrested with requirement to pay fine. In denying the
injunction, the court said, "It is no longer open to dispute that a state in the
exercise of its police power and in the absence of Congressional action, may impose
reasonable restrictions upon the weight and size of vehicles which travel over its
highways, equally applicable to intrastate and interstate commerce, without running
afoul of the Commerce or Due Process Clause. . . ." [emphasis supplied]);
Whitney v. Johnson, 37 F. Supp. 65 (E. D. Ky. 1941) (interstate motor carriers
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provided for regulation, the power was thereby reserved to the states.
This section has remained substantially unchanged, and without further
act of Congress, it is well established today that states may regulate the
weights and sizes of interstate carriers.
However, by the recent decision of Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines,
Inc.,1° a case involving penalties which may be imposed on interstate
were denied injunction to restrain enforcement of weight law); Philadelphia-
Detroit Lines, Inc. v. Simpson, 37 F. Supp. 314 (S. D. W. Va. 1940), aff'd, 312
U. S. 655 (1941) (Carrier of autos sought injunction retraining enforcement of
weight and size laws and was denied) ; Darnall Trucking Co. v. H. Simpson, 122
W. Va. 656, 12 S. E. 2d 5i6, appeal dismissed, 313 U. S. 549 (1940).
10 348 U. S. 61, 64 (1954). In this case an interstate carrier, operating under
a certificate of convenience and necessity from the ICC, and from the state agency,
sought to enjoin state authorities from enforcing the state regulation provided for
the suspension of the carrier's right to use the highways for ninety days, or one
year for habitual violators, on the ground that such an enforcement measure con-
flicted with the Federal Motor Carrier Act. The Supreme Court of Illinois, in
Hayes Freight Lines, Inc. v. Castle, 2 Ill. 2d 58, 117 N. E. 2d 106 (1954), de-
clared that the penalty could not be imposed on interstate operators, but could be
imposed on intrastate operators. The U. S. Supreme Court affirmed, the sub-
stance of the reasoning being, that since the Federal Motor Carrier Act is all em-
bracing with regard to issuance and suspension of certificates of public convenience
and necessity "it would be odd if a state could take action amounting to a sus-
pension or revocation of an interstate carrier's commission granted right to operate."
As to whether the public interest requiring safe hiighways necessitates the sus-
pension of right to use the highways for habitual violators of the weight limit,
quaere.
It appears that a state may impose many burdens on interstate carriers without
fatally obstructing interstate commerce: In Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. Wood,
344 U. S. 157, 162 (1952), rehearing denied, 345 U. S. 913 (1953), an Arkansas
statute requiring interstate as well as intrastate carriers to obtain a permit, was
held constitutional. Mr. Justice Black there said: "In this situation our prior cases
make clear that a state can regulate so long as no undue burden is imposed on
interstate commerce and that a mere requirement for a permit is not such a burden.
It will be time enough to consider apprehended burdensome conditions when and
if the state attempts to enforce them." (Emphasis supplied.) But the Court said
the state had no discretionary right to refuse the permit to the interstate carrier.
For other examples see: Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Bd. of R. R. Commis-
sioners, 332 U. S. 495 (1947) (annual state tax levied on interstate carriers for use
of highways allowed) ; California v. Thompson, 313 U. S. 109, 116 (1941) (A
California statute required every transportation agent to procure a license from
the state Railroad Commission, to pay a license fee, and to file a bond. The
Court said: "If there is authority in the state, in the exercise of its police power,
to adopt such regulations affecting interstate transportation, it must be deemed
to possess the power to regulate the negotiations for such transportation where they
affect matters of local concern which are in other respects within state regulatory
power, and where the regulation does not infringe the national interest in maintain-
ing the free flow of commerce and in preserving uniformity in the regulation of the
commerce in matters of national concern.") ; Eichholz v. Public Service Commis-
sion, 306 U. S. 268 (1939) (an interstate motor carrier's practice of hauling mer-
chandise, consizned from St. Louis, Missouri, to persons in Kansas City, Missouri,
over the state line to Kansas City, Kansas, and then back to its intended destina-
tion in Missouri, was a mere subterfuge to evade permit requirements of Missouri,
and the state could require that he obtain a permit.) ; H. P. Welch Co. v. New
Hampshire, 306 U. S. 79 (1939) (before Federal Motor Carrier Act's effective
date, state law limited hours of duty for drivers) ; Clark v. Poor, 274 U. S. 554
(1927) (carrier required to procure certificate and pay a tax for use of high-
ways) : Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 160 (1916) (licensing and registration) ;
Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610 (1915) (licensing and registration required
of non-resident operators) ; Dobrn Transfer Co. v. Hoegh, 116 F. Supp. 177 (S. D.
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carriers for violating these weight and size regulations, Mr. Justice Black
said that although regulation by states was not of itself invalid, a state
could not prohibit an interstate carrier from using the highways, even
though the carrier had habitually violated the state law. His language
was, "We are not persuaded . . . that the conventional forms of pun-
ishment are inadequate to protect states from overweighted or improperly
loaded motor trucks." No indication was given as to what specific
penalties a state could validly enforce, but the Court did point out that
since the Interstate Commerce Commission could revoke certificates of
motor carriers which willfully refuse to comply with any lawful regula-
tion of the Commission, and a Commission regulation requires that motor
carriers abide by valid state highway regulations, relief to suspend a
carrier would be through the Interstate Commerce Commission.
Before this decision, states had resorted to various methods to en-
force their weight and size regulations. A very common one was allow-
ing peace officers to weigh interstate vehicles, and upon finding them
overloaded, require the removal of the excess weight.1 Also, the driver
could be arrested and the owner fined.12  Injunctive relief13 could be
sought to force a carrier to comply with state regulations, and finally,
Iowa 1953) (state may condition use of highway by requiring a fee to maintain
it) ; State v. Nagle, 148 Me. 197, 91 A. 2d 397 (1952) (license or permit) ; Coun-
cil Bluffs Transit Co. v. City of Omaha, 154 Neb. 717, 49 N. W. 2d 453 (1951)
(city ordinance routing interstate traffic) ; McClean Trucking Co. v. City of New
York, 116 N. Y. S. 2d 292 (1952) (city motor use tax pursuant to statutory
authorization) ; Arrow Carrier Corp. v. Traffic Commission of City of New York,
99 N. Y. S. 2d 138 (1950) (routing traffic in city) ; Ex parte Truelock, 139 Tex.
Crim. Rep. 365, 140 S. W. 2d 167 (1940) (requiring a certificate of public con-
venience and necessity).
"ALA. CODE, tit. 36, § 85 (1940); IOWA CODE ANN. c. 321, § 321A65 (1949);
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 20-118.1 (1953); OHIO Ray. CODE § 4513.33 (1954). Most
of these statutes are very similar and read like the North Carolina statute, supra:
"Any peace officer having reason to believe that the weight of a vehicle and load
is unlawful is authorized to weigh the same either by means of portable or station-
ary scales, and may require that such vehicle be driven to the nearest scales in
event such scales are within 2 miles. The officer may then require the driver
to unload immediately such portion of the load as may be necessary to decrease the
gross weight of such vehicle to the maximum therefor specified in this article.
All material so unloaded shall be cared for by the owner or operator of such
vehicle at the risk of such owner or operator. Any person who refuses to permit
a vehicle being operated by him to be weighed as in this section provided or who
refuses to drive said vehicle upon the scales provided for weighng for the purpose
of being weighed, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."
"ALA. CODE tit. 36, § 83 (1940) ; IOWA CODE ANN. c. 321, §§ 321A77, 321.482
(1949); N. C. GEN. STAT. § 20-176, 20-118(1) (1953); N. Y. VEHICLE AND
TRAwFIc LAW § 70 (1952); OHIo Ray. CODE § 4513.99 (1954). It should be
noted that these are typical provisions for enforcement although the manner of
arriving at the penalty differs in the various states. North Carolina imposes a fine
proportionate to amount of overload, others base the fine on the number of
offenses committed, and others provide still other methods.
" N. C. GEN. STAT. § 62-121.34 (1950). This is part of the N. C. Motor
Truck Act of 1947.
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an action for damages14 against the carrier could be brought by the
government official in charge. These methods are still widely used,
and the Supreme Court decision' 5 apparently does not encompass them
in its prohibition. But, when the penalty imposed results in a complete
obstruction of interstate commerce, as in the Hayes Freight Lines case,1
by suspending the carrier's right to use the highways of the state, the
courts will strike the penalty. However, in the twilight area of balancing
the state's interest in the safety and maintenance of its highways, against
the national interest in protecting the free flow of interstate commerce,
the Supreme Court will probably uphold reasonable state regulations
which fall short of preventing interstate commerce. This conclusion
would seem to follow from the provision' 7 in many state statutes for a
construction not in conflict with federal legislation or the Constitution.
Louis A. BLEDSOE, JR.
Labor Law-Railway Labor Act-Federal-State Conflict Over Union
Shop
In 1951 Congress amended the Railway Labor Act' to permit car-
riers and the union representative of their employees to enter into
"union shop" agreements 2 under certain conditions. The amendment
specifically states the agreements may be entered into "nothwithstanding
any other provisions of the Act, or of any other statute or law of the
United States or territory thereof, or any state."3 The problem is thus
"' IowA CoDE ANN. c. 321, § 321.475 (1949). In such case the superintendent
of Public Works sues the owner of the vehicle for the damages the vehicle does
to the highway, and the recovery goes to the highway fund.
Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., 348 U. S. 61 (1954).
16 Ibid.1 ALA. CODE, tit. 48, § 28 (1940) ; N. C. GEN. STAT. § 62-121.39 (1950). The
North Carolina statute reads: "(1) This article shall apply to persons and ve-
hicles engaged in interstate commerce over the highways of this state and the
Commission may, in its discretion, require such carriers to file with it copies of
their respective interstate authority, registration of their vehicles operated in this
State, and the observance of such reasonable rules and regulations as the Commis-
mission may deem advisable in the administration of this article and for the pro-
tection of persons and property upon the highways of the State, except insofar as
the provisions of this article may be inconsistent with, or shall contravene, the
Constitution and laws of the U. S. (2) The Commission or its authorized repre-
sentative is authorized to confer with and hold joint hearings with the authorities
of other states or with the Interstate Commerce Commission or its representatives
in connection with any matter arising under this article, or under the Federal
Motor Carrier Act which may directly or indirectly affect the interests of the
people of this state or the transportation policy declared by this article of the Inter-
state Commerce Act."
'64 STAT. 1238, 45 U. S. C., § 152 (eleventh) (1951).
2 "Union shop" agreements permitted by the Act are agreements requiring, as
a condition of continued employment, that within 60 days following the beginning
of such employment, or of the effective date of such agreements, whichever is later,
all employees shall become members of the labor organization representing their
craft or class.
'64 STAT. 1238, 45 U. S. C., § 152 (eleventh) (1951).
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presented: What effect will the amendment have in those states, as
North Carolina, which have "Right-to-Work" laws4 or constitutional
provisions, which in substance outlaw the union shop contract?
There have been several lower court decisions on the problem and
from these cases two principal questions have emerged: (1) is the amend-
ment a constitutional exercise of the commerce power by Congress, and
(2) has it pre-empted the field to be regulated and thus superseded
state laws on the subject? Three lower state court cases ruling on these
and related questions have reached divergent results, with two de-
cisions5 upholding the constitutional validity of the amendment, while
a third case0 questioned its constitutionality and held that, irrespective
of this issue, the state constitutional prohibition against union shop agree-
ments was not so inconsistent with the federal law as to be superseded. 7
'The North Carolina "Right to Work" statute is G. S. §§ 95-78 to 95-84(1950). By the statute any agreement between the employer and a labor organiza-
tion whereby membership in the labor organization is made a condition of employ-
ment is declared to be against public policy of the state, and an illegal combination
or conspiracy in restraint of trade. The statute also declares that it is the public
policy of the state that the right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged
on account of membership or non-membership in any labor union or labor organi-
zation or association.
As of 1950, seventeen states and the Territory of Hawaii had enacted statutes
regulating union-security agreements. The following twelve states appear to have
outlawed all forms of union security: Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Iowa,
Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas and
Virginia. Colorado, Kansas, and Wisconsin and the Territory of Hawaii re-
quire certain voting procedures as a condition precedent to the execution of valid
union-security agreements. Colorado, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin
and the Territory of Hawaii specifically outlaw certain kinds of discrimination in
the enforcement of union-security agreements. See MATTHEWS, LABOR RELATIONS
AND THE LAW 484 (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1953). Within the past
year "Right to Work" laws prohibiting union shop agreements have also been
enacted in Alabama, Mississippi, and South Carolina and the Virginia law has been
made more stringent. See 23 U. S. L. WEEK 2103 (Aug. 24, 1954).
'International Association of Machinists v. Sandsberry, 23 U. S. L. WEEK 2229
(Tex. Civ. App., Nov. 23, 1954) reversing 22 U. S. L. WEEK 2370 (Texas, Feb.
16, 1954); and Moore v. Chesapeake and Ohio RV., 23 U. S. L. WEEK 2106
(Va., Richmond Hustings Court, Aug. 31, 1954). Both cases held that the 1951
amendment permitting the union shop contracts was a constitutional exercise of
the commerce power by Congress. The Texas court cited the following cases to
sustain its finding: United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144 (1938) ;
Virginian Ry. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U. S. 515 (1937) ; Brotherhood
of Railroad Shop Crafts v. Lowden, 86 F. 2d 458 (1936) ; and Texas & New
Orleans Rv. v. Brotherhood of Railroad and Steamship Clerks, 281 U. S. 548
(1930). The Virginia court relied on the Virginian Ry. case supra.
'Hanson v. Union Pacific Ry., 22 U. S. L. WEEK 2346 (Neb., Feb. 2, 1954).
The Nebraska court reasoned that the federal act merely permitted such contracts,
while the Nebraska Constitution takes the definite position of forbidding them.
Thus the direct conflict of position, if any, lies between private contracting parties
who determine that such contracts shall be made and the state which has proscribed
them. Under this interpretation, the court concludes that the state law will prevail.
"A North Carolina Superior Court case (Hudson v. Atlantic Coast Line RR,
Tan. 6, 1955. In the Superior Court of New Hanover County, not officially reported)
faced a similar problem when asked to enjoin the operation of a union shop agree-
ment between the carrier and the unions representing its employes. However, in its
findings and conclusions of law, the court did not discuss or even refer to the
1951 amendment to the Railway Labor Act permitting such agreements. Injunc-
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The broad scope of the Commerce power of Congress has been
established since Gibbons v. Ogden,8 and the power has been recognized
to embrace labor relations9 and more specifically the relations of car-
riers and employees subject to the Railway Labor Act.10 This Act was
passed in 1926, and under it union shops were not illegal. However,
company dominated unions began to control the field, and in 1934 or-
ganized labor pressed for federal legislation outlawing the company
union. In response to this request, Congress outlawed the union shop
entirely, irrespective of type." With the disappearance of company
unions and substitution therefor of organized labor unions, the latter
began to press for the repeal of the prohibition against union-shop agree-
ments, and finally succeeded in securing passage of the 1951 amendment.
tion was issued apparently on the grounds that the unions had failed properly to
represent the employees, and had exceeded their authority in negotiating the agree-
ments and that such contracts were contrary to the laws and public policy of the
state. Since there was no consideration given to the Railway Labor Act amend-
ment authorizing such contracts, it is uncertain what the court would have done
if the amendment had been considered, and what the North Carolina Supreme
Court will hold when faced with the problem.
A similar suit was instituted in another Superior Court of North Carolina by
non-union employees of the Southern Railway to enjoin the enforcement of a union-
shop contract. Defendant unions sought removal to the U. S. District Court for
the Western District of North Carolina. A three judge court convened and the
petition for removal was denied and the case remanded since the complaint did not
set forth a cause of action arising under the 1951 amendment or under the Consti-
tution or laws of the United States and thus no federal questions were involved.
In his opinion, Judge Parker said: "The amendment to the Railway Labor Act
of which we take judicial notice must unquestionably be considered in passing upon
the case; but the complaint states no cause of action arising under that statute,
the effect of which is to destroy any cause of action which plaintiff might other-
wise have had under state law.... So long as plaintiff's cause of action does not
arise under the laws of the United States, the case is not removable, even though
when these laws are considered plaintiff has no cause of action and is not entitled
to an injunction. The defendant in such case must rely for protection of his rights
upon action by the state courts, which are just as much bound as are the federal
courts to give effect to the laws of the United States, and in a case involving
these laws are subject to review by the United States Supreme Court." Allen
v. Southern Ry., 114 F. Supp. 72, 73, 75 (W. D. N. C. 1953).
The course of the litigation in the Sandsberry case, supra note 5, presents a
problem similar to that faced by the North Carolina court. See Sandsberry v.
Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry., 114 F. Supp. 834 (N. D. Tex. 1953) where the
case was remanded for lack of a federal question, and International Association
of Machinists v. Sandsberry, 22 U. S. L. WEzK 2370 (Tex., Feb. 16, 1954) where
the union shop agreement was enjoined and the 1951 amendment declared uncon-
stitutional, which decision was reversed by Texas Court of Civil Appeals, 23
U. S. L. WEFx 2229 (Tex., Nov. 23, 1954).
89 Wheat. 1, at 196 (U. S. 1824).
'Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 301 U. S. 1 (1937).10 Virginia Ry. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U. S. 515 (1937).
" "They [the 1934 prohibitions against union shop contracts] were enacted into
law against the background of employer use of these agreements as devices for
establishing and maintaining company unions, thus effectively depriving a substantial
number of employees of their right to collective bargaining. . . . It was because
of this situation that labor organizations agreed to the present statutory prohibition
against union security agreements." SEN. REP. No. 2262, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 2(1950).
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Both the Railway Labor Act of 1926 and the Railway Labor Act of
1934 were upheld by the Supreme Court as valid legislation under the
commerce power soon after the passage of each.' 2 It is thus a matter of
history that union shop agreements have been regulated in the interstate
railroad industry (by section 2, paragraphs fourth and fifth of the Act of
1934) for some seventeen years prior to the enactment of the amend-
inent of 1951. It is also history that the Wagner Act1 3 legislated with
reference to union security agreements for the non-railroad industry in
that section 8 (3) of the Wagner Act did not prohibit union shop agree-
ments, but permitted them, as well as the so-called "closed shop" agree-
ments.14  The constitutionality of the Wagner Act, and specifically of
section 8, was upheld in Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. N. L. R. B.'5
If the provisions of the Wagner Act under. which the even more re-
strictive "closed shop" contract could be entered into were constitutional,
then it seems that section 2, paragraph eleventh, of the Railway Labor
Act (the 1951 amendment), permitting "union shop" contracts would be
valid. Throughout the period of the operation of the Wagner Act, the
Supreme Court did not question the constitutionality of the closed shop
proviso of the Act.'0 In 1947 Congress amended the Wagner Act by
enacting the "Taft-Hartley" amendments.' 7  At that time the subject
of union shop agreements was thoroughly reviewed, and Congress re-
stricted, but did not eliminate, the right of unions and employers to in-
clude union shop provisions in their contracts. The proviso of section
8 (a) (3)18 of Taft-Hartley allowed union shop agreements on specified
2 Texas & New Orleans Ry. v. Brotherhood of Railroad and Steamship Clerks,
281 U. S. 548 (1930) ; and Virginian Ry. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U. S.
515 (1937). Note also that in Brotherhood of Railroad Shop Crafts v. Lowden,
86 F. 2d 458 (10th Cir. 1936) the court held the Congressional prohibition of
check-off contracts contained in Section 2, fourth, of the Railway Labor Act of
1934 was a valid regulation under the commerce clause.
1 49 STAT. 449, 29 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. (1935).
"'Under "closed .shop" agreements, the employer contracts not to hire anyone
except members of the appropriate union, and to to discharge any employee who
does not remain a union member in good standing throughout the life of the agree-
ment. See MATTHEWS, LABOR RELATIONS AND THE LAW 447 (Boston: Little,
Brown and Co., 1953).
15 301 U. S. 1 (1937).
" In Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co. v. N. L. R. B., 338 U. S. 355 (1949) the
Court enforced a closed shop contract executed pursuant to the authority of the
Wagner Act and said "Congress knew that a closed shop would interfere with
the freedom of employees to organize in another union and would, if used, lead
inevitably to discrimination in tenure of employment. Nevertheless, with full
realization that there was a limitation by the proviso of section 8 (3) upon the
freedom of section 7 [section guaranteeing right of self-organization and right
to join union of choicel, Congress inserted the proviso of section 8 (3). It is
not necessary for us to justify the policy of Congress. It is enough that we find
it in the statute." Id. at 362-363.
1 61 STAT. 136, 29 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. (1947) (Labor-Management-Relations
Act).
"8 The section provides inter alia "that nothing in this Act, or in any other
statute of the United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agree-
ment with a labor organization (not established, maintained, or assisted by any
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conditions and is substantially similar to the union shop proviso of the
1951 amendment to the Railway Labor Act. The Court in Radio
Officers Union, C. T. U. v. N. L. R. B.19 did not question last year the
validity of the union shop proviso of section 8 (a) (3) as a proper
regulation by Congress under the commerce power. The Court has not
indicated that the Wagner or Taft-Hartley union shop provisions were
invalid; rather the Court has indicated that it is a problem over which
reasonable men will differ and over which Congress is to legislate.20
Since the question is "at least debatable" 21 whether union shop agree-
ments in the interstate railroad and airline industry should be left un-
regulated, restricted, or wholly prohibited, Congress may legislate on
the subject, and the courts may not re-evaluate the judgment of Congress
and strike down the legislation on the grounds that it was not in their
opinion wise or reasonable.
Assuming, then, the 1951 amendment to be a valid exercise of the
commerce power by Congress, does the amendment represent a pre-
emption of the field and supersede state legislation on the subject? Two
of the three lower court decisions held that it did, in ruling on this and
related problems.2 2
action defined in Section 8 (a) of this Act as an unfair labor practice) to require
as a condition of employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day fol-
lowing the beginning of such employment or the effective date of such agreement,
whichever is the later ..
"347 U. S. 17 (1954).
20 See Radio Officers' Union, C. T. U. v. N. L. R. B., 347 U. S. 17, 41 (1954):
In enacting the Taft-Hartley union-shop amendment which is similar to the
Railway Labor Act union-shop amendment, "Congress recognized the validity of
the union's concern about 'free riders,' i.e., employees who receive the benefits of
union represenation but are unwilling to contribute their share of financial support
to such union, and gave the unions power to contract to meet that problem while
withholding from unions the power to cause the discharge of employees for any
other reason."
21 The problem of whether Congress should permit union shop agreements or
prohibit them altogether is similar to the problem the Court faced in United States
v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144 (1938), as to whether Congress might
prohibit the shipment of filled milk in interstate commerce. There the Court said
the question is at least debatable whether commerce in filled milk should be left
unregulated, or in some measure restricted or wholly prohibited, and as that de-
cision was for Congress, the court's decision could not be substituted for it.
-" International Association of Machinists v. Sandsberry, 23 U, S. L. WEEK
2229 (Texas, Nov. 23, 1954) and Moore v. Chesapeake and Ohio Ry., 23 U. S. L.
WEEK 2106 (Va., Aug. 31, 1954).
Other objections raised and ruled against by both courts included the con-
tention that the 1951 amendment deprived non-union workers of rights guaranteed
by the Bill of Rights. The Texas court said the agreement was between private
parties and did not represent governmental action to which the Bill of Rights ap-
plied. Both courts noted a recent case, Otten v. Baltimore & Ohio Ry., 205 F. 2d
58 (1953), in which Chief Jude Learned Hand said that an argument to the
effect that the 1951 amendment deprived an employee of right of religious liberty
guaranteed under the first amendment did not even raise a substantial question.
The Virginia court pointed out that whenever one becomes the employee of another,
he does so by virtue of his contract, and while he has an absolute right to quit
or work as he may see fit, his remaining rights are governed by all lawful con-
ditions of the contract.
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In previous labor relations cases, 23 the Supreme Court has upheld the
power of Congress to supersede state legislation in a field subject to
its regulation, and found that it does so when it enacts specific governing
legislation. It is also the general rule that whether Congress has pre-
empted the field and made the state law inapplicable is to be determined
by the intention of Congress.24
The intention of Congress that the 1951 amendment should prevail
over state legislation on the subject seems manifest in the language of
the statute itself. While under the Wagner Act and Taft-Hartley
amendments reference to state laws was omitted in the union shop pro-
visos [and under Taft-Hartley, by section 14 (b) a proviso was in-
serted that union shop agreements were not authorized in states which
bad laws to the contrary], section 2, paragraph eleventh, of the Railway
Labor Act (the 1951 amendment) expressly states, "notwithstanding
.. any statute or lawv... of any state... to the contrary," the carrier
and the union may make union shop agreements. There is no proviso,
as 14 (b) of Taft-Hartley, which makes the authorization of union shop
contracts inapplicable in states with laws to the contrary; rather, the
language is express and plain that the amendment shall prevail in such
instances. The reports of the Committees of the House and Senate are
likewise clear that the amendment was intended to supersede state regu-
Examining the 1951 amendment more specifically the Virginia court held the
act valid against the following objections: (1) That there was no "regulation"
within the meaning of the commerce clause. The Court pointed out that para-
graphs fqurth and fifth of the Act, which prohibit the carrier from requiring em-
ployees to join a labor organization as a condition of employment are regulatory,
and paragraph eleventh (the 1951 amendment) recites a special situation in which
paragraphs fourth and fifth are suspended. The Court concluded that when viewed
in the light of creating an exception to a given regulation, while the language is
permissive in a sense, it is regulatory in its character. (2) That there had been a
delegation of legislative power. The court answered this by stating that Congress
had spelled out a definite standard and left no discretion to the contracting parties.
(3) That the amendment discriminated against "non-operating" employees (those
who are not involved in actual operation of the trains, as yard and shop workmen)
of the carriers. Under the amendment "operating" employees are deemed to have
met the requirements of union membership if they belong to any one labor
organization, while "non-operating" employees are required to be members of the
labor organization which is the bargaining representative of their craft. The
court said that this was a proper classification of the subject to be regulated by
Congress, and noted that the Congressional committee hearings demonstrated that
the application of the "union-shop" section to "operating employees" would have
resulted in chaotic administrative situations, because they shuttle back and forth
from one craft to another, while no such situation prevails among non-operating
employees.
"
3International Union, U. A. W. v. O'Brien, 339 U. S. 454 (1954); Garner v.
Teamsters Union, 346 U. S. 485 (1954) ; Amalgamated Association v. Wisconsin
Employ. Bd., 340 U. S. 383 (1951).
2 Allen Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Employ. Bd., 315 U. S. 740 (1942) ; United
States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100 (1941). Also see Algoma Plywood Co. v. Wis-
consin Employ. Bd., 336 U. S. 310 (1949) in which the union-shop proviso of the
original Wagner Act was involved.
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lation on the subject.2 5 And, as was noted by the Virginia court in the
Chesapeake and Ohio case, attempts by Congressmen and Senators to
amend the section to make it inoperative in those states which have the
"Right to Work" laws were defeated by large majorities.2 6
The conclusion is rather inevitable that the patent intent of Congress
was that the 1951 amendment should prevail over any state laws to the
contrary. The trend of decisions surveyed here has been to recognize
that conclusion and to apply the amendment in spite of laws of the state
prohibiting union shop agreements. Whether to permit union shop con-
tracts, and how to regulate them, is.a problem to which neither the
states nor Congress have found a clear-cut, definitive solution, and the
states and Congress have taken varying positions with respect to it over
a period of years. Undoubtedly there will be further legislation on the
subject in the future.2 T Until there is further legislation, the 1951
amendment is the law of the land, and state "Right to Work" laws in
conflict must yield to the Congressional Act.
28
JAMES ALBERT HousE, JR.
Adverse Possession-Intent as a Requisite in Mistaken Boundary
Cases
In a recent Texas case,' the court, in denying defendant's claim of
title by adverse possession, reaffirmed the Texas rule as regards the in-
tent necessary to acquire title by adverse possession in cases where there
2' "It will be noted that the proposed paragraph eleventh would authorize agree-
ments notwithstanding the laws of any state. For the following reasons, among
others, it is the view of the committee, that if, as a matter of national policy such
agreements are to be permitted in the railroad industries it would be wholly im-
practicable and unworkable for the various states to regulate such agreements.
Railroads and airlines are direct instrumentalities of interstate commerce; the
Railway Labor Act requires collective bargaining on a system-wide basis; agree-
ments are uniformly negotiated for an entire railroad system and regulates the
rates of pay, rules of working conditions of employees in many states, the duties
of many employees require the constant crossing of state lines; many seniority
districts under labor agreements extend across state lines, and in the exercise of
their seniority rights employees are frequently required to move from one state
to anothe:.' H. R. REP. No. 2811, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1950).
The Senate Committee report stated that there was no disagreement that the
right of unions generally in industry to enter into union shop contracts should be
extended to labor organizations subject to the Railway Labor Act; but three
members of the Committee reserved the right to introduce and support amend-
ments on the floor, premised on asserted differencs between the provisions of the
amendment and corresponding provisions of Taft-Hartley. The majority felt
that the terms of the two Acts were substantially the same, and "such differences
as exist are warranted either by experience or by special conditions existing among
employees of our railroads and airlines." SEN. REP. No. 2262., 2d Sess. 3 (1950).
2 See 96 CoNG. REc. 536 (1951).
27 For varying state and federal legislation on the subject, see MATTHEWS,
LABOR RELATIONS AND THE LAW 475 et seq. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co.,
1953).
" See discussion of Allen v. Southern Ry., 114 F. Supp. 72 (W. D. N. C. 1953),
note 7 supra.
'Orlando v. Moore, 274 S. W. 2d 86 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
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is a mistake in the boundary line between two adjacent landowners.
The court said:
"Where one of two adjacent landowners extends his fence,
through mere inadvertence or ignorance of the location of the
true boundary line, so as to embrace within his enclosure lands
belonging to his neighbor, with no intent of claiming such ex-
tended area, but with intent of claiming adversely only to the true
boundary line, wherever it may be, his possession of such ex-
tended area is not adverse or hostile to the true owner."2
The courts are in sharp disagreement as to the requisite intent neces-
sary to acquire title through adverse possession. The purpose here is
to compare the several rules applied, with particular emphasis on North
Carolina decisions, in order to arrive at the most practical solution to
this frequently occurring problem of boundary disputes.
The leading case of French v. Pearce3 laid down the rule that the
visible possession, with intent to possess, is the controlling factor.
Whether the possession is with intent to disseize the owner or is merely
under a mistake of ownership is immaterial. So long as the possessor
holds the land as his own, he may acquire the fee through adverse pos-
session. This view seems to be followed in the majority of jurisdic-
tions.4
A second view, as stated in the early Iowa case of Grube v. Wells,5
requires the possession to be consciously hostile before a possessor may
acquire title by adverse possession. Under this view, unless the posses-
sor knows that he is holding adversely and intends to do so, his posses-
2 Id. at 89.
38 Conn. 439, 21 Am. Dec. 680 (1831).
' Milstead v. Devine, 254 Ala. 442, 48 So. 2d 530 (1950) ; Park v. Powers, 2 Cal.
2d 590, 42 P. 2d 75 (1935) ; Vade v. Suhler, 118 Colo. 236, 195 P. 2d 390 (1921) ;
Searles v. DeLadson, 81 Conn. 133, 70 Atl. 589 (1890) ; Manuel v. Barley Mill
Road Home, 104 A. 2d 908 (Del. 1954); Bridges v. Brackett, 205 Ga. 637, 54
S. E. 2d 642 (1949) ; Calkins v. Kausouros, 72 Idaho 150, 237 P. 2d 1053 (1951) ;
Cooper v. Tarpley, 112 Ind. App. 1, 41 N. E. 2d 640 (1942) ; Sattler v. Pellichino,
71 So. 2d 689 (La. 1954); Hub Bel Air v. Hirsch, 203 Md. 637, 102 A. 2d 550(1954); Locks and Canals v. Nashua and L. R. Co., 104 Mass. 1 (1870); May
v. Maurer, 339 Mich. 115, 62 N. W. 2d 455 (1954) ; Fredericksen v. Henke, 167
Minn. 356, 209 N. W. 257 (1926) ; Alexander v. Hyland, 214 Miss. 348, 58 So. 2d
826 (1952) ; State ex- rel. Edie v. Sham, 348 Mo. 119, 152 S. W. 2d 174 (1941) ;
Carman v. Hewitt, 105 N. Y. S. 2d 239 (Sup. Ct. 1951) ; Hallow~ell v. Borchers,
150 Neb. 322, 34 N. W. 2d 404 (1948) ; Yetzer v. Thoman, 17 Ohio St. 130,
91 Am. Dec. 122 (1866); Johnson v. Whelan, 186 Okla. 511, 98 P. 2d 1103(1940) ; Liberto v. Steele, 188 Tenn. 529, 221 S. W. 2d 701 (1949) ; Menzer v.
Tracy, 247 Wis. 245, 19 N. W. 2d 257 (1945) ; Rock Springs v. Sturm, 39 Wyo.
49_4, 273 Pac. 908 (1929). In Patterson v. Wilmont, 245 S. W. 2d 116, 121 (Mo.1952), the court said: "It is not necessary that he intend to take away from the
owner something which he knows belongs to another, or even that he be indiffer-
ent as to the facts of the legal title. It is the intent to possess, and not the intent
to take irrespective of his right which governs."
'34 Iowa 148 (1871).
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sion cannot be adverse. This view has been repudiated in Iowa and
seems to be virtually abandoned as a rule of law.7
A third view, as laid down by Preble v. Maine Central R. R.,8 is that
if the party occupies to a fence beyond his boundary, believing it to be
the true line, but with no intent to claim title if it be ascertained that
the fence was on his neighbor's land, he cannot acquire title by adverse
possession. The reason given is that the requisite intent to claim title
exists only upon the condition that the fence be on the true boundary
line. If, however, his intent is to claim title whether it shall eventually
be found to be the correct boundary or not, then the possession is ad-
verse. This is the view followed in the principal case9 and in many ju-
risdictions.'10
The North Carolina decisions appear to be inconsistent as to the rule
to be applied in mistaken boundary cases. The case of Locklear v.
Savage," a frequently cited case in the field of adverse possession, lays
down the rule as to the requirements necessary to hold adversely: The
possession must be actual, open, decided, and as notorious as the prop-
erty will admit, indicating an assertion of exclusive ownership and an
intent to exercise dominion over it against all claimants. It is readily
apparent that this definition of adverse possession could be interpreted
to include cases of mistaken boundary where the possessor thought the
land was his and exercised dominion over it. However, the cases have
not so held.
The North Carolina Supreme Court has defined the requisite intent
as being "the intent to claim, against the true owner, which renders the
entry and possession adverse.' 2 This language seems to indicate that
it is necessary that the person holding the land have knowledge that it
is not his land in order for him to hold adversely. This interpretation
was followed in Price v. Whisnant,13 where the court said that if the
'The Grube case was expressly overruled by Lawrence v. Washburn, 119
Iowa 109, 93 N. W. 73 (1903).
See, however, Price v. Whisnant, 236 N. C. 381, 72 S. E. 2d 851 (1952) and
Westland Realty Corp. v. Griffin, 151 Va. 1005, 145 S. E. 718 (1928), where the
courts seemed to apply the rule of the Grube case.
'85 Me. 260 (1893).
' Orlando v. Moore, 274 S. W. 2d 86 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
"Tanner v. Dobbins, 255 Ala. 671, 53 So. 2d 549 (1951); Davis v. Wright,
220 Ark. 743, 249 S. W. 2d 979 (1952) ; Shaw v. Williams, 50 So. 2d 125 (Fla.
1951) ; Patrick v. Chency, 226 Iowa -853, 285 N. W. 855 (1939) ; Wilson v. Pum
Ze, 167 Kan. 31, 204 P. 2d 723 (1949) ; Traylor v. West, 255 S. W. 2d 612 (Ky.
1953) ; Landry v. Giguere, 127 Me. 264, 143 Atl. 1 (1928) ; Warner v. Noble, 286
Mich. 654, 282 N. W. 855 (1939); Northern Pacific Ry. v. Cash, 67 Mont. 585,
216 Pac. 782 (1923) ; Gibson v. Dudley, 233 N. C. 255, 63 S. E. 2d 630 (1951) ;
Newton v. McKeel, 142 Ore. 674, 21 P. 2d 206 (1933) ; Bettack v. Conachen, 235
Wis. 559, 294 N. W. 57 (1940).11159 N. C. 236, 74 S. E. 347 (1912).
12 Vanderbilt v. Chapman, 175 N. C. 11, 13, 94 S. E. 703, 704 (1918) ; Parker
v. Banks, 79 N. C. 480, 485 (1878).13236 N. C. 381, 72 S. E. 2d 851 (1952).
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possessor thought his deed covered the disputed area, his possession was
not adverse, but a claim of rightful ownership. This is the view of the
Grube case.
In Gibson v. Dudley,14 plaintiff took possession of a driveway on the
side of his lot, thinking the driveway belonged to him. He used the
driveway for the requisite time to acquire title by adverse possession.
The court, however, denied his claim, and said that it was not one of
adverse possession, but of rightful ownership. The fact that plaintiff
thought the driveway was his own prevented him from acquiring it by
adverse possession. This case would also seem to be an example of the
Grube view. 15
Only one year prior to the Gibson case, the North Carolina Supreme
Court upheld a claim of adverse possession for the defendant, although
she testified that it was never her intention of claiming anything except
what she owned. 16 This case would tend to support the view of the
French case.
But to confuse the picture even further in North Carolina, the court
has quoted with approval the doctrine of the Preble case to the effect
that "where the occupation of the land is by a mere mistake, and with
no intention on the part of the occupant to claim as his own land which
does not belong to him, but he intends to claim only to the true line,
wherever it may be, the holding is not adverse." 17  In this case, plain-
tiff testified that he had no intention of holding any land which did not
belong to him; but the court held that there was adverse possession be-
cause plaintiff asserted the boundary to be at a certain place and claimed
it as his own, even if there was a mistake. It appears that here the
court applied the Preble view.
A discussion of the North Carolina decisions would not be com-
plete without a brief mention of the firmly established doctrine to the
effect that if there is but a "slight encroachment" and the jury finds the
encroachment to be inadvertently or unintentionally made, and that the
purpose was to run the fence on the true line, the possession of the
small extra strip is permissive, and not adverse.' 8  One North Carolina
14233 N. C. 255, 63 S. E. 2d 630 (1951).
" The court said, however, that when the plaintiff first went into possession,
he was claiming and intended to claim, only that which he had purchased. Id. at
257, 63 S. E. 2d at 631.
" Whiteheart v. Grubbs, 232 N. C. 236, 60 S. E. 2d 101 (1950). This case
may be distinguished on the ground that there was a lappage question and the
defendant was claiming adverse possession of land which her deed actually in-
cluded.
" Dawson v. Abbott, 184 N. C. 192, 195, 114 S. E. 15, 16 (1922). Quoted from
1 Cyc., Adverse Possessiont § VI(E) (1901).
1" Waldo v. Wilson, 173 N. C. 689, 92 S. E. 693 (1917); Blue Ridge Land
Co. v. Floyd, 171 N. C. 543, 88 S. E. 862 (1916) ; Currie v. Gilchrist, 147 N. C.
648, 61 S. E. 581 (1908) ; McLean v. Smith, 106 N. C. 172, 11 S. E. 184 (1890);
King v. Wells, 94 N. C. 344 (1886) ; Gilchrist v. McLaughlin, 29 N. C. 310 (1847);
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case held that an encroachment of twenty-five yards is of sufficient
notoriety to be adverse. 9
Adverse possession statutes "rest on a wise public policy, which
regards litigation with disfavor and aims at the repose of conditions
which the parties have suffered to remain unquestioned long enough to
indicate their acquiescence therein. °20 This public policy can best be
realized by allowing one who has held the land for the statutory period
to acquire the fee thereto.
To rely on an intent to dispossess, as is required by the view of
Grube v. Wells,21 would necessarily reward dishonesty, whereas the
honest, mistaken possessor would be penalized.
It is submitted that the view of Preble v. Maine Central R. R.,
22
which is followed in the principal case, is too theoretical to be workable.
"Neither the courts nor anyone else can tell or conjecture what the
party might have intended to do in the event he discovered later that
he had been mistaken as to the true line."'23 The possibility of the land
belonging to someone else probably never occurs to the possessor in mis-
take cases, and therefore the test fails. It would seem that the intent,
if acquird at all in cases under this test, is acquired after the possessor
has learned of his mistake and consulted his lawyer.
Mistaken belief of the possessor should be immaterial, and the courts
should allow what actually happened to govern. 24 The best view in
mistaken boundary cases is the view as laid down in French v. Pearce,25
that is, that visible possession, regardless of whether it be under a mis-
taken belief of ownerhip, will constitute adverse possession.
Under the view of the French case, here advocated, one holding for
the requisite time would not lose the land by innocently stating at the
trial that he did not intend to take what was not his. Nor would it be
necessary to speculate as to what intent, if any, was in the mind of the
possessor when he took possession, many years previously.
Bynum v. Carter, 26 N. C. 310 (1844) (The court, by way of dictum at page 314,
said: "We admit there may be cases in which the possession may be of so
minute a part of the disputed land as not to amount to an ouster of the owner,
being regarded, rather, as an inadvertent encroachment without a claim of right, or
as permissive and not adverse. But in such cases, the conclusion does not arise
from the supposition that the owner was actually ignorant of the fact of the
possession or of its extent, but that the other party did not intend to usurp a
possession beyond the boundaries to which he had a good title.") ; Green v. Har-
mon, 15 N. C. 158 (1833).
" Mode v. Long, 64 N. C. 433 (1870).
2 1 Am. JuR., Adverse Possession § 4 at p. 794 (1936).
2134 Iowa 148 (1871).
2285 Me. 260 (1893).
22 Bayhouse v. Urquides, 17 Idaho 286, 295, 105 Pac. 1066, 1068 (1909).
24 See Note, 3 VAND. L. REv. 337 (1950), where the writer approved the view
urged here.
28 Conn. 439, 21 Am. Dec. 680 (1831).
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Finally, adoption of the French view would tranmute the seemingly
irreconcilable rules existing in North Carolina today into one practicable,




In the recent case Guest v. Brenner Iron & Metal Co.,1 plaintiff em-
ployee was sent out on the road to change two flat tires on one of de-
fendant's trucks. After replacing the old tubes, it became necessary to
obtain air to inflate the tires, so plaintiff drove along the highway until
he found a service station open. He asked and received permission from
the man in charge to use the air hose. Before he inflated the first tire,
plaintiff was asked to assist in pushing off the stalled car of a customer
of the station. Plaintiff acceded to this request and, while pushing, was
struck and injured by an approaching car.
The North Carolina Industrial Commission awarded compensation
on the ground that there was an injury arising out of and in the course
of the employment.2 The supreme court affirmed the award, rejecting
the contentions that the plaintiff had deviated from the course of his
employment, and that the hazard was not peculiar to the employment.3
The main reasons given for the holding were that the response of the
plaintiff was natural and reasonable; that he had reasonable grounds
to believe that his acts were incidental to his employment and bene-
ficial to his employer; and that if the employer had been present he
would have instructed the employee to render the assistance. Under
the circumstances, the aid received from the service station and the aid
given by plaintiff were said to be so closely interwoven that the injury
"- For excellent discussions on the problem here presented, see: Johnson v.
Whelan, 186 Okla. 511, 98 P. 2d 1103 (1940), and Rock Springs v. Sturm, 39
Wyo. 494, 273 Pac. 908 (1929) with annotation in 97 A. L. R. 14 (1935).
1241 N. C. 448, 85 S. E. 2d 596 (1955).
- The term "arising out of" refers to the cause or origin of the accident, and
"in the course of" refers to the time, place, and circumstances under which the
accident occurred. Taylor v. Wake Forest, 228 N. C. 346, 45 S. E. 2d 387 (1947) ;
Wilson v. Mooresville, 222 N. C. 283, 22 S. E. 2d 907 (1942) ; Ashley v. F-W
Chevrolet Co., 222 N. C. 25, 21 S. E. 2d 834 (1942). See also Note, 10 N. C. L.
REv. 373 (1932).
'If the risk involved is one to which all others in the general area are sub-jected, as distinguished from a hazard peculiar to the employee's work, the re-
sulting injury is not compensable. Bryan v. T. A. Loving Co., 222 N. C. 724,
24 S. E. 2d 751 (1943); Plemmons v. White's Service, 213 N. C. 148, 195 S. E.
370 (1938). The court in the present case said, "Plaintiff, while pushing the
car onto and along the highway, subjected himself to a hazard not common to all
others in the neighborhood but peculiar to the task in which he was engaged."
Guest v. Brenner Iron & Metal Co., 241 N. C. 448, 454, 85 S. E. 2d 596, 601 (1955).
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must be held connected with4 and incidental to5 plaintiff's employment.
The court also distinguished the present case from the so-called "good
Samaritan" cases.6
There is a ground for an award of compensation in cases similar
to the present case which has been very little used or referred to by the
courts; that is, acts of employees which further the good will of the
employer.7 Good will is widely, if not universally, recognized as a very
valuable asset of any business.8 The acts of the employee creating good
will, such as picking up riders or doing other small favors for the
public in general, has a definite benefit to the employer's business.0 They
create a favorable attitude toward the business and aid in keeping its
name before the public. This is especially true when the business deals
directly with the customer, but it is also of benefit when it deals in-
directly, in view of the widespread policy of putting the organization's
name in conspicuous places on its cars and trucks.1 0
The employer's good will has been brought up in a few cases where
a third party sued the employer or master under the doctrine of re-
' As to the necessity for a causal connection between the employment and the
accident see, Taylor v. Wake Forest, 228 N. C. 346, 45 S. E. 2d 387 (1947).
As to the necessity that the acts of the employee be incidental to the em-
ployment see, Goodwin v. Bright, 202 N. C. 481, 163 S. E. 576 (1932).
' These cases involve situations where the employee voluntarily offers his assist-
ance to a third party solely as an act of humanity, the act. having no connection
to the employment or the employer's business. Sichterman v. Kent Storage Co.,
217 Mich. 364, 186 N. W. 498 (1922). See also, 17 Cm-KENT REv. 399 (1939),
commenting on Puttkammer v. Industrial Commission, 371 Ill. 497, 21 N. E. 2d
575 (1939) in which case compensation was granted.
'The appellee refers to good will at only one point: "The primary, if not
the sole object in the plaintiff's mind in so doing (pushing the car) was to ac-
complish his ultimate task for his employer with the good will and good relations
expected of him by his employer." Brief for Appellees, pp. 15-16, Guest v.
Brenner Iron & Metal Co., 241 N. C. 484, 85 S. E. 2d 596 (1955).
The court quotes from 7 SCHNEiDER, WORKmEN'S COMPENSATION § 1675
(1950): "However, where competent proof exists that the employee understood,
or had reasonable grounds to believe that the act resulting in injury . . . was
encouraged by the employer in performance of the act or similar acts for the
purpose of creating a feeling of good will, . . . " No other specific reference is
made to good will, but it is possible that the court may have had good will in
mind, although it was not used as a ground for the compensation award.
'Ely Lilly & Co. v. Saunders, 216 N. C. 163, 4 S. E. 2d 528 (1939), holding
that good will is as much "property" as is coal or pig iron, or wheat, and is sub-ject to audit, taxation, appraisal, purchase, and sale.
' Examples are acts of telephone operators, bus or truck drivers, and train
conductors, in summoning aid, giving assistance to parties in need, and other
courtesies beyond the call of duty. In certain instances these acts may be of an
heroic nature. Employers are quick to take full advantage of such acts in their
advertisements to build up good will or better public relations for their organiza-
tions.
'0 Note, 17 CHI-KENT REV. 399 (1939) discusses the custom of placing the
business name on its vehicles, and the effect it has on the public when the driver
refuses a small favor. The argument that the plaintiff's act in the present case
v-s in furtherance of the defendant's good will would be stronger if a company




spondeat superior for injury caused by the employee's negligence.
Generally in these cases, the employee has picked up riders or is ac-
commodating friends, although they may not be potential customers of
the employer." The rider, friend, or some other person, e.g., a pe-
destrian, is injured by the negligence of the employee. The employer
contends that the employee has deviated from the scope of his employ-
ment, thereby relieving the employer of liability. 12 But if the acts can
be shown to have furthered the good will of the employer, the courts
may hold them to be within the scope -of the employment.' 3 This argu-
ment would seem to apply as well to workmen's compensation cases.
In both groups the main issue is whether the act in furtherance of good
will is a deviation' 4 to such an extent that it will relieve the employer
from responsibility or liability for the injury. The application would
not be too far-fetched in view of the fact that the courts tend to give
the compensation acts a very liberal construction.' 5 Under such a doc-
trine any bona fide argument in favor of the employee should be con-
sidered.
The workmen's compensation cases which have considered the em-
"' It should be noted that ordinarily one who is engaged to operate a motor
vehicle has no implied authority, by virtue of the employment, to invite or permit
third parties to ride; and the employer is ordinarily not liable for personal in-
juries sustained by the invitee while riding therein, except for willful or malicious
acts of the emplbyee. Wigginton Studio, Inc. v. Reuter's .Adm'r, 254 Ky. 128, 71
S. W. 2d 14 (1934); Cotton v. Carolina Truck Transportation Co., 197 N. C.
709, 150 S. E. 505 (1929). This rule does not apply where there is express or
ostensible authority to invite people to ride. Cole v. Johnson Motor Co., 217 N. C.
756, 9 S. E. 2d 425 (1940) ; Shrimplin v. Simmons Auto Co., 122 W. Va. 248,
9 S. E. 2d 49 (1940). The latter case left open the question whether a servant
in charge of an automobile may not in some circumstances be clothed with
ostensible or apparent authority.
"2 In Russell v. Cutshall, 223 N. C. 353, 26 S. E. 2d 866 (1943) it was alleged
that the employee had the implied authority to pick up passengers, on the ground
that the defendant customarily carried passengers in the conduct of business in
that particular area for the purpose of creating good will. The court held the
evidence did not sustain any such custom and the act was a deviation relieving the
employer of liability.
"3 Cole y. Johnson Motor Co., 217 N. C. 756, 9 S. E. 2d 425 (1940). In this
case there was a conflict in the testimony as to the authority of the employee to
pick up hitchikers; there was also evidence that in the course of the employee's
duties he was to promote good will by contacting prospects. The court held that
he was acting within the ostensible scope of his authority and whether the acts
constituted a violation of his instructions and thereby a deviation from the course
of the employment was a question for the jury. Cochran v. Michaels, 110 W. Va.
127, 133, 157 S. E. 173, 175 (1931). There the court said, "A friend picked up
became an eager informant as well as a partisan of the driver, and the interest of
the defendant was thus promoted." The Cochran case is criticized in Note, 37
W. VA. L. Q. 441 (1931), but is approved in Note, 18 VA. L. REv. 330 (1931).
1" Parrish v. Armour & Co., 200 N. C. 654, 158 S. E. 188 (1931) (Workmen's
Compensation) ; Paiewonsky v. Joffe, 101 N. J. L. 521, 129 Atl. 142 (1925)
(Master and Servant).
"
2 Johnson v. Asheville Hosiery Co., 199 N. C. 38, 40, 153 S. E. 591, 593 (1930)
"It is generally held by courts that the various compensation acts of the Union
should be liberally construed to the end that benefits thereof should not be denied
upon technical, narrow, and strict interpretation."
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ployer's good will in granting an award have varied as to the authority
granted the employee. There are cases where express authority was
granted to do anything necessary to create good will. An example is
Gross v. Davey Tree Expert Co.10 where defendant company instructed
the employee to do all that he could to further the good will of the
telephone company for which defendant was working.' 7 Plaintiff's job
consisted of trimming trees that grew near the telephone lines. At the
request of a third party, plaintiff came down from a tree and pushed the
party's car approximately two miles in an attempt to get it started.
Plaintiff was injured at that point, distant from his place of employ-
ment. Compensation was granted on the ground that the defendant had
not placed any limit on the favors the plaintiff could extend.
At the other extreme are cases in which the furtherance of the em-
ployer's good will is implied from the nature of the employment itself
without any express authority. An example of this is Parrish v. Armour
& Co.' 8 where a wrong delivery was made to one of defendant's cus-
tomers and plaintiff was sent to straighten out the matter. On the way
to see the customer, plaintiff deviated several blocks to obtain some
cigars which he thought would be expedient to the purpose of his visit.
He was injured before he reached the place where he intended to obtain
the cigars. Compensation was granted by the commission on the theory
that the deviation was incidental to the employment.
It would also seem probable that acts furthering the good will of
the employer might in some instances be done in violation of the em-
ployer's express instructions.'" When the acts violate instructions, com-
18248 App. Div. 838, 290 N. Y. Supp. 168 (3d Dep't 1936), aff'd, 272 N. Y.
657, 5 N. E. 2d 379 (1936). See also, Murphy v. N. Y. Butchers Dressed Meat
Co., 249 App. Div. 888, 292 N. Y. Supp. 629 (3d Dep't 1937), where the employee
was crossing the street to buy a drink for the merchant from whom he had ob-
tained a check in payment of his employer's account. This was a custom and an
expense account was furnished for such courtesy. The court held that the em-
ployee was engaged in the interests of his employer and in the furtherance of the
employer's good will.
"'The instructions were to create good will for the customer of the employer
rather than for the employer himself, but the same reasoning and result would
seem.to follow in the latter situation.
78200 N. C. 654, 158 S. E. 188 (1931). See also, Bauman v. Howard J.
Ehmke Co., 126 Pa. Super. 108, 190 Atl. 343 (1937) where a salesman staying
overnight at a farmer's house helped the farmer fell a tree. Compensation was
awarded upon the ground that the assistance was no more than any other guest
would do in the natural order of events. In Boyd v. Philmont Country Club, 129
Pa. Super. 135, 195 Atl. 156 (1937), a caddy went into the woods to pick flowers
upon the request of a customer of the defendant and was struck by a golf ball.
Compensation was granted.
" No workmen's compensation cases discussing good will as a basis for award-
ing or denying compensation when the acts violated instructions have been found.
In Cole v. Johnson Motor Co., 217 N. C. 756, 9 S. E. 2d 425 (1940) (liability of
the master for tort of servant) the court said, conceding the instructions pro-
hibited picking up riders, it would be questionable whether the violation was such
a deviation from the employment as would put the employee entirely without the
purposes and confines of his employment and relieve the employer from liability.
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pensation is generally denied if the instructions limited the sphere of the
employment, but compensation is generally awarded if the instructions
merely directed the employees not to do certain acts, or not to do an
act within the sphere of the employment in a certain way.20 If the
violation does not take the employee out of the sphere of the employ-
ment, he is only guilty of negligence and is not deprived of the pro-
tection of the workmen's compensation acts.21  In addition, where the
act is necessitated by an emergency,22 or the instructions against com-
mitting the acts is habitually violated,23 the employee's case is greatly
strengthened.
It is submitted that if there is authority, express or implied, to do
acts in furtherance of the employer's good will, such acts should not
be held to be a deviation from the course of the employment to the
extent that compensation will not be granted. Of course, the courts
will have to examine the facts and circumstances of each case and
apply a reasonable rule, such as, whether the acts could be reasonably
held within the scope of an employer's policy to create good will. The
courts might go further and base the award on whether the act did
create, or was aimed at creating, good will for the employer; but what-
ever the theory or basis used, good will should be given careful con-
sideration by the courts when applicable to a particular fact situation.
CALVIN B. BRYANT.
Criminal Law-Attempted Perjury-the Rules of "Legal" and
"Factual" Impossibility as Applied to the Law of
Criminal Attempts
In a recent decision, State v. Latiolais,l the Supreme Court of Loui-
siana upheld a conviction of attempted prejury. So far as is known, this
is the first reported conviction of such a crime in the history of law.2
" Maryland Casualty Co. v. Brown, 131 Tex. 404, 115 S. W. 2d 394 (1938);
Prentice v. Twin City Wholesale Grocery, 202 Minn. 455, 278 N. W. 895 (1938);
Moss v. Hamilton, 234 Ala. 181, 174 So. 622 (1937).21 See note 20 supra.
"2 O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, 340 U. S. 504 (1951). Defendant main-
tained a recreation area for employees. It was forbidden, and signs were erected
to that effect, to swim in the channel because of the dangerous currents. The
plaintiff's intestate swam in the channel in an attempt to rescue an unknown man
and was downed. Compensation was granted.
"2 Archie v. Greene Bros. Lumber Co., 222 N. C. 477, 23 S. E. 2d 834 (1934):
Moss v. Hamilton, 234 Ala. 181, 174 So. 622 (1937).
1225 La. 878, 74 So. 2d 148 (1954).
2 Generally, when courts have been unable to convict a defendant of perjury, the
defendant has been acquitted. Where, for example, the officer administering the
oath did not have authority to administer it, courts have held that a demurrer to
the indictment should be sustained. United States v. Curtis, i07 U. S. 671 (1883) ;
United States v. Garcelon, 82 Fed. 611 (D. Colo. 1897) ; United States v. Edwards,
43 Fed. 67 (C. C. S. D. Ala. 1890) ; State v. Phippen, 62 Iowa 54, 17 N. W. 146(1883).
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The verdict in the lower court was returned on an indictment for
perjury.3 The opinion of the court did not relate the facts of the case,
but stated that there could be attempted perjury, for example, where
"the board or official for some reason was not legally authorized to take
testimony, or if the one administering the oath was not authorized or
qualified to administer it."
'4
The questions raised by the case are (1) whether the elements of
criminal attempts are applicable to the crime of perjury, and (2) if so,
whether the so-called "rules" relating to "impossibility," applied in many
attempt situations, are relevant to attempted perjury. Each of these will
be discussed.
Criminal attempt is defined as an act done with intent to commit a
crime, tending but failing to effect its commission.5 Thus, the elements
of attempt are: (1) specific intent to commit the particular crime at-
tempted; (2) some overt act directed toward accomplishment of the
crime; and (3) failure of consummation of the crime intended.0
The intent. There must be specific intent to commit the particular
3 Such procedure is permitted in Louisiana by the following statute: "When the
crime charged includes another of lesser grade, a verdict of guilty of the lesser
crime is responsive to the indictment, and it is of no moment that the greater of-
fense is a felony and the lesser a misdemeanor." LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:406
(1951).
The following states have a similar statute: Alabama, Arizona, California, Con-
necticut, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Ten-
nessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wis-
consin.
For the federal statute on this procedure, see FED. R. CRIM. P. 31 (c).
It would seem, theoretically at least, that states having this statute and the
federal courts would permit the return of a verdict of guilty of attempted perjury
on a charge for perjury. Much would depend, however, on the substantive law of
each jurisdiction.
' State v. Latiolais, 225 La. 878, 74 So. 2d 148, 150 (1954). The court actually
held that the verdict of guilty of attempted perjury was responsive to the indictment
for perjury.
IN. Y. PEN. LAW § 2. The Louisiana statutory definition is: "Any person who,
having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of
and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt
to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the cir-
cumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose." LA. Ray. STAT.
ANN. § 14:27 (1951).
The following states have varying statutory definitions of attempt: Montana,
Nevada, North Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin. All states have general
penal statutes for attempt, except: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Dela-
ware, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Nebraska, North Carolina,
Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Texas. Although these states do not have
general penal statutes encompassing all attempted crimes, most of them have
statutes punishing specific attempts, such as attempted arson, rape, robbery, etc.
' Graham v. People, 181 Ill. 477, 55 N. E. 179 (1899); Scott v. People, 141 Ill.
195, 30 N. E. 329 (1892); Thompson v. People, 96 Ill. 158 (1880); Johnson v.
State, 27 Neb. 687, 43 N. W. 425 (1889) ; State v. Thompson, 31 Nev. 209, 101 Pac.
557 (1909) ; Hicks v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. 223, 9 S. E. 1024 (1889).
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crime attempted, 7 or as stated by one writer, there must be intent to
commit a specific crime." The requisite mens rea is "the state of mind
of the man who intends the consequences of his conduct."9  In attempt
situations, special emphasis is placed on the element of intent.
These generalizations may be more meaningful if we consider the'
function of the mental element in criminal attempts. It is to identify
those who consciously engage in a criminal endeavor and to distinguish
those who act negligently' ° and blunderingly:" from those who will or
desire specific consequences which the criminal law proscribes.
Applying this to attempted perjury, it would appear that a defendant,
to be convicted in Louisiana and most other states,12 would have to make
'Lewis v. State, 35 Ala. 380 (1860) ; Dahlberg v. People, 225 Ili. 485, 80 N. E.
310 (1907); State v. Meadows, 18 W. Va. 658 (1881); MILLER, CRIMINAL LAW§ 29a (1934) ; 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW § 215 (11th ed. 1912) ; Sayre, Criminal
Attempts, 41 HARV. L. REV. 821, 837-842 (1928); Turner, Attempts to Commit
Crimes, 5 CAmB. L. J. 230, 235 (1934).
' Keedy, Criminal Attempts at Common Law, U. OF PA. L. REv. 464, 468 (1954).
' Turner, supra note 7, at 235.
10 Obviously there can be no attempt at negligence, since a negligent act is by
definition done without intent. Moore v. State, 18 Ala. 532, 534 (1851) ; Scott v.
State, 49 Ark. 156, 4 S. W. 750 (1886). See also Simpson v. State, 59 Ala. 1(1879) ; Morgan v. State, 33 Ala. 413, 414 (1859) ; White v. State, 13 Tex. App.
259, 261 (1882) ; MILLER, op. cit. supra note 7, § 29a; Sayre, supra note 7, at 842.
" Definition also precludes blundering into an attempt. Sayre, supra note 7, at
842.
12 The Louisiana statutory definition of perjury is as follows: "Perjury is the
intentional making of a false statement in, or for use in, a judicial proceeding, or
any proceeding before a board or official, wherein such board or official is authorized
to take testimony. In order to constitute perjury the false statement must be made
under sanction of an oath or an equivalent affirmation and must relate to matter
material to the issue or question in controversy." LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:123
(1951).
It should be noted that the Louisiana statutory definition of perjury has in-
corporated the common law offenses of perjury and false swearing. At common
law, false swearing in only judicial proceedings was punished as perjury. CLARK
AND MARSHALL, CRIMES § 446 (5th ed. 1952) ; 2 WHARTON, Op. cit. supra note 7,
§ 1058. All other false swearing under oaths required by law was punished under
the offense designated "false swearing." Regina v. Hodgkiss, 11 Cox C. C. 365
(1869); Regina v. Chapman, 175 Eng. Rep. 356 (1850); 2 WHARTON, sUpra.
Most states have statutes similar to the Louisiana statute: ARIZ. CODE ANN.§43-4201 (1939); ARK. STAT. §§ 41-3001 and 41-3002 (1947); CAL. PEN. CODE§§ 118 and 118a (Supp. 1953) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8481 (1949) ; IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 18-5401 (1948) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 38, § 473 (1935) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3801(1942) ; IowA CODE ANN. § 721.1 (1950) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. § 21-701 (1949) ; Ky.
REV. STAT. § 432.170 (1953) (this statute does not call the offense "perjury," but
is similar to the general perjury statutes) ; ME. REv. STAT. c. 135, § 1 (1954) ; MD.
ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS art. 27, § 531 (1951) ; MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 268, §§ 1 and
IA (Supp. 1954) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 613.39 (1947) ; Miss. CODE Am. § 2315(1942); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 557.010 (1953); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 94-3801
(1947); NED. Rrv. STAT. § 29-2025 (1943); NEV. Co Ip. LAWS § 9974 (1929);
N. H. REV. LAWS c. 457, § 1 (1942) ; N. C. GEN. STAT. § 14-209 (1953) ; N. D.
REv. CODE § 12-1401 (1943): OHIO REv. CODE § 2917.25 (1954) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, § 491 (1937); PENN. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4322 (1945) ; R. I. GEN. LAwS
c. 605, § 1 (1938); S. D. CODE § 13.1237 (1939); TENN. CODE ANN. § 11073
(Williams 1934); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-45-1, 76-45-7, 76-45-8 (1953); VA.
CODE § 18-237 (1950); WASH. REv. CODE §§ 9.72.010 and 9.72.030 (1953); WIs.
CRIM. CODE § 346.31 (1953).
However, a few states have preserved the common law distinction between the
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a false statement under an oath required by law, in the belief that the
person administering the oath was qualified and authorized, and in the
belief that the official, board, or judicial proceeding was authorized to
receive his testimony (whether written or oral).13 Quaere, whether the
defendant would also have to possess the belief that his false statement
would be "material," in those jurisdictions where materiality is an ele-
ment of the substantive crime of perjury.
The overt act. Intent alone, however clear, is of course never enough
to constitute an attempt. There must be some overt act directed toward
the accomplishment of the crime, by means "apparently suitable" to
accomplishment, and this overt activity must be designed to achieve the
anticipated results and must go beyond that stage which the courts am-
biguously refer to as "mere preparation.' 14
offenses of perjury and false swearing: DEL. CODE ANNr. tit. 11, §§ 721 and 722
(1953); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-4001-4003 (1953); N. J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2-157-1 and
2-157-4 (1939) ; ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 162.110 and 162.140 (1953) (the latter statute
defines false swearing as a false statement not material to the issue in question;
otherwise, false statements are perjury); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 5999 and 6000
(1949).
The remaining states, though they have not merged into one the general statutes
on perjury and false swearing, define false swearing as perjury: CoLo. REv. STAT.
§§ 40-7-1 and 40-7-2 (1953) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 837.02 and 837.01 (1944) ; MIcH.
STAT. ANN. §§ 28.664 and 28.665 (1954); N. H. REv. LAWS c. 457, §§ 1 and 2
(1942); N. Y. PEN. LAW §§ 1620 and 1622; S. C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-201 and 16-203
(1952); VT. REv. STAT. §§ 8515 and 8516 (1947).
The general federal statute on perjury is. 18 U. S. C. § 1621 (1952).
1 For example, see the federal statute, and the statutes in New Jersey, Oregon,
and West Virginia. Supra note 12. In the Louisiana statute, supra note 12,
materiality is made an element of the crime of perjury, but the court in State v.
Latiolais did not discuss what effect, if any, this might have on the requisite nature
of the defendant's intent
This problem would not arise in Arkansas, New York, Utah, and Washington
where the offense of perjury has been divided into two degrees. The main distinc-
tion between the two classifications is that first degree perjury applies to false
swearing as to material matter, and second degree, to immaterial matter. Supra
note 12.
" CLARK AND MARSHALL, CRIMI ES § 118 (5th ed. 1952) ; HALL, GENERAL PRIN-
CIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 99-117 (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., (1947);
MILLER, op. cit. supra note 7, § 29f; 1 WHARTON, op. cit. supra note 7, § 219.
If the means appear to the defendant sufficient to consummate the crime, the
weight of authority is that there is an attempt. Beale, Criminal Attempts, 16 HARV.
L. REv. 491, 496-500 (1903). Thus, where the defendant points a gun and pulls the
trigger, it is an attempt to kill, even though the gun did not go off, People v. Ryan,
55 Hun, 214, 8 N. Y. Supp. 41 (1889), or even though the gun did not have a cap
on it, Mullen v. State, 45 Ala. 43 (1871). And it has been held an attempt to kilt
where one administers a harmless drug to another, thinking it poisonous. State v.
Glover, 27 S. C. 602, 4 S. E. 564 (1888). Likewise, placing an insufficient dose of
poison into another's cup with intent to kill has been held an attempt. Common-
wealth v. Kennedy, 170 Mass. 18, 48 N. E. 770 (1897).
The problem of distinguishing between "mere preparation" and attempt is some-
times difficult, though some of the cases provide rather clear examples. For in-
stance, generally it is held that purchasing or owning some article with which to
commit a crime is not an indictable attempt. Purchasing poison would not be
indictable as as attempt to poison, but intentionally placing it in the way of other
human beings would be. Mullen v. State, 45 Ala. 43 (1871). Owning a false
weight would not be an attempt to cheat, but using it as a means of cheating would
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The function of the overt act "element" is similar to that of the intent
"element." The rationale of attempts assumes that certain acts, which
tend but fail to effect the commission of a crime intended to be consum-
mated, ought to be punished. 15 Functionally, then, the act should (1)
supply evidence to preclude punishment of mere mental activity; (2)
supply evidence that the defendant intended the commission of a specific
crime; and (3) supply evidence of some external harm to society'6
(this external harm may be recognizable from the harm inherent in the
nature of the overt act itself, or it may be recognizable from the immi-
nent threat of the harm that would result if the substantive crime were
committed) .17
be such an attempt. Regina v. Brown, 48 L. T. 270 (1882). If a man, with intent
to rape a child, went to the place where the child was located, though that would
be some act toward commission of the crime, it would not be indictable. Regina v.
Meredith, 173 Eng. Rep. 630 (1838). Holmes has said that "the act must come
pretty near to accomplishing that result [intended]." Commonwealth v. Kennedy,
170 Mass. 18, 20, 48 N. E. 470 (1897). And Baron Parke has stated that criminal
attempt originates when the actor no longer controls the force which he has set
in motion, Regina v. Eagleton, 169 Eng. Rep. 826, 836 (1855), though that would
not seem applicable when considering, for example, attempted rape.
So as not to oversimplify the problem of distinguishing between "mere prepa-
ration" and attempt, the following will illustrate some of the difficulties: "The
defendant bought matches to set a. fire; he cannot yet be punished. He solicited
another to burn and furnished him with material; there is no punishable attempt.
He prepared combustibles at the house, went to a third party, solicited him to set
the fire, and started with him toward the house. Quaere-whether a punishable
attempt has been committed. The combustibles were arranged and another who
was on the spot was solicited to light it; the attempt is punishable. The defendant
himself having arranged the combustibles lit a match, which went out, or lit a candle
and placed it among the combustibles, or lit the combustibles, he has committed a
crime." Beale, Criminal Attemps, 16 HAv. L. REv. 491, 504-505 (1903).
It is hoped that the ideas developed in this note will be of some assistance in
approaching the problem of "preparation."
HALL, op. cit. supra note 14, at 99 and 129.
l External harm to society may be said to result from the impairment of some
legally protectible interest or from a threat of such impairment. Some of these
interests are life, limb, privacy, property, public peace, health, morals, welfare, and
the like. As applied to perjury, some protectible interests are: effective and effi-
cient functioning of governmental agenices, orderly conduct of legal proceedings,
solemnity of the oath, dignity and respect of the court, essential powers of legal
agencies for administration of justice, etc.
What constitutes external harm to society will vary with social mores and
attitudes and how both are reflected and ingrained into the minds of individuals
attempting to determine the external harm. Social mores and attitudes are naturally
affected by philosophical, sociological, theological, psychological, political, and eco-
nomic influences.
External harm is not absolute, but relative to a given society. This is evidenced
by the fact that at very early common law attempts to commit crimes were not
punished though today they are.
On the subject of external harm, see HALL, op. cit. supra note 14, at 15, 61, 96-
97, 111, 113, 115-116, 135-136.
"? It is important to realize that there may be harm inherent in the overt act
itself as well as in the threat of the harm of the substantive crime. For example,
in attempted perjury, it may be harmful to society for a person to exhibit a con-
tempt for legal proceedings, even under circumstances where his false swearing
cannot amount to perjury. It may very well be that the threat of perjury may add
to that harm but there is nevertheless harm in the unsuccessful act itself. The same
is true of attempted rape, where there is harm both in the unsuccessful acts as well
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Functional rather than conceptual application of the elements of at-
tempt may be a more edifying method of determining criminality in spe-
cific cases involving alleged attempts. This is true, for example, when
considering attempted perjury, where the court should be less concerned
with how "dangerously close" the act comes to consummation of the in-
tended crime, and more primarily concerned with the external harm
inherent in the defendant's acts, that is, his wilful affront to the solemnity
of the oath and to the dignity of a governmental agency.18
Accordingly, intentional lying under oath before an official appar-
ently authorized to administer the oath should be a sufficient overt
act. Quaere, whether the following would be sufficient: making an
immaterial false statement (in jurisdictions requiring the statement to
be material for the crime of perjury) ; making a false statement on the
witness stand which is interrupted before completion; falsifying an affi-
davit which is never used for the purpose intended; falsifying a written
statement which is changed before an oath is taken.
Failure of consummation of the crime intended. Obviously, the overt
act must fail to effect the crime, else the law would concern itself with
punishing the substantive crime. 19 As reference to particular cases indi-
cates, many circumstances may operate to prevent successful completion.
Some may cause interruption of the overt act,20 preventing the defendant
as in the threat of rape. In some cases of attempted rape, the threat may not in
actuality be so important, for example where the offender is impotent.
The extent of the harm in attempts will always be affected by the gravity of the
substantive crime, but it is impprtant to recognize that that will not necessarily be
exclusive of the extent of the harm.
See note 52 infra.
8 However, in a case of attempted arson, where the defendant's match is blown
out before the combustibles are lit, a court could concern itself equally with the
problems of proximity (how "dangerously close") and external harm.
The proximity test is often applied by the courts in attempt cases. For a dis-
cussion of this aspect of attempts, see Beale, Criminal Attempts, 16 HARV. L. REv.
491, 501-506 (1903).
" However, the language of this Louisiana statute would seem to be contra:
"An attempt is a separate but lesser grade of the intended crime and any person
may be convicted of an attempt to commit a crime although it appears on the trial
that the crime intended or attempted was actually perpetrated by such person in
pursuance of such attempt." LA. REv. STAT. A~x. § 14:27 (1951).
Most states do not permit conviction of an attempt when the substantive crime
has been consummated. However, several states have statutes similar to the one in
Louisiana.
"0 These circumstances involve the over-all question of how far one must go in
preparation before being guilty of an attempt. If one preparing to commit arson
strikes a match to combustibles, but the match goes out, the person will still be
guilty of an attempt. Regina v. Taylor, 175 Eng. Rep. 831 (1859). And where the
defendant starts from his house with a dynamite bomb to blow up a railroad track,
but is arrested some distance from the track, it has been held that he is guilty of
an attempt. People v. Stites, 75 Cal. 570, 17 Pac. 693 (1888). Attempt has also
been found where the defendant threw oil on a house with intent to burn it. but was
frightened away before igniting the oil. Weaver v. State, 116 Ga. 550, 42 S. E. 745
(1902). "So far as the defendant's criminality is concerned, it would seem to make
little or no difference whether the interruption of the defendant's intended acts is
due to another's interference or to his own repentance or change of mind.... The
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from doing what he sought to do, and others may fender completion of
the crime impossible, even where the defendant does all he planned to
do.21 These latter circumstances have been labeled as "legal im-
possibility," "factual impossibility," "intrinsic impossibility," "extrinsic
impossibility," "absolute impossibility," and "relative impossibility.
'22
Impossibility to commit the crime of perjury may be evidenced where
an unauthorized official administers the oath; where a board, investiga-
tive committee, judicial proceeding, or any other legal proceeding is
unauthorized to receive testimony, or is illegally constituted; where a
legal proceeding does not have jurisdiction over the person testifying;
where an affidavit given is mistakenly believed to be required by law;
and the like.
From this discussion of the elements of criminal attempt, it is evident
that they can be made applicable to the crime of perjury.
What is primarily involved in State v. Latiolais is the "impossibility"
aspect of the case. In the examples cited by the court, where the board
or official was not legally authorized to take testimony, or where the one
administering the oath was not authorized or qualified to administer the
oath, it is impossible under all of the circumstances for the defendant to
commit the substantive crime of perjury. The problem therefore is the
relevancy of the general "rules" relating to "impossibility" in criminal
attempts to these particular circumstances.
Courts and writers generally recognize two kinds of "impossibility,".
"legal" and "factual."
23
It is said to be a general "rule" that a defendant cannot be guilty of
an attempt where it was "legally impossible" for him to commit the
burglar who, while trying to force the lock on the front door, decides to abandon
the attempt is equally guilty whether his change of mind is due to the voice of his
own conscience or the voice of an approaching policeman." Sayre, supra note 7, at
847.
2" Some cases in which the defendant has been held guilty under these circum-
stances are where the defendant attempts to pick an empty pocket, People v. Moran,
123 N. Y. 254, 25 N. E. 412 (1890), Regina v. Ring, 17 Cox C. C. 491, 66 L. T.
300 (1892), Regina v. Brown, 16 Cox C. C. 715, 61 L. T. 594 (1889) ; attempts an
abortion on a woman who is not -pregnant, Eggart v. State, 40 Fla. 527, 25 So. 144
(1898), State v. Snyder, 188 Iowa 1150, 177 N. W. 77 (1920), State v. Fitzgerald,
49 Iowa 260 (1878), Commonwealth v. Tibbets, 157 Mass. 519, 32 N. E. 910 (1893),
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 132 Mass. 261 (1882) ; attempts to shoot one who is not
in the place where the bullet is shot, People v. Lee Kong, 95 Cal. 666, 30 Pac.
800 (1892), State v. Mitchell, 170 Mo. 633, 71 S. W. 175 (1902) ; attempts to poison
when the intended victim does not actually consume the poison, Commonwealth v.
Kennedy, 170 Mass. 18, 48 N. E. 770 (1897).
Cases in which the defendant has not been held guilty in "impossibility" circum-
stances are discussed in the text under "legal impossibility."
.2 See Keedy, supra note 8, at 476-489; Strayhorn, The Effect of Impossibility
on Criminal Attempts, 78 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 962 (1930) ; Turner, stpra note 7, at
246.
22 Other classifications, mentioned in the text elsewhere, are simply variations of
"legal" and "factual" impossibility.
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intended crime.24  In People v. Jaffe,25 it was held that the defendant
could not be guilty of an attempt to receive stolen goods because the
goods were not actually stolen. In Marley v. State,26 it was held that
the defendants, members of a county board of freeholders, could not be
guilty of an attempt to incur indebtedness on behalf of the county in an
amount greater than that provided by law. Another classic illustration
of "legal impossibility" is that a boy under fourteen years of age cannot
be guilty of an attempt to commit rape, because he is "conclusively pre-
sumed to be incapable of committing the crime of rape."' 27
Where, however, the courts have found not a "legal" but a "factual
impossibility," it is said to be a general "rule" that the defendant may
be guilty of a criminal attempt.28  It has been stated that "factual im-
possibility" exists when "the accomplishment of the crime may be ren-
dered impossible by reason of (1) the physical inability of the actor,
(2) some inactive prevention or (3) the intervention of some natural
force."' 29 A man who fails to rape a woman because of a physical im-
potency is said to be guilty of attempted rape.80 Inactive prevention
may be provided by the absence of a subject of larceny in a man's pocket,
though the person who attempts to pick the pocket will be guilty of
attempted larceny.3 ' Active prevention may be illustrated by the de-
fendant's attempt to rape a girl who runs away from him, in which case
the defendant has been found guilty of attempted rape.3 2
Some of the difficulties in "impossibility" are presented when one con-
siders the instant case of attempted perjury. Three writers have said
that a person could not be convicted of an attempted perjury (applying
the rule of "legal impossibility"), 3. However, Wharton states: "An
attempt to commit perjury is indictable on the same reasoning as are
attempts to commit other offenses. And when the complete offense of
perjury is not proved (as where the false oath is taken before an incom-
petent officer, the defendant believing him to be competent), the de-
fendant may be indicted for the attempt. '3 4 Yet, none of the cases cited
by Wharton recognized the crime of attempted perjury as such.3 5 Two
24 HALL, op. cit. supra note 14, at 117.
185 N . Y. 497, 78 N. E. 169 (1906).
2658 N. J. L. 207, 33 Atl. 208 (Sup. Ct. 1895).
Foster v. Commonwealth, 96 Va. 306, 311, 31 S. E. 503, 505 (1898).
2 HALL, op. cit. supra note 14, at 117.
29 Keedy, supra note 8, at 479.
Preddy v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 765, 36 S. E. 2d 549 (1946).
"State v. Wilson, 30 Conn. 500 (1862) ; People v. Jones, 46 Mich. 441 (1881).
"Lewis v. State, 35 Ala. 380 (1860).
"HALL, op. cit. supra note 14, at 92; 2 STPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMtINAr,
LAW OF ENGLAND 227 (London: MacMillan and Co., 1883) ; Strayhorn, supra note
22, at 995.
" 2 WHARTON, op. cit. supra note 7, § 1592.
", Regina v. Hodgkiss, 11 Cox C. C. 365 (1869) ; Regina v. Stone, 6 Cox C. C.
235, 169 Eng. Rep. 715 (1853) ; Regina v. Chapman, 175 Eng. Rep. 356 (1850) ;Rex v. Taylor, 90 Eng. Rep. 1194 (1738). Each of these defendants was indicted
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cases somewhat in point seem to infer that the notion of "legal impossi-
bility" should preclude conviction.8 6
What seems to be involved in the examples cited by the court in State
v. Latiolais is the label "legal impossibility." Thus, if the general rule
of "legal impossibility" is followed, the defendant in such circumstances
should be acquitted. But should the determination of whether certain
acts constitute criminal attempts turn on the labeling of various circum-
stances as "legally impossible" or "factually impossible ?" That is what
the courts have done in many cases, but a reference to them will indicate
that this is not a wholly satisfactory procedure.
It is submitted that the rule of "legal impossibility" is of no relevance
to attempted perjury (or other criminal attempts). It must be remem-
bered that what is involved in all attempt cases is the absence of a
material element of the substantive crime ;37 and that that absence creates
the failure of consummation of the intended substantive crime. To label a
circumstance "legally impossible" is merely to designate a missing mate-
rial element of the substantive crime. In that respect, a "legally impos-
sible" circumstance merely possesses-what is common to all other attempt
situations, that is, a factual circumstance which prevents commission of
the substantive crime. Consider a classic case of "factual impossibility"-
the' thief who picks an empty pocket,38 with a classic case of "legal im-
possibility"-the thief who buys goods that he wrongly thinks are stolen
from the true owner.3 9 In the former the defendant was held guilty of
attempted larceny, and in the latter the defendant was held not guilty
of an attempt to receive stolen goods. In the pickpocket case, it was
for perjury. In Rex v. Taylor, the court merely discussed an evidentiary question.
In Regina v. Hodgkiss and Regina v. Chapman, no case for perjury could be made
out, so the courts found the defendants guilty of a misdemeanor, more for making
false affidavits under prohibition of statute than for attempting perjury. No men-
tion of attempt was made at all. The cases seemed to be simply statutory cases of
false swearing, for which the defendants had not been properly indicted. There is
some sign of attempted perjury in Regina v. Stone. There the defendant swore to
a false affidavit for use in the Admiralty Court, but the official did not have author-
ity to give the oath or take the affidavit for that purpose. The court held that the
defendant would not be guilty of perjury, but "would be guilty of a misdemeanor-
for he would thereby attempt to fraud the court." Regina v. Stone, 6 Cox C. C.
at 240. It is interesting to note that the English Reprint report, written in some-
what different language, does not contain the clause "for he would thereby attempt
to fraud the court."
" One held that the defendant could not be guilty of an attempt to obtain a school
warrant from a board of school officials, if the officials had no legal authority to
issue a valid warrant. State v. Lawrence, 178 Mo. 350, 77 S. W. 497 (1903). The
other held that the defendant could not be guilty, of an attempt to bribe an official
to vote for awarding a contract, when the official had no legal right or authority
to vote on the issue. State v. Butler, 178 Mo. 272, 77 S. W. 560 (1903).
"7 See HALL, op. cit. supra note 14, at 117-129.
" State v. Wilson, 30 Conn. 500 (1862) ; People v. Jones, 46 Mich. 441 (1881)
People v. Moran, 123 N. Y. 254, 25 N. E. 412 (1890) ; Regina v. Ring, 17 Cox C. C.
491, 66 L. T. 300 (1892) ; Regina v. Brown, 16 Cox C. C. 715, 61 L. T. 594 (1889).
: 185 N. Y. 497, 78 N. E. 169 (1906).
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impossible for the defendant to violate the law of larceny. And in the
stolen goods case, it was impossible for the defendant to violate the law
of criminal receiving. In one case, the fact that the pocket was empty,
and in the other, the fact that the goods had been surreptitiously returned
to the true owner's control prevented commission of the intended sub-
stantive crime. In both cases, the law was dealing with thieves who had
done all they could to achieve success in a manifestly anti-social enter-
prise. For penological purposes, both defendants were thieves, and both
had engaged in open thievery. In both cases, a factual circumstance was
the essential factor which prevented the commission of the substantive
crime.
The same argument holds true in other cases of "legal impossibility."
For example, the fact that a boy is under the statutory age precludes his
being held guilty of rape.40 But if he possesses the intent to ravish a
woman and does some act toward the accomplishment of that end, why
should he not be held guilty of an attempted rape? If it is believed that
he should not be so convicted, such a conclusion should be based on
reasoning other than that it was "legally impossible" for him to commit
the crime of rape.41  It would seem therefore that the rule of "legal
impossibility" is circumscribed by the rule of "factual impossibility."
Thus one writer has been led to the conclusion that "there is no such
thing as 'legal impossibility,' ",42 and that in criminal attempts only
"factual impossibility" is relevant. 43
The significance of "impossibility" circumstances has been sum-
marized by Professor Hall as follows: "(1) that unless the objective
sought is legally proscribed, the doing of it is not criminal nor is any
conduct falling short of it a criminal attempt ... ; and (2) if the end
sought is legally proscribed, the failure to attain it, because of the lack
of a factual condition necessary to its attainment, is no defense." 44 Thus,
it is what the defendant believes he is doing that is important. If what
the defendant intends is not a crime, no act falling short of it will be
criminal. But if the result which he thinks he can accomplish-his
expectations as he conceived them-is a crime, action which does not
result in commission of the crime may nevertheless be a criminal attempt.
Thus, since all "impossibility" is "factual," and since that should be
no defense, "impossibility" is not a criterion to be utilized in determining
whether a given overt act is a criminal attempt, but is merely a term
40 Foster v. Commonwealth, 96 Va. 306, 311, 31 S. E. 503, 505 (1898).
4 1, [T]he simple holding that age is also a material fact in the criminal attempt
suffices." HALL, op. cit. supra note 14, at 127.
'2 1d. at 118.




descriptive of some types of circumstances which operate to prevent
commission of the substantive crime.45
We are left, then, with the question of what criteria should be utilized
in determining when an overt act, failing to effect the commission of the
crime intended, becomes a criminal attempt.
It must be remembered that at very early common law attempts to
commit crimes were not punished, simply for the reason that they were
not regarded as harmfil.46 And it was not until the 17th and 18th cen-
turies that the English courts began recognizing certain attempts as
criminal.4 7  During that period, courts, apparently with no conscious
design, began to realize that certain attempts to commit crimes were
harmful to society and should be punished. However inarticulate their
motivations may have been, courts slowly recognized that certain at-
tempts constituted punishable behavior that was antithetical to the in-
terests of social welfare and detrimental to the existence of a well-
ordered society. This rationale of attempts led to the formulation of the
doctrine that an attempt to commit a crime is criminal.
Since the origin of this doctrine, the maze created by the voluminous
number of court decisions has tended to obscure the rationale and its
function. The rationale recognizes that certain attempts to commit
crimes ought to be punished. The function of the rationale is the deter-
mination of whether the defendant's ultimate objective as he conceived
it is legally proscribed, and, if it is, whether the steps taken toward its
consummation produce sufficient external harm to society to justify legal
cognizance and punishment. What is important is not how "dangerously
"',The most significant effort to deal with the problems of attempt and "impos-
sibility" is found in Wis. CRIm. CODE § 339.32 (1953) : "(2) An attempt to commit
a crime requires that the actor have an intent to commit that crime and that he
either :
(a) Does all the acts which he believes necessary to commit the crime; or
(b) Does acts which go far enough toward the commission of the crime to
demonstrate unequivocally, under all the circumstances, that a person having formed
that intent and having gone that far would normally commit the crime except for
the intervention of another person or some other extraneous factor. This para-
graph does not apply if the actor voluntarily changes his intent and decides not to
commit the crime.
(3) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this section that, because of a
mistake of fact or law other than criminal law, which does not negative the actor's
intent to commit the crime, it would have been impossible for him to commit the
crime attempted."
" "Apparently in those forthright days, a miss was as good as a mile." Id. at
64. Bracton quoted what was apparently a maxim of the day, "'For what harm did
the attempt cause, since the injury took no effect?"' 2 BRAcrON, DE LEGIBUS Er
CONSUrTDIus ANGLIAE 337, f. 128, 13 (Twiss ed.; London: Longman and Co.,
1878).
"Authorities are in disagreement as to whether the doctrine of criminal attempts
was born in the Court of the Star Chamber. Compare HALL, op. cit. supra note
14, at 72-81 with 2 STEPHEN, op. cit. supra note 33, at 223. Stephen is of the
opinion that the doctrine originated in that court. But Professor Hall believes that
it did not receive expression until 1801. HALT- at 87. On the history of criminal
attempts, see HAL at 61-88.
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close" the act comes within completion of the substantive crime, or how
"impossible" it is to commit the crime, but rather whether the external
harm created by the overt act is of such magnitude that it can be recog-
nized and identified as an act which ought to be punished.
The determination of the criminality of overt acts must be left to the
courts, for the law of criminal attempts presupposes that statutory crimi-
nal prohibitions cannot be all-inclusive of human conduct that should be
punishable. The law of criminal attempts therefore gives the courts a
power 4 3 to extend the rationale of prohibited substantive crimes to in-
clude conduct which, though not within the definition of a substantive
crime, ought not to go unpunished.49
Criteria that may be applied in determining whether certain acts
constitute criminal attempts are: (1) what is the rationale of the pro-
hibited substantive crime;5° (2) what is the nature of the defendant's
intent and overt act;,1 (3) what is the extent of the external harm to
society created by the defendant's act ;52 and (4) do the rationale of the
substantive crime and the extent of the external harm justify legal cog-
nizance and punishment of the defendant's act ?53
These criteria can be applied to the instance case. The commission
of the crime of perjury is a flagrant exhibition of contempt for the or-
ganized proceedings of government, which if left unpunished would
eventually lead to a chaotic state of government. The rationale of its
statutory prohibition recognizes: (1) the essentiality of soliciting truthful
testimony from citizens for effective performance of various govern-
mental functions; and (2) for the purpose of minimizing obstructions
to the accomplishment of that end, the essentiality of preserving the
solemnity of the oath and the dignity of the courts, tribunals and other
agencies of government. The defendant in State v. Latiolais intended to
commit perjury before. an apparently legally authorized governmental
48 See Arnold, Criminal Attempts-The Rise and Fall of an Abstraction, 40 YALE
L. J. 53, 75-80 (1930).
" Thus, in dealing with a given overt act, it is necessary to understand the
rationale of the substantive crime attempted, in addition to the rationale of attempts.
"' Determination of the rationale of the prohibited substantive crime involves a
consideration of what human action is proscribed by the prohibition, a consideration
of the policy underlying the particular prohibition (i.e., why such action is deemed
punishable), and a consideration of theories of punishment underlying the entire
field of criminal law and their relation to the policy of the particular prohibition.
This determination lays the foundation for the consideration of whether the de-
fendant's acts should be punished.
" This criterion merely involves the determination of the physical aspects of the
defendant's actions.
2 Determination of external harm will depend upon the nature of the defendant's
action, the nature (i.e., the physical aspects) and the rationale of the prohibited
substantive crime, and the functions of the mental element and the overt act. See
notes 16 and 17 supra for a discussion of the meaning of external harm and some of
the problems involved in recognizing external harm.
" This determination will of course depend primarily upon the attitude and ap-
proach of each court or jurisdiction.
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agency, and made. a false statement under oath before that agency. His
effort was frustrated only by the fact that for some reason the agency
was either unauthorized to receive his testimony or by the fact that the
official administering the oath was unauthorized to administer it. The
defendant's acts, though not constituting perjury, nevertheless seem to
be within the scope of the rationale of the substantive crime.
To permit such actions to go unpunished because of "legal impossi-
bility" would not only condone planned and deliberate contempt of legal
proceedings, but would make criminality turn on rules which have no
functional relevance to the determination of whether the defendant's be-
havior should be punished. It would seem under such circumstances
that a court should be justified in punishing the defendant's actions as a
criminal attempt.
J. THOMAS MANN.
Dead Bodies-Autopsies--Authority to Use Parts Removed in
Treatment of the Living
Medical science has made great progress in the use of tissue, bone,
and other matter removed from deceased persons in the treatment of
living patients,1 but in North Carolina the sources of supply of such
matter are limited because of areas of uncertainty in the law with regard
to property and disposition rights in dead bodies.2
North Carolina seems to be in accord with the general rule that a
dead body is not property, in the ordinary sense.3 However, a right of
testamentary disposition is recognized by the court,4 and provided for
by statute.5 In the absence of such disposition, there is a right to pos-
1 "It is becoming increasingly easy to use organs and tissues from deceased per-
sons (cadavers) in treating and sometimes curing, otherwise fatal diseases in living
patients. There is a good possibility that within 10 years it will be possible to
transplant complex organs from a cadaver to a living person." Letter from John
B. Graham, M.D., Department of Pathology, University of North Carolina School
of Medicine, to Richard A. Myren, Assistant Director, Institute of Government.
University of North Carolina, March 7, 1955. The Raleigh Times, March 28, 1955,
p. 9, col. 6, reported the successful transplantation of four ribs, a collarbone, and a
breastbone from the body of a deceased person to that of a living person. Colliers,
April 25, 1953, pp. 74-77.
. Although medical schools obtain cadavers for use in the study of anatomy under
the authority of N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-211, et seq. (1950), these sections do not
authorize the use of parts of such bodies in the treatment of patients.
' Travelers' Insurance Co. v. Welch, 82 F. 2d 799 (5th Cir. 1936) ; Gray v.
Southern Pacific Co., 21 Cal. App. 2d 240, 68 P. 2d 1011 (1937) ; Pierce v. Pro-
prietors, 10 R. I. 227 (1872) ; Koerber v. Patek, 123 Wis. 453, 102 N. W. 40 (1905).
Accord, Kyles v. Southern Ry. Co., 147 N. C. 394, 61 S. E. 278 (1908). But see
Bonaparte v. Fraternal Funeral Home, 206 N. C. 652, 175 S. E. 137 (1934).
'Kyles v. Southern Ry. Co., supra note 3. 25 C. J. S., Dead Bodies § 9 (1941).
r"... nothing in §§ 90-211 through 90-216, inclusive, shall prevent a person
from making testamentary disposition of his or her body after death." N. C. GEN.
STAT. § 90-213 (1950). N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-216.1, et seq. (Supp. 1953) provides
for the testamentary donation of one's body to certain institutions for the rehabili-
tation of the maimed.
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session in the surviving spouse, if any, and then in the next of kin, for
purposes of preservation and burial. 6 Nowhere does the North Carolina
court intimate that the right of possession exists for any other purpose,
and no North Carolina statute specifically provides for sale, donation,
or other disposition of a dead body by the surviving spouse or next of
kin.
If there were legal authority to do so, parts removed during the
course of an authorized autopsy could be preserved and later used in the
treatment of patients.7 The right to perform an autopsy in North Caro-
lina is limited "to cases specially provided by statute ..... 8  The statutes
which so provide define certain conditions under which an autopsy may
be ordered under governmental authority without the consent of the per-
son entitled to possession of the body,0 and other circumstances under
which the consent of such person specifically is required. 10 None of
these statutes, however, authorizes the retention of parts removed or
their use in the treatment of patients.
In other jurisdictions, where authority to perform an autopsy is
given in general terms, without specific limitations, it has been held that
there is included by implication the right to remove such parts of the
body for any further microscopic examination as is necessary and proper
to accomplish the purpose of the autopsy. 1 However, in all cases ex-
amined, the attitude of the court was clearly opposed to the idea that a
general authorization to perform an autopsy might include the right to
retain parts removed for any purpose other than examination for a
reasonable time. 12 It is apparent from a study of these cases that those
'Lamm v. Shingleton, 231 N. C. 10, 55 S. E. 2d 810 (1949); Gurganious v.
Simpson, 213 N. C. 613, 197 S. E. 163 (1938); Bonaparte v. Fraternal Funeral
Home, 206 N. C. 652, 175 S. E. 137 (1934) ; Kyles v. Southern Ry. Co., 147 N. C.
394, 61 S. E. 278 (1908) ; Note, 30 N. C. L. REv. 299 (1952) ; 15 Am. JuR., Dead
Bodies § 9 (1938).
'After six days in storage, a six inch long piece of aorta was successfully trans-
planted to the body of a living person. Science News Letter, Jan. 30, 1954, p. 71,
col. 3.
IN. C. GEN. STAT. § 90-217 (1950) (This section also provides the right to
perform an autopsy "by direction or will of the deceased .. .and [in] cases where
the husband or wife or one of the next of kin or nearest known relative or other
person charged by law with the duty of burial, in the order named and as known,
shall authorize such examination or autopsy.").
' N. C. GEN. STAT. § 15-7 (1953) (Officer prosecuting for the state in cases of
homicide) ; N. C. GEN. STAT. § 90-213 (1950) (Chairman of N. C. Board of Anat-
omy) ; N. C. GEN. STAT. § 90-217 (1950) (Coroner or majority of coroner's jury);
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 152-7 (6) (1952) (Coroner, coroner's jury, or solicitor).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. § 90-220 (1950) requires "the written consent of the de-
ceased person's husband or wife, or one of the next of kin, or nearest known rela-
tive or other person charged by law with the duty of burial, in the order named
and as known" before the administrative head of a public institution for the care of
the sick, insane, etc. may authorize a post mortem examination upon the body of a
person dying while an inmate of such institution.
"' Palmquist v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 3 F. Supp. 358 (S. D. Cal. 1933);
Winkler v. Hawkes, 126 Iowa 474, 102 N. W. 418 (1905).
12 Palmquist v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 3 F. Supp. 358, 359 (S. D. Cal. 1933),
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performing an autopsy, even when properly authorized, are under a
clear duty to replace in the body before burial all parts removed, 13 and
that the next of kin of the deceased have a cause of action against such
persons for any violation of this duty.' 4  North Carolina has imposed
liability upon those performing an autopsy at the order of a coroner
when the order is later found to have been improperly issued,15 and it
seems clear that liability would also accrue in such a case for retention
of parts removed.
It remains to be considered whether consent to the performance of
an autopsy may lawfully include permission to retain and use removed
parts in the treatment of patients. If a dead body is not property, and
the property right, or quasi property right, in the surviving spouse or
next of kin is solely for the purpose of preservation and burial, it would
seem to follow that the person entitled to possession of the body has no
power to grant such permission. Since consent to have an autopsy per-
formed is based upon statutory provision in North Carolina,' 6 and since
that statutory provision is for consent only to the performance of an
autopsy, it would seem that there is no basis for consent to retention and
later use of parts removed.' 7
"No right was possessed by the insurance company other than to make an autopsy.
This included acts and operations necessarily involved therein. It contemplated
removal of the internal organs, but did not contemplate their retention." Robertson
v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 232 Iowa 743, 6 N. W. 2d 153 (1942) (The court deemed
the demand of the insurance company for an autopsy to be unreasonable because
it included the authority to retain parts of the body removed, whereas the policy
gave only a general right to have an autopsy performed.).
" It re Disinterment of Body of Jarvis, 244 Iowa 1025, 1032, 58 N. W. 2d 24,
28 (1953). A court order granting an application to have an autopsy performed
included authority to remove such "organs from the body . . . as may be required
to effectively perform such autopsy, provided, however, such organs or parts of
organs so removed, except only such portions thereof as inay be necessary to be
subjected to microscopic examination, shall be restored to their normal place in the
body prior to reburial." On appeal, the italicized portion was modified to read,
"except only shavings or such slivers of tissue as may be necessary to subject to
microscopic examination," and the order was approved.
1" Palmquist v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 3 F. Supp. 358 (S. D. Cal. 1933) ; Gould
v. State, 181 Misc. 884, 46 N. Y. S. 2d 313 (Sup. Ct. 1944) semble; Koerber v.
Patek, 123 Wis. 453, 102 N. W. 40 (1905). But cf. Gray v. Southern Pacific Co.,
21 Cal. App. 2d 240, 68 P. 2d 1011 (1937).
11 Gurganious v. Simpson, 213 N. C. 613, 197 S. E. 163 (1938).
10 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 90-217 (1950) ; N. C. GEN. STAT. § 152-7 (6) (1952) (It
is the duty of the coroner to have a post-mortem examination performed "upon
the request of ... any member of the family of the deceased. .. ").
17 The effect of consent to the use of parts removed for purposes of treatment
of patients apparently has not been decided in this jurisdiction. The question raises
a number of problems beyond the scope of this note. For example, would such
consent be an absolute defense to a suit for mutilation of the body if the court held
that the person giving the consent was not authorized to do so? Even if consent
were a good defense in such a case, would the agency retaining the parts removed
be protected by the consent of only the person entitled to possession, or would it be
necessary for complete protection to get the written consent of all of the next of
kin entitled to sue for mutilation of the body? The difficulty of determining with
certainty the identity of such person or persons is. apparent, e.g., where the deceased
was living apart from his wife at the time of his death and the next of kin lived
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A desirable solution of the problem might be obtained by means of
several slight statutory modifications, viz.:
(1) The statutes providing for testamentary disposition of one's
body to certain institutions for the rehabilitation of the maimed 18 could
be reworded so as to give a present right of disposition for similar pur-
poses to the surviving spouse or next of kin, in the absence of such testa-
mentary disposition.
(2) The statutes providing for the distribution of cadavers to medi-
cal schools' 9 could be modified so as to include a specific grant of such
bodies to medical schools for the additional purpose of obtaining material
to be used in the treatment of the living.
(3) The autopsy statutes20 could be reworded to authorize the de-
livery to public institutions for the rehabilitation of the maimed of all
parts and other material removed, upon completion of the examination,
with the written consent of the person entitled to possession of the body,
if known.
It is submitted that the enactment of such amendments would serve
not only to enhance the development of medical science in the field of
transplantation in North Carolina, but would also serve to clarify in some
measure the uncertainty in the law of this state with regard to the rights
of others in the bodies of deceased persons.
ROYAL G. SHANNONHOUSE, III.
Criminal Law-Insanity as a Defense-New Test for Determining
In the important case of Durham v. United States defendant had
been discharged from the United States Navy in 1945 at the age of
seventeen, after a psychiatric examination showed that he was mentally
unfit for Naval service because of a personality disorder.' During the
succeeding eight years he attempted suicide, was convicted of stealing
cars and passing bad checks, and was committed three different times to
mental hospitals. Two months after his third release from a mental
hospital, he was caught breaking into a house. Again he was committed
to a mental hospital. Finally, in February of 1953, he was brought to
trial in the United States District Court in the District of Columbia
in other sections of the country. From whom would the performing agency obtain
the consent where the deceased was survived by several children by two marriages
when neither wife survived him? Since consent to retention is, in effect, a dona-
tion, the statutes providing for consent to the performance of an autopsy do not
provide the answers to these questions.
"- N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-216.1 et seq. (Supp. 1953).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-211 et seq. (1950).
20 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 15-7 (1953) ; N. C, GEN. STAT. §§ 90-217 et seq. (1950);
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 152-7 (6) (1952). See also N. C. GEN. STAT. § 90-216.1 (Supp.
1953).
1 Durham v. United States, 214 F. 2d 862 (D. C. Cir. 1954).
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charged with housebreaking. The only defense raised was that of in-
sanity at the time the crime was committed.
During the trial, an expert witness testified'at least four different
times that defendant was of unsound mind at the time the crime was
committed.2 Yet the trial court, without a jury, convicted accused of
housebreaking. The basis for the conviction was very simple: the ex-
pert witness would not testify to the fact that defendant did not "know"
"the difference between right and wrong in connection with governing
his own actions."3
The test applied by the district court was that set out in the cele-
brated M'Naghten case, 4 a test which has been adopted by a majority
of the states5 and the Supreme Court of the United States. 6 Many states
and the District of Columbia (until the Durham case) have added to
the right and wrong test, the irresistible impulse test.7 Yet this defend-
ant, an acknowledged mental case, received no benefit from either of
these rules in the district court. The court of appeals, however, reversed
the district court, set out a new test by which mental responsibility is to
be determined, and sent the case back for a new trial. And the court of
appeals abandoned completely the old right and wrong test which has so
long held sway over the defense of insanity in the criminal law.
Briefly, the circumstances under which. the right and wrong rule
was promulgated one hundred and twelve years ago by an English court
Id. at 866.
Id. at 868.
'8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
Leland v. Oregon, 343 U. S. 790 (1952) ; State v. Eisenstein, 72 Ariz. 320, 235
P. 2d 1011 (1951) ; People v. Field, 108 Cal. App. 2d 496, 238 P. 2d 1052 (1951) ;
Hall v. State, 78 Fla. 420, 83 So. 513 (1919) ; Griffin v. State, 208 Ga. 746, 69 S.E.
2d 192 (1952); State v. Powell, 71 Idaho 145, 227 P. 2d 582 (1951) ; State v.
Beckwith, 242 Ia. 228, 46 N. W. 2d 20 (1951) ; Fisher v. Fraser, 171 Kan. 472,
233 P. 2d 1066 (1951) ; State v. Johnston, 207 La. 161, 20 So. 2d 741 (1945) ; State
v. Knight, 95 Me. 467, 50 Atl. 276 (1901) ; Taylor v. State, 187 Md. 306, 49 A. 2d
787 (1946) ; State v. Simenson, 195 Minn. 258, 262 N. W. 638 (1935) ; McGann v.
State, 175 Miss. 320, 167 So. 53 (1938) ; State v. Barton, 361 Mo. 780, 236 S. W.
2d 596 (1951) ; Fisher v. State, 154 Neb. 166, 47 N. W. 2d 349 (1951) ; State v.
27 (1949); People v. Irwin, 166 Misc. 751, 4 N. Y. S. 2d 548 (Ct. Gen. Sess.
Skaug, 63 Nev. 59, 161 P. 2d 708 (1945) ; State v. Cordasco, 2 N. J. 189, 66 A. 2d
27 (1949) ; People v. Irwin, 166 Misc. 751, 4 N. Y. S. 2d 548 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1938) ;
State v. Shackleford, 232 N. C. 299, 59 S. E. 2d 825 (1951) ; State v. Barry, 11
N. D. 428, 92 N. W. 809 (1903) ; Kobyluk v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. Rep. 73, 231
P. 2d 388 (1951) ; State v. Layton, 174 Ore. 217, 148 P. 2d 522 (1944) ; Comm. v.
Neill, 362 Pa. 507, 67 A. 2d 276 (1949) ; State v. Gardner, 219 S. C. 97, 64 S. E.
2d 130 (1951) ; State v. Leehman, 2 S. D. 171, 49 N. W. 3 (1891) ; Gibbs v. State,
192 Tenn. 529, 241 S.W. 2d 556 (1951) ; McGee v. State, 155 Tex. Crim. 639, 238
S. IV. 2d 707 (1951) ; State v. Putzell, 40 Wash. 2d 174, 242 P. 2d 180 (1952) ;
State v. Harrison, 36 W. Va. 729, 15 S. E. 982 (1892) ; Simecek v. State, 243 Wis.
439, 10 N. W. 2d 161 (1943); GUTTMACHER AND WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE
LAw 403 (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1952); WEIHOFEN,
MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 68, 129-173 (Buffalo: Dennis and Co.,
Inc., 1954).C Davis v. United States, 160 U. S. 469, 488 (1895).
'WEIHOFEN, Op. cit. supra note 5, at 129-173; Keedy, Irresistible Impulse As a
Defense in the Criminal Law, 100 U. OF PA. L. REv. 956 (1952).
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were these: M'Naghten, a paranoiac under delusions of persecution,
shot and killed the secretary to Sir Robert Peel in an attempt to kill
Peel. M'Naghten was found not guilty because of insanity. The case
aroused a great deal of public interest and debate, prompting the House
of Lords to ask the fifteen highest judges of England to state the law
governing such cases. These judges stated that in order to establish the
defense of insanity, it must be "proved to the satisfaction of the jury"
that:
"at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was
laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind,
as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or
if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was
wrong."8
At the time this case was decided, Francis Gall's theory of phrenology
was the accepted view in medicine. 9 The fifteen English judges evidently
were influenced by Gall's theory' 0 for they spoke of a person suffering
from delusions "and not in other respects insane."11  Thus it would
appear that the judges had the idea that if the particular section of the
brain governing reason and logic were not unbalanced, the person was
sane and capable of committing a criminal act. It made no difference
that the person was totally insane in other sections of the brain.
The irresistible impulse rule needs little explanation, for it is exactly
what the name implies. The person compelled to commit a criminal act
by an impluse produced by a mental disease which is beyond his power
to control, may be excused from criminal responsibility.' 2 The Supreme
Court of the United States stated the irresistible impulse rule in con-
junction with the M'Naghten rule as follows:
"The term 'insanity' as used in this defence means such a per-
verted and deranged condition of the mental and moral faculties as
to render a person incapable of distinguishing between right and
' M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843).
' Gall declared that the brain was divided into twenty-seven different sections or
organs, each section controlling a particular trait of the person. The dominant trait
of a person depended on which section was the largest, and the size of each section
could be ascertained by studying the shape of the skull. GLUECIC, MENTAL DISORDER
AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 170 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1925) ; GuTr-
MACHER AND WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 418 (New York: W. W. Nor-
ton and Company, Inc., 1952); WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER As A CRIMINAL
DEFENSE 3-4 (Buffalo: Dennis and Co., Inc., 1954).
'0 "It seems not at all improbable that the learned judges . . . had a sentimental
weakness for phrenology." GLUECK, op. cit. supra note 9, at 170. "It is this dis-
carded fanciful brain-child of an eccentric Viennese physician of a hundred and
thirty years ago that underlies the cornerstone of our law governing the criminal
responsibility of the mentally sound." WEiHOFEN, op. cit. supra note 9, at 4.
"M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843).12U. S. ex rel. Wing v. Pennsylvania, 90 F. Supp. 208 (W. D. Penn. 1950).
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wrong, or unconscious at the time of the nature of the act he is
committing, or where, though conscious of it and able to distin-
guish between right and wrong and know that the act is wrong,
yet his will, by which I mean the governing power of his mind,
has been otherwise than voluntarily so completely destroyed that
his actions are not subject to it, but are beyond his control."' 3
By applying the irresistible impulse rule with the M'Naghten rule, the
scope of insanity sufficient to excuse a criminal act is increased.
North Carolina follows the majority of American jurisdictions in
applying the M'Naghten rule. 14  In State v. Haywood, the following
charge to the jury was called to the attention of trial court judges as
being a proper one to use:
"That if the prisoner, at the time he committed the homicide,
was in a state to comprehend his relations to other persons, the
nature of the act and its criminal character, or, in other words, if
he was conscious of doing wrong at the time he committed the
homicide, he is responsible. But if on the contrary, the prisoner
was under the visitation of God, and could not distinguish between
good and evil, and did not know what he did, he is not guilty of
any offense against the law; for guilt arises from the mind and
wicked will."' 5
Today, eighty-eight years later, this same charge or one very similar, is
still used.'0
The person compelled to commit a crime by an "irresistible impulse"
is denied the defense of insanity in North Carolina,17 for the reason stated
by Justice Bailey in State v. Brandon,
"The law does not recognize any moral power compelling one to
do what he knows is wrong .... There are many appetites and
passions which by long indulgence acquire a mastery over men
more or less strong. Some persons, indeed, deem themselves in-
capable of exerting strength of will sufficient to arrest their rule,
speak of them as irresistible, and impotently continue under their
dominion; but the law is far from excusing criminal acts com-
mitted under the impuse of such passions. . . . If the prisoner
13 Davis v. United States, 165 U. S. 373, 378 (1897).
14 State v. Shackelford, 232 N. C. 299, 59 S. E. 2d 825 (1950) ; State v. Hay-
wood, 61 N. C. 376 (1867) ; State v. Brandon, 53 N. C. 463 (1862) ; Gardner, In-
sanity As a Defense in the North Carolina Criminal Law, -30 N. C. L. REv. 4, 10
(1952).
1 State v. Haywood, supra note 14, at 377.
10 State v. Grayson, 239 N. C. 453, 80 S. E. 2d 387 (1954) ; State v. Shackleford,
232 N. C. 299, 59 S. E. 2d 825 (1950) ; State v. Creech, 229 N. C. 662, 51 S. E. 2d
348 (1949).
11 State v. Shackleford, supra note 16; Gardner, sipra note 14, at 18.
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knew that what he did was wrong, the law presumes that he had
the power to resist it against all supernatural agencies and holds
him amenable to punishment."' 8
It seems that the court has given little credence to the idea that "pas-
sions" and "supernatural agencies" could overcome the power of reason
to know right from wrong. In State v. Potts, Chief Justice Smith,
writing the majority opinion, said,
"We have not allowed, as exempting from the consequences of
crime, what is called moral insanity ;E11 that is, an alleged uncon-
trollable impulse to commit an act, with the mental faculties in full
force, to comprehend its criminality and wrong. '20
A fair interpretation of this language would indicate that the court has
not been persuaded that the emotional "section" of the brain could in-
fluence the reasoning "section" of the brain; otherwise how could the
person have his "mental faculties in full force, to comprehend its crimi-
nality and wrong"?
It was stated in State v. Bracy that:
"Whatever may be his mental weakness, if a person has knowl-
edge and consciousness that the act he is doing is wrong and will
deserve punishment whatever may be his mental weakness, he is
in the eye of the law of sound mind and memory, and subject to
punishment." 2
1
It seems a bit inconsistent to recognize a person's mental weakness in
one sentence, yet declare him to be of sound mind in the next sentence.
Therefore, a proper conclusion would seem to be that the court not
only follows the rule of M'Naghten's case, but in denying the irresistible
impulse test, follows the medical rationale on which the reasoning of
the M'Naghten case is based. The North Carolina Supreme Court
recognizes that intelligence and reasoning can be overcome only by a
"visitation of God" 22 and the defense of insanity is not available unless
reason has been overcome.23
18 State v. Brandon, 53 N. C. 463, 467-468 (1862).
" "Moral insanity" as used here means an irresistible impulse. See State v.
Terry, 173 N. C. 761, 765, 92 S. E. 154, 156 (1917).
.0 State v. Potts, 100 N. C. 457, 465, 6 S. E. 657, 660 (1887).
21 State v. Bracy, 215 N. C. 249, 256, 1 S. E. 2d 891, 896 (1939).
_ The court does not attempt to define of what a "visitation of God" consists.
Still this phrase is repeated in many of the older cases. See State v. Journegan,
185 N. C. 700, 117 S. E. 27 (1923) ; State v. English, 164 N. C. 498, 80 S. E. 72
(1913) ; State v. Spivey, 132 N. C. 989, 43 S. E. 475 (1903).
23 State v. Grayson, 239 N. C. 453, 80 S. E. 2d 387 (1954) (defendant was an
illiterate man 26 years old. He had congenital syphilis which resulted in chronic
infection of the brain and meninges. From 1944 until 1949, except for a period
of two months, he was confined in two mental hospitals. In July of 1949 he was
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It is submitted that the medical theory on which the M'Naghten case
was based is outdated, and thus the law of the case is outdated.2 4 Francis
Gall's "section" theory of the brain has been discredited. Modem medi-
cine has shown that the brain functions as a unit.25 A disorder to any
one part of the brain is a disorder to the whole.26 An emotional disorder
can overcome the power of reason in the strongest of persons.27 Thus
the person emotionally deranged may be driven to commit a crime which
he knows to be wrong.28 Tested by the traditional application of the
right and wrong standard, this person is guilty of a crime even though
it was not an act of his free will.
29
In recent years, the right and wrong rule has been the subject of
much criticism. 30 The North Carolina Supreme Court as early as 1935
released to his mother who was to place him in another mental hospital. Tests
showed his mental age to be four years, eleven months, and he had the intelligence
quotient of an imbecile. The court reversed a conviction of murder on the ground
that there was an error in the instructions, and awarded a new trial.) ; State v.
Shackleford, 232 N. C. 299, 59 S. E. 2d 825 (1950) (defendant had a long record
of maladjustment in his home life, had been tried for petty larceny, drunkenness,
immoral conduct, and reckless driving, and served time for killing a man while in
service. An expert witness testified that the defendant had a psychopathic per-
sonality. Still the defendant was convicted of rape and sentenced to die.) ; State
v. Potts, 100 N. C. 457, 6 S. E. 657 (1887) (dipsomanic convicted of murder).
2' It should be noted that some experts feel that it is not the law of the
M'Naghten Case that is outdated, but it is the interpretation of the law that is out-
dated. "[A] person who is prevented by mental disease from controlling his own
conduct cannot be said, in the true sense of the words, to 'know the nature of his
acts' and . . . he is therefore not criminally responsible under the existing law as
formulated in the M'Naghten Rules." Royal Commission on Capital Punishment
1949-1953 Report (Cmd. 8932) 80 (1953).
"2 "What is needed in the law . . . is a proper conception of the unified per-
sonality. Disease of the mind is disease of a unity. . . ." GLuECK, MENTAL Dis-
ORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAw 265-266 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company,
1925) ; Notes, 40 CORNELL L. Q. 135 (1954) ; 102 U. OF PA. L. Rxv. 224 (1954).
"0 "The intellect, the emotions, and the will are not disparate functions operating
in separate compartments of the brain, but are wholly interdependent, each reacting
on the other. A disorder manifesting itself in one sphere of mental activity is still
a disorder of the mind as a whole, and not merely of the one compartment."
WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER As A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 10 (Buffalo: Dennis and
Co., Inc., 1954).
27 GLUECK, op. cit. supra note 21, at 312; "On the basis of undeniable and over-
whelming clinical evidence, it has been proven that human behavior is basically
emotionally conditioned and that intellectual activities are emotionally determined."
Karpman, Concepts of Law and Psychiatry, 38 J. OF CR m. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY
206, 212 (1948).
8 DAVIDSON, FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 13 (New York: The Ronald Press Com-
pany, 1952) ; GLUECK, op. cit. supra note 21 at 312; MERCIER, CRIMINAL RESPON-
SmILITY 157 (New York: Physicians and Surgeons Book Co., 1926); Keedy,
Irresistible Impulse As a Defense in the Criminal Law, 100 U. OF PA. L. RaV. 956,
957 (1952) ; Weihofen and Overholser, Mental Disorder Affecting the Degree of
a Crime, 56 YALE L. J. 959, 975 (1947).
2 State v. Shackleford, 232 N. C. 299, 59 S. E. 2d 825 (1950) ; State v. Potts,
100 N. C. 457, 6 S. E. 657 (1887).
"0 In a recent poll, the question of the adequacy of the M'Naghten rule was sub-
mitted to a large group of psychiatrists in the United States. Eighty per cent
stated that the rule was unsatisfactory. In a similar poll among Canadian psy-
chiatrists, ninety per cent expressed dissatisfaction. GUTTmACHER AND WEIHOFEN,
PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAw 408 (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc.,
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recognized the fact that the rule was under attack, but refused to make
any change.3 ' In 1951, the Special Committee on Crime and Psychiatry
of the North Carolina Bar Association recommended that the legal test
of insanity "should be extended to include diseases which destroy will
power and volition and the capacity to control one's conduct."8 2
The Durham case is undoubtedly a result of this criticism for it
overruled the previous tests applied in the District of Columbia. 3 The
court of appeals, in reversing the district court by a unanimous decision
discarded the old right and wrong rule, saying:
"We find that as an exclusive criterion the right-wrong test is
inadequate in that (a) it does not take sufficient account of psychic
realities and scientific knowledge, and (b) it is based upon one
symptom and so cannot validly be applied in all circumstances. '3 4
The new test to be applied by the district court on retrial is simple in its
statement:
"An accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was
the product of mental disease or mental defect."35,
The mental-cause rule of the Durham case is not new in the United
States. Eighty-five years ago, in State v. Pike,30 the Supreme Court of
New Hampshire affirmed a similar rule which is still followed in that
state.37 The court of appeals probably used the New Hampshire rule
1952) ; Speaking of the M'Naghten standards, Dr. Gregory Zilboorg said, "These
moralistic criteria are the expression of man's horror of the revolting act of mur-
der, but they are disguised in the formalistic, quasi-metaphysical dress of centuries
gone by, which one is asked to accept as a judicial formula of logic and law."
ZILBooRG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL ACT AND PUNISHMENT 17 (New
York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 1954).
31 "We are aware of the criticism of this standard by some psychiatrists and
others." State v. Jenkins, 208 N. C. 740, 741, 182 S. E. 324, 325 (1935) ; The court
repeated this statement in State v. Creech, 229, N. C. 662, 51 S. E. 2d 348 (1949).
'230 N. C. L. REv. 25 (1951).
"' Durham v. United States, 214 F. 2d 862 (D. C. Cir. 1954).
"' Id. at 874. The irresistible impulse rule was found inadequate "in that it
gives no recognition to mental illness characterized by brooding and reflection and
so relegates acts caused by such illness to the application of the inadequate right-
wrong test." Id. at 874.
" Id. at 875. This test is now the sole legal test for insanity in criminal cases
in the District of Columbia, for the circuit court of appeals denied a rehearing en
banc on September 10, 1954, and the time limit for filing a writ of certiorari ex-
pired October 10, 1954. In the subsequent case of Stewart v. United States, 214
F. 2d 879 (D. C. Cir. 1954), the new test was held to be applicable.
"' The trial court of New Hampshire instructed the jury, "that whether there
is such a mental diseases as dipsomania, and whether defendant had that disease,
and whether the killing ... was the product of such disease, were questions of fact
for the jury." The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed this instruction.
49 N. H. 399, 407-408 (1870).
" The events preceding the New Hampshire case show that particular attention
was given to its decision. Chief Justice Doe had voluminous correspondence with
Dr. Issac Ray, a leading forensic psychiatrist, concerning responsibility of a men-
tally disordered person. See: Reik, The Doe-Ray Correspondence: A Pioneer Col-
laboration in the Jurisprudence of Mental Disease, 63 YALE L. REv. 183 (1953).
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in formulating its own, for it said, "The rule . . . is not unlike that
followed by the New Hampshire court since 1870. ' '38
The application of the rule by the court presents no great problem.
The court of appeals' proposed charge to the jury3 9 suggests the pro-
cedure applicable. Evidence is received concerning the mental disease4"
or the mental defect.41 This will, of course, include the use of expert
witnesses. It is then left to the jury to determine (a) if the defendant
had a mental disease or mental defect, and (b) if the criminal act was
"caused" by the mental disease or defect. The jury must find both for
insanity to be a good defense. The application of the rule is somewhat
similar to that applied in tort cases where negligence is involved.4
2
The function of the expert witness is to describe the mental condition
of the accused. No longer does he have to pass upon the very issue of
insanity by testifying to the ability of the defendant to distinguish right
from wrong.43 The issue of insanity must be determined by the jury
from the evidence before it, as it properly should be. This also leaves
the psychiatrist free to use the terminology of his profession rather than
to try to interpret his diagnoses into legal terms.
Nor is there any greater chance that the defendant can feign insanity
under this mental-cause rule. For there are the same two safe-guards
provided: the expert witness and the jury. Under the right and wrong
rule, the testimony of the expert witness, in effect, decides the outcome
of the insanity issue as was demonstrated in the Durham case at the trial
in the district court. Under the new rule, the expert witness testifies
only as to mental condition and the jury determines the issue of respon-
sibility. Thus, if one does not catch the pretense, the other should.
The Durham case represents an attempt to get away from a legal
"8 Durham v. United States, 214 F. 2d 862, 874 (1954).
" "If you the jury believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was not
suffering from a diseased or defective mental condition at the time he committed
the criminal act charged, you may find him guilty. If you believe he was suffering
from a diseased or defective mental condition when he committed the act, but believe
beyond a reasonable doubt that the act was not the product of such mental abnor-
mality, you may find him guilty. Unless you believe beyond a reasonable doubt
either that he was not suffering from a diseased or defective mental condition, or
that the act was not the product of such abnormality, you must find the accused
not guilty by reason of insanity. Thus your task would not be completed upon
finding, if you did find, that the accused suffered from a mental disease or defect.
He would still be responsible for his unlawful act if there was no causal connection
between such mental abnormality and the act. These questions must be determined
by you from the facts which you find to be fairly deducible from the testimony and
the evidence in this case." Id. at 875.
"' "We use 'disease' in the sense of a condition which is considered capable of
either improving or deteriorating." Ibid.
" "We use 'defect' in the sense of a condition which is not considered capable
of either improving or deteriorating and which may be either congenital, or the
result of injury, or the residual effect of a physical or mental disease." Ibid.
"-'Henderson v. Henderson, 239 N. C. 484, 490, 80 S. E. 2d 383, 385 (1954),
which states law of proximate cause for negligence.
" STANSBURY, THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW OF EVIDENCE 238.
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definition of insanity. The authorities in the field of psychiatry concede
that insanity cannot be defined.44 The attempts of the courts to reach a
legal definition of that state of mental disorder which renders a crime
excusable have met with some difficulties because of the different inter-
pretations of the terminology used and the difficulty of translating medi-
cal testimony into the legal terms used in the tests. The Durham case
presents no standard to which the court may point and attempt to com-
pare with the mind of the defendant. It is unnecessary under this test
for the expert witness to attempt to translate the terms of his profession
into legal concepts.
Perhaps the Durham case also represents a more humanitarian ap-
proach to the problem of the mentally disordered criminal, for rehabili-
tation rather than punishment could be stressed under this rule.4 5 Take,
for example, the person with a psychopathic personality. He is able to
distinguish right from wrong, but has no control over his will due to
emotional instability. He lives for the present, not the future, and any
present impulse will control over the threat of possible punishment in
the future.40  The court of appeals speaks of the type of "mental illness
characterized by brooding and reflection.1 47  That is the person who
knows that society has declared an act to be wrong, but after much de-
liberation decides in his warped manner of thinking that it is better to
commit the wrong act.
It would serve no useful purpose to send this type of mentally ill
prisoner off to prison to become even more unbalanced and antisocial.
An eminent psychiatrist has said,
"The belief that society serves the common and individual good
by a system of rigid punishment has never been fully justified by
history, and its persistence looks more and more like supersition
than conviction based on fact."14 8
" GUTTMACHER AND WEIEOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 419-420 (New
York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1952).
" A finding of insanity by the jury would not result in the complete discharge of
the prisoner, instead he should be committed to a hospital for treatment. This
would entail having available adequate facilities and personnel to accommodate such
patients. Unfortunately North Carolina appears unwilling to provide adequately
for the criminally insane as was demonstrated by the recent defeat of H. P_ 48 deal-
ing with sexual psychopaths. Lack of facilities to handle those committed under the
proposed statute would seem to be the reason for its defeat.
" WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 23 (Buffalo: Dennis
and Co., Inc., 1954).
" Durham v. United States, 214 F. 2d 862, 874 (D. C. Cir. 1954).
"8 Dr. Zilboorg believes that society is too concerned with the idea of seeking
revenge against the violator of the law. He agrees that a criminal should be pun-
ished for his crimes when punishment would be effective, but in the case of mentally
ill prisoners, punishment has little or no effect as a deterrent of future crimes.
ZILBOORG, THE PSYcHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL ACT AND PUNISHMENT 97 (New
York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 1954); "Punishment, in such instances, is
not useful as a means of dissuading the offender from repeating his unlawful act.
." Waelder, Psychiatry and the Problem of Criminal Responsibility, 101 U. OF
PA. L. REv. 378, 379 (1952).
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A program of rehabilitation based on psychiatric treatment could cure
the accused in many cases, and by doing this, more serious crimes in
the future would be prevented. It is society, not the defendant, which
will receive the chief benefits from this rule.
In a dissenting opinion in a case in the United States Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit, there was a statement suggestive of
the North Carolina situation,
"The rule of M'Naghten's case was created by decision. Perhaps




Criminal Law-Improper Court Response to Spontaneous Jury
Inquiry as to Pardon and Parole Possibilities
Does a jury which has "unbridled discretion" to recommend life
imprisonment in a capital case have a right to consider what effect
parole and pardon may have upon that sentence? North Carolina first
answered this question in State v. Dockery,' where a private prosecutor
referred to parole possibilities in his argument before the jury. In
reversing, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that such argument
was prejudicial and directly in conflict with the 1949 statutory proviso
which granted to juries the right to recommend life imprisonment in
capital cases.2  Recently, in State v. Conner,3 the problem arose in a
different manner. Here, the jury spontaneously returned to the court
room after having deliberated for some time, and one of the jurors asked
the court the following question: "Will the defendant be eligible for
parole if given life imprisonment?" The court replied without elabora-
tion, "Gentlemen, I cannot answer that question." The supreme court
held that the presiding judge was correct in refraining from commenting
on defendant's eligibility for parole, because such matters are deemed
in law to be irrelevant to the issues involved in the case and prejudicial
to the accused. The court granted a new trial, however, on the ground
that once such a question was propounded, it became the duty of the
presiding judge to positively charge the jury to put the question and
matters relating thereto out of their minds.
The courts have long been divided as to the permissibility of an
explanation, in response to queries from the jury, of the possible effect of
"United States v. Baldi, 192 F. 2d 540, 568 (3rd Cir. 1951). The dissentingjudges were Biggs, McLaughlin, and Staley.
1 238 N. C. 222, 77 S. E. 2d 664 (1953).
2 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1953). The 1949 proviso referred to above by the
court was added to this section by the 1949 Session Laws of North Carolina, Chap-
ter 299, section 1.
241 N. C. 468, 85 S. E. 2d 584 (1955).
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pardon and parole upon a sentence. North Carolina's position is that
of perhaps a bare majority of jurisdictions, 4 with the exception that few
other courts hold the trial court responsible for instructing the jury to
dismiss the factor from their minds,5 once the question has been pro-
pounded.
The basic reason for excluding such matters from the jury is that
the power of pardon and parole rests with the executive-not the judi-
cial-branch of government, and the jury's discretion should not be
influenced by speculation as to what another branch of government may
'In addition to North Carolina, the following states hold that such explanation
is improper: Colorado: Sukle v. People, 107 Colo. 269, 111 P. 2d 233 (1941).
Georgia: Bland v. State, 211 Ga. 178, 84 S. E. 2d 369 (1954) ; Strickland v. State,
209 Ga. 65, 70 S. E. 2d 710 (1952) ; Thompson v. State, 203 Ga. 416, 47 S. E. 2d
54 (1948). In the Bland case three justices thought the trial judge's explanation
of pardon and parole in response to a jury inquiry was proper. Another concurred
on the ground that no objection thereto was timely entered, so the case was affirmed.(The North Carolina court usually grants a new trial in capital cases where there
is error, regardless of whether an exception has been timely entered.) See Note,
31 N. C. L. RZxv. 300 (1953). Kentucky: Houston v. Commonwealth, 270 Ky. 125,
109 S. W. 2d 45 (1937) ; Gaines v. Commonwealth, 242 Ky. 237, 46 S. W. 2d 75(1932). Missouri: State v. Quilling, 363 Mo. 1016, 256 S. W. 2d 751 (1953). But
see also State v. McGee, 361 Mo. 309, 234 S. W. 2d 587 (1950), and State v. Ship-
man, 354 Mo. 265, 189 S. W. 2d 273 (1945). Pennsylvania: Commonwealth v.
Carey, 368 Pa. 157, 82 A. 2d 240 (1951) ; Commonwealth v. Johnson, 368 Pa. 139,
81 A. 2d 569 (1951) ; Commonwealth v. Mills, 350 Pa. 478, 39 A. 2d 572 (1944).
Tennessee: Williams v. State, 191 Tenn. 456, 234, S. W. 2d 993 (1950) ; Porter v.
State, 177 Tenn. 515, 151 S. W. 2d 171 (1941). Texas: Moore v. State, 152 Tex.
Cr. App. 312, 213 S. W. 2d 844 (1948) ; Prater v. State, 131 Tex. Cr. 35, 95 S. W.
2d 971 (1936). Virginia: Jones v. Commonwealth, 194 Va. 273, 72 S. E. 2d 693(1952).
Explanations by the trial court have been sustained in the following states:
Arkansas: Glover v. State, 211 Ark. 1002, 204 S. W. 2d 373 (1947). But in a
later case it was held error for the trial judge to answer from his personal observa-
tions rather than with declarations of law. Bell v. State, 265 S. W. 2d 709 (Ark.
1954). California: It is generally held that the jury should not consider the possi-
bility of parole or pardon in determining guilt; however, the jury may consider
and the court instruct as to how pardon and parole relates to the punishment. See
People v. Barclay, 40 Cal. 2d 146, 252 P. 2d 321 (1953) ; People v. Chessman, 38
Cal. 2d 166, 238 P. 2d 1001 (1951) ; People v. Osborn, 37 Cal. 2d 380, 231 P. 2d 850(1951) ; People v. Alcade, 24 Cal. 2d 177, 148 P. 2d 627 (1944). Earlier cases
clearly held that the proper course was for the trial judge to refuse to discuss
parole and pardon in response to queries from the jury. People v. Hoyt, 20 Cal. 2d
306, 125 P. 2d 29 (1942) ; People v. Ramos, 3 Cal. 2d 269, 44 P. 2d 301 (1935).
Kansas: State v. Lammers, 171 Kan. 668, 237 P. 2d 410 (1951). Nebraska: The
court, in the exercise of judicial discretion, may reply or refuse to reply to jury
inquiry as to parole eligibility of defendant. Griffith v. State, 157 Neb. 448, 59
N. W. 2d 701 (1953). New Jersey: State v. Molnar, 133 N. J. L. 327, 44 A. 2d
197 (1945) ; State v. Barth, 114 N. J. L. 112, 176 Atl. 183 (1935). Ohio: State v.
Tudor, 154 Ohio St. 249, 95 N. E. 2d 385 (1950) ; State v. Evans, 146 Ohio St. 276,
63 N. E. 2d 838 (1945) ; Liska v. State, 115 Ohio St. 283, 152 N. E. 667 (1926) ;
State v. Schiller, 70 Ohio St. 1, 70 N. E. 505 (1904). Wyoming: State v. Carrol,
52 Wyo. 29, 69 P. 2d 542 (1937). However, jury should be told not to speculate
on what might happen after verdict.
' See Jones v. Commonwealth, 194 Va. 273, 72 S. E. 2d 693 (1952). But note
that in Virginia it is the duty of the jury to impose such punishment as they con-
sider to be just under the evidence; whereas, in North Carolina, the jury need not
consider the evidence in exercising its "unbridled discretion" to recommend life
imprisonment. State v. McMillan, 233 N. C. 630, 65 S. E. 2d 212 (1951).
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do in the future.6 Furthermore, punishment is assessed against a person
convicted of crime on the basis of his acts and conduct prior to trial;
whereas, parole is determined mainly on the basis of subsequent acts
and demeanor. 7 Other less frequently used arguments include the fol-
lowing: parole and pardon rules and regulations may change; hence, the
regulations influencing a jury's action might not be the ones the de-
fendant will be subject to at a later time.8 If jurors impose capital pun-
ishment because of the fear that the defendant may be paroled at some
future time, they are, in effect, predicting that he will be paroled even
though unworthy of it.9 Moreover, even though an undeserving person
may be released, the weakness is one of the parole system and does not
necessarily mean that the defendant should be executed.' 0
In cases where the prosecuting counsel argues the possibility of
parole or pardon as in the Dockery case, the majority of jurisdictions do
not regard it as proper ;'1 however, many are reluctant to consider this
sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal.12 In Kentucky, where the
propriety of such argument has been most frequently considered, the
0 Sukle v. People, 107 Colo. 269, 111 P. 2d 233 (1941) ; Thompson v. State, 203
Ga. 416, 47 S. E. 2d 53 (1948) ; State v. Conner, 241 N. C. 468, 85 S. E. 2d 584
(1955) ; Commonwealth v. Johnson, 368 Pa. 139, 81 A. 2d 569 (1951) ; Prater v.
State, 177 Tenn. 515, 151, S. W. 2d 171 (1941).
7 State v. Conner, 241 N. C. 468, 469, 85 S. E. 2d 584, 586 (1955).
Broyles v. Commonwealth, 267 S. W. 2d 73 (Ky. 1954).
o Knowlton, Problems of Jury Discretion in Capital Cases, 101 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 1009, 1118 (1953).
20 Ibid.
" Alabama: Cobb v. State, 248 Ala. 548, 28 So. 2d 713 (1947) ; Oliver v. State,
232 Ala. 5, 166 So. 615 (1936). California: People v. Byrd, 42 Cal. 2d 200, 266
P. 2d 505 (1954). Illinois: People v. Burgard, 377 Il. 322, 36 N. E. 2d 558 (1941) ;
People v. Klapperich, 370 Ill. 588, 19 N. E. 2d 579 (1939) ; People v. Kircher, 333
Ill. 200, 164 N. E. 150 (1928). Indiana: Pollard v. State, 201 Ind. 180, 166 N. E.
654 (1929). Kenttucky: Broyles v. Commonwealth, 267 S. W. 2d 73 (Ky. 1954) ;
Howard v. Commonwealth, 313 Ky. 667, 233 S. W. 2d 282 (1950) ; Bass v. Com-
monwealth, 296 Ky. 426, 177 S.W. 2d 282 (1944) ; Powell v. Commonwealth, 276
Ky. 234, 123 S. W. 2d 279 (1938); Lee v. Commonwealth, 262 Ky. 15, 89 S. W.
2d 316 (1935) ; Tiernay v. Commonwealth, 241 Ky. 201, 43 S. W. 2d 661 (1931) ;
Hall v. Commonwealth, 207 Ky. 718, 270 S. W. 5 (1925) ; Bolin v. Commonwealth,
206 Ky. 608, 268 S. W. 306 (1925) ; Chappel v. Commonwealth, 200 Ky. 429, 255
S. W. 90 (1923). Louisiana: State v. Henry, 196 La. 217, 198 So. 910 (1940) ;
State v. Johnson, 151 La. 625, 92 So. 139 (1922). Mississippi: Augustine v. State,
201 Miss. 731, 28 So. 2d 243 (1946). Pennsylvania: Commonwealth v. Earnest,
342 Pa. 544, 21 A. 2d 38 (1941). Texas: Pena v. State, 137 Tex. Cr. 311, 129
S. W. 2d 667 (1939). Virginia: Dingus v. Commonwealth, 194 Va. 273, 149 S. E.
414 (1929).
The following states have held such arguments by prosecutors not to be im-
proper: Arizona: State v. Macias, 60 Ariz. 93, 131 P. 2d 810 (1942) ; Sullivan v.
State, 47 Ariz. 224, 55 P. 2d 312 (1936). Arkansas: House v. State, 122 Ark. 476,
92 S. W. 2d 868 (1936). Georgia: Fields v. State, 88 Ga. App. 1, 75 S. E. 2d 839
(1953) ; McLendon v. State, 205 Ga. 55, 52 S. E. 2d 294 (1949) ; Bryan v. State,
206 Ga. 73, 55 S. E. 2d 574 (1949) ; Hyde v. State, 196 Ga. 475, 26 S. E. 2d 744
(1943) ; Lucas v. State, 146 Ga. 315, 91 S. E. 72 (1916). Washington: State v.
Buttry, 199 Wash. 228, 90 P. 2d 1026 (1939); State v. Talbott, 199 Wash. 431,
91 P. 2d 1020 (1939).
12 See Note, 28 N. C. L. REv. 342 (1949).
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court formerly took such a position.13 Recently, however, the Kentucky
court granted a new trial on the ground that such argument was preju-
dicial. 14 Apparently, the court was influenced by the fact that prosecu-
tors persisted in talking about parole and pardon, though the court had
for thirty years consistently condemned such argument as improper.
Paradoxically, the Georgia court does not regard argument of parole
and pardon possibilities by the prosecutor as improper, although it has
held instruction by the trial court in response to jury questions about
such matter to be reversible error.15 One distinction offered is that
when the prosecutor refers to the possibility of a pardon or parole, it
does not bind the jury but is merely a matter of argument; whereas,
when the court speaks, the jury receives it as solemn verity.'" However,
a review of the language used by some of the Georgia proscutors imme-
diately raises the issue as to which is more prejudicial, a fair and accu-
rate instruction on the part of the court, or a zealous and impassioned
argument by the prosecutor.17
There is substantial authority holding that it is not improper for a
jury to consider parole and pardon possibilities.' 8 One line of reasoning
is that the fact that a person sentenced to life imprisonment may be
paroled is universal knowledge among intelligent citizens, and the jury
is entitled to consider the effect parole will have upon the sentence which
it imposes. 19 Also, it is maintained that society is entitled to have the
jury know the true meaning of their verdict,20 namely, life imprisonment
provided the defendant is not paroled or pardoned.
Where, as in North Carolina, there are no conditions attached to, and
no qualifications or limitations imposed upon, the right of the jury to
recommend life imprisonment,21 there would seem to be several reasons
13 See Kentucky cases cited in note 11 supra, which were decided prior to 1954.
'
4 Broyles v. Commonwealth, 267 S. W. 2d 73 (Ky. 1954).
Compare Georgia cases cited in note 11 supra, with those cited in note 4 supra.
10 Bland v. State, 211 Ga. 178, 84 S. E. 2d 369, 371 (1954). (concurring opinion).
7 "If you give the defendant a life sentence his lawyers and some politicians will
get him out of jail and have him walking the streets in a few years." McLendon
v. State, 205 Ga. 55, 63, 52 S. E. 2d 294, 299 (1949). In White v. State, 177 Ga.
115, 125, 169 S. E. 499, 504 (1933), the judge instructed the jury not to consider
the following language; however, no mistrial was declared and the case was affirmed
on appeal: "The jury has it in their power to recommend imprisonment for life.
Now what does that mean? It means that after three years this defendent has a
right to ask for a parole by going over with a sob sister from the Interracial
Commission."
18 State v. Macias, 60 Ariz. 93, 131 P. 2d 810 (1942); Sullivan v. State, 47
Ariz. 224, 55 P. 2d 312 (1936) ; see also other cases in second paragraph, note 11
sup ra.
1" State v. Molnar, 133 N. J. L. 327, 44 A. 2d 197 (1945) ; State v. Shawen, 40
W. Va. 1, 8, 20 S. E. 873, 875 (1894). In the latter case it is said: "The jury was
the sole judge as to whether prisoner should die or suffer lifelong imprisonment-
and cannot the jury consider whether the circumstances of the crime show its per-
petrator to be a desperate man and an enemy of society, and dangerous, should he
escape or be pardoned ?"
2 Bland v. State, 211 Ga. 178, 84 S. E. 2d 369 (1954).
21 State v. McMillan, 233 N. C. 630, 65 S. E. 2d 212 (1951).
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for allowing the jury to consider the possibility of defendant's subse-
quent release in arriving at its decision.22
In the first place, if the basic philosophy upon which a jury seeks to
arrive at its decision is one based upon the idea of punishment, it would
seem proper that they consider parole and pardon possibilities, because
such factors bear directly on the quantum of the punishment.
Secondly, if the sentence is imposed as a deterrent to future crimes,
should the jury not be allowed to consider whether a life sentence with
a possibility of parole will be a sufficient deterrent? Also, if the sen-
tence is based upon the idea of protecting society through the rehabilita-
tion of the defendant, the jury must necessarily decide whether the
defendant is beyond rehabilitation. If they decide he is, should they be
forbidden to consider the possibility that he may be released in the future
if given a life sentence?
At any rate, it is reasonable to assume that most intelligent jurors
are aware that there is a fair possibility that a convicted person will not
serve the full sentence imposed. It is equally reasonable to assume that
they often consider this possibility in deliberating on questions of punish-
ment in capital cases. Even if the correctness of the North Carolina court
in holding such considerations to be prejudicial and improper be con-
ceded, the present approach of the court affords theoretical protection
only in those cases where the issue of parol or pardon is openly raised
by the prosecutor or jury. In other cases, the jury is left free to apply
its own knowledge of the laws relating to parole and pardon, if it chooses
to do so. 23
As long as we are to follow the present North Carolina view as to
the total irrelevancy of parole and pardon, it is submitted that a better
approach would be to allow the trial court to inform the jury in its charge
that they are to consider no matters relating to pardon or parole in with-
holding a recommendation of life imprisonment. This would prevent the
problem of a later request by the jury for information as to the possi-
bility of parole or pardon. But perhaps even more important, it would
discourage the jury from being influenced by any misconceived ideas
individual jurors might have as to defendant's parole and pardon eli-
gibilty.
WILLIAM E. GRAHAM, JR.
2 "The court has said the jurors have the right in their unbridled discretion to
recommend life imprisonment. The right to refuse to make such a recommendation
is equally unbridled. For the judge to have told the jury that the question of
parole was no concern of theirs and that they should not consider it tends to put
a bridle on discretion." Higgins, J., dissenting in Conner v. State, 241 N. C. 468,
472, 473, 85 S. E. 2d 584, 588 (1955).
" In any event, it is doubtful whether the defendant's interests are served by
leaving the jury to apply its own limited knowledge of parole laws, and the fact
of this common knowledge cannot be overlooked." Note, 90 U. OF PA. L. Rrv.
221, 222 (1941).
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Torts-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Mid-Air Explosion of Aircraft
Plaintiffs' homes were showered with burning fuel and debris follow-
ing the mid-air explosion of a B-47 Stratojet operated by the United
States Air Force. The aircraft was totally destroyed and there were no
survivors. The wives of both plaintiffs and plaintiff Williams' two chil-
dren were burned, the latter fatally, and the homes of both plaintiffs were
destroyed.' At trial plaintiffs were unable to show any specific "negli-
gent or wrongful act or omission ' 2 and rested their case on the rule of
res ipsa loquitur. At the close of the plaintiffs' evidence, counsel for
the defendant moved for judgment in its favor, stating that as national
security would be imperiled the government would not call any witnesses
to testify.3 Judgment was entered for the United States on the grounds
that the court lacked jurisdiction, the activity being of the sort falling
within the section of the Federal Tort Claims Act related to discretionary
activities of the United States government.4 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held these grounds untenable but refused
to disturb the decision; affirming the ruling on the ground that the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur was inapplicable to the facts.5
Under Florida law, the rule of res ipsa loquitur is one of circumstan-
tial evidence, by which allegations and proof of the circumstances sur-
rounding the occurrence may raise a presumption of negligence, based
on the probability that negligence on the part of some person was the
legal cause of the plaintiff's injury. To rebut this presumption the de-
fendant must show that proper care was in fact exercised.6 The rule has
various effects in different jurisdictions,7 but in Florida the effect of the
rule is to afford a sufficient basis for a finding that the accident arose
from want of care in the absence of a satisfactory showing to the con-
'Williams v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 386 (N. D. Fla. 1952).2 Suits against the government for torts of its employees are brought under the
Federal Tort Claims Act, 60 STAT. 843 (1946), 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346(b), 2671 et seq.
(1952). This act in substance provides that the United States shall be liable for
the negligence of its employees, acting within the scope of their employment, if a
private person, in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred, would be liable. Cf. United States v. Harris, 205 F. 2d 765 (11th Cir.
1953). It is procedural and bare of any substantive tort law implications.
' See United States v. Reynolds et al., 345 U. S. 1 (1953). See Note, 32
A. L. R. 2d 393 (1953).
'Under 28 U. S. C. § 2680 (a) (1950), jurisdiction is withheld as to discre-
tionary acts of the United States Government. See Dalehite v. United States, 346
U. S. 15 (1953), and Note, 32 N. C. L. REv. 118 (1954).
'Williams v. United States, 218 F. 2d 473 (5th Cir. 1955).
'Orme v. Burr, 157 Fla. 378, 25 So. 2d 870 (1946).
'The majority rule is that the effect of the doctrine is to raise an inference of
negligence. See Williams v. United States, 218 F. 2d 473, 475 (5th Cir. 1955).
See PROSSER, TORTS § 43 (1941). It is also said to raise an inference of fact.
Parcell v. United States, 104 F. Supp. 110 (S. D. W. Va. 1951) and cases cited
therein. See Notes, 53 A. L. R. 1494 (1928) and 167 A. L. R. 658 (1947). The
difference in the statements of the effect of the rule may be semantic. See Seavey,
Res Ipsa Loquitur, Tabula in Naufragio, 63 HARv. L. REv. 643 (1950).
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trary by the defendant.8 The rationale for the rule is that as between
the plaintiff and the defendant, the defendant is more likely to know or
have access to knowledge as to whether proper care was exercised. To
justify this reasoning, there must be a showing that the defendant had
exclusive control of the instrumentality causing injury to the plaintiff,
and that the occurrence was one which does not happen in the ordinary
course of events if those having the management of the instrumentality
use proper care.9
The instant case refers to the rule as one of human experience and
notes that although inapplicable at one time, in that it cannot be shown
that the occurrence was extraordinary in the absence of negligence, it
may later become applicable, "when experience ... in the situation is so
uniform and well established that it is not necessary to prove this by
extrinsic evidence."' 1  Speaking of the requirement that plaintiff show
extraordinariness, the court said further:
"We have no knowledge, judicial or otherwise as to what would
cause a jet airplane to explode while in mid-air." '"
The court points, as do many legal writers, to a split of authority as
to the applicability of the doctrine to aircraft accidents. 12  Both the
"exclusive control" and "extraordinary event" requirements have given
difficulty in this application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. The former
is more often involved in litigation involving private aircraft, where there
is the problem of dual control, and the latter in the commercial carrier
cases, although the first requirement is troublesome even in these cases
where the problem is one of negligence in the repair or maintenance of
the aircraft by an independent contractor. The applicability of the doc-
trine has been tested predominantly in suits by passengers or guests
against the owners or operators of private or commercial aircraft. 13
The problems involved where negligence in the operation or mainte-
nance of the aircraft causes personal injury or property damage to per-
sons on the ground is totally removed from occurrences in which there
is injury to the person or property of the passenger or guest. In the
former situation the injured party is removed from questions of assump-
tion of risk or contributory negligence, i.e., there is no question as to the
8 Orme v. Burr, supra note 6.
' PROSSER, TORTS § 43 (1941).
10 Williams v. United States, 218 F. 2d 473, 476 (5th Cir. 1955).
11Ibid.12 See United States v. Kesinger, 190 F. 2d 529 (10th Cir. 1951), where authori-
ties on both sides are listed. See also Note, 6 A. L. R. 2d 528 (1949). Compre-
hensive articles with analytical tabulations appear in McLarty, Res Ipsa Loquitur
in Airline Passenger Litigation, 37 VA. L. Rev. 55 (1951). See also Goldin, Res
Ipsa Loquitur in Aircraft Law, 18 So. CALIF. L. REV. 15, 152 (1946).
13 See note 12 supra. See also Notes, 22 N. C. L. REv. 160 (1944) and 28 N. C.
L. Rv. 432 (1950).
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defendant's exclusive control. Another distinguishing feature is the
nature of the interest invaded in each type case. In the ground damage
cases, there is an invasion of two of the plaintiff's interests; (1) freedom
from negligently inflicted harm to person or property, and (2) freedom
from trespass upon his possessory interests in land.14
No reported case on "all fours" with the instant case has been found,
and in those cases presenting somewhat similar fact situations the plain-
tiffs have not chosen to rely solely on negligence with its doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur but have asserted in addition strict liability,'5 whether
common law for trespass,' 6 statutory, 17 or that arising from the carrying
on of an ultrahazardous activity.' 8 Also, in many of these cases the
plaintiff has been able to prove some antecedent acts of specific negligence
on the part of the defendant. 19 In the cases asserting that res ipsa loqui-
tur is applicable, it is questionable whether statements to that effect are
holdings or dicta.
Two cases seem to hold that the doctrine of res ipsa loquiture is
applicable. However, in Parcell v. United States"° the court bolsters
its decision with the further statement that the defendant was also liable
on the grounds of strict liability for carrying on an ultrahazardous ac-
tivity. In San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. United States2 ' there was
evidence that the aircraft had been continuously operated below the legal
altitude of 500 feet.
In the Parcell case two jet aircraft crashed and then exploded, hurling
burning fuel into the plaintiff's dwelling and outbuildings. Speaking of
the grounds asserted for the decision in the principal case, the court said:
"If one were to follow this logic to its ultimate conclusion there
would be few cases indeed in which the doctrine would be appli-
cable. It is because the facts surrounding the accident are un-
known that the plaintiff seeks the benefit of the legal inference or
presumption. An accident known to grow out of one set of cir-
cumstances and no others would supply a plaintiff with good and
"PROssER, TORTS §§ 6, 13 (1941).
'
5
REsTATEmExT, TORTS §§ 519, 520 (a), (b), (d). (1938). PRossER, TORTS
§44 (1941).
" United States v. Gaidys et ir., 194 F. 2d 762 (10th Cir. 1952). Cf. Rochester
Gas and Electric Corp. v. Dunlop, 266 N. Y. Supp. 469 (Monroe Co. Ct. 1933)(Res ipsa loquitur not applicable but defendant liable on theory of trespass.)
"7 United States v. Praylou et aL., 208 F. 2d 291 (4th Cir. 1953) ; D'Anna v.
United States, 181 F. 2d 335 (4th Cir. 1950) ; Prentiss v. National Airlines Inc.,
112 F. Supp. 306 (D. N. J. 1953).
29Parcell v. United States, 104 F. Supp. 110 (S. D. W. Va. 1951).
"9 United States v. Gaidys et ux., 194 F. 2d 762 (10th Cir. 1952) ; United States
v. Kesinger, 190 F. 2d 529 (10th Cir. 1951) ; San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. United
States, 173 F. 2d 92 (9th Cir. 1949); Leisy v. United States, 102 F. Supp. 789(D. Md. 1953); Evans et al. v. United States, 100 F. Supp. 5 (D. La. 1951).;0 Parcell v. United States, 104 F. Supp. 110 (S. D. W. Va. 1951).
21 San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. United States, 173 F. 2d 92 (9th Cir. 1949).
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sufficient evidence of itself, without the aid of a rule of law based
on probabilities.
'22
In D'Anna v. United States 3 an auxiliary fuel tank suspended be-
neath the fuselage of a diving naval aircraft became detached and fell
into the plaintiff's fruitstand injuring the plaintiff and others, and dam-
aging property. Here, there was a statute making the owner of the air-
craft prima facie liable, rebuttable by a showing of proper care. The
court held res ipsa loquitur was applicable in addition to the statutory
presumption and justified a finding of liability. Speaking of the burden
on the defendant to rebut the presumption, Chief Judge Parker said.
"Such burden ... is more difficult to meet where the plane itself
or an object attached to it crashes to the ground and inflicts in-
jury, for the falling in such case is the strongest sort of proof of
either negligent operation defective constrution or equipment." 24
The court points out in Kesigner v. United States25 that the hazards
of flying have been so reduced that the proposition is now acceptable
that aircraft do not usually fall in the absence of negligence. This view
has gained some support since World War II largely due to considera-
tions of the social value of air transport and the desire to remove the
fledgling industry from under the rules of strict liability. On the other
hand, there has been much agitation pro and con among the legal writers
as to which policy should control, and the trend in thinking seems to
be veering towards idea that flying is an ultrahazardous activity and that
those legally responsibile should be liable accordingly.2 6
The court in the instant case seems convinced that aviation has not
yet reached the staged where the fiction of vis major or Act of God has
no application, and feels that there are some "accidents" which no amount
of care would avoid. The distinction drawn between jet and conven-
tional aircraft may be valid, and if so, the application of the legal rule
is probably correct. However, if such be the case, this is the strongest
argument for the imposition of strict liability. Other considerations
would seem to indicate that the modified strict liability statute such as
" 104 F. Supp. 110, 115.
23 181 F. 2d 335 (4th Cir. 1950).
" Id. at 337.
22190 F. 2d 529 (10th Cir. 1951).
20 See Notes, 22 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 245 (1954), 30 TEXAS L. Rnv. 790 (1952).
Orr, Constitutionality of Prentiss v. National Airlinws, 21 INsUR. COUNSEL JOUR.
48 (1954) (Statistical survey of air operations in relation to fatal accidents.)
Leading articles urging strict liability are: Vold, Strict Liability for Aircraft
Crashes and Forced Landings on Ground Victims Outside of Established Landing
Areas, 5 HASTING L. JOUR. 1 (1953) and Baker, An Eclipse of Fault Liability, 40
VA. L. REv. 273 (1954). By international agreement absolute liability is imposed
for damages caused on the surface by aircraft or objects falling therefrom. See
discussion of 1952 Rome Aircraft Convention in 31 CAN. BAR. REv. 90 (1953).
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that involved in the D'Anna case presents the most workable approach to
the problem for the benefit of all concerned.2 7  Without the benefit of
the statute and without access to some evidence of negligence the plain-
tiff faces the difficulty illustrated here.2 3
North Carolina has not considered the problem directly, and has no
explicit statutory provision.29  If the case applying the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur where injuries were sustained by a guest is held not to be
controlling,"° the policy of the statutory provision as to dangerous flying
may afford the plaintiff some evidence of negligence. 31
WALTER LEE HORTON, JR.
Libel-Special Damages
The law of libel is an area of the law which at the present time is
fraught with confusion in this jurisdiction.
Some of this confusion in North Carolina and elsewhere may be
attributed to the fact that the common law distinguishes between that
defamation which is oral and that which is written. Originally the
common law courts took no jurisdiction over defamatory utterances, i.e.,
spoken statements calculated to detract in a substantial way from the
esteem in which a person is held in the community. The ecclesiastical
courts took them under their jurisdiction, regarding them as sins, and
dealt with them accordingly. As these spiritual courts began to lose
2Art. I-A Maryland Code § 9 (1951) as applied in D'Anna v. United States,
181 F. 2d 335 (4th Cir. 1950), provides that the owner of any aircraft damaging
property or injuring persons in ascent, descent, or flight shall be prima facie liable
in the absence of contributory negligence of the person involved or unless the air-
craft is used without the consent, express or implied, of the owner. This statute
provides the plaintiff a way to the jury as contrasted with the futility of the plain-
tiff's position in the Williams case. It does not burden the aircraft industry with
absolute liability, but at the same time affords the plaintiff protection.
"8 These problems are set out and discussed fully in Simpson, Use of Aircraft
Accident Investigation Information in Actions for Damages, 17 J. AiR L. 283(1950). As to preparation for trial see Finley, Trial Technique in Aircraft Acci-
dent Cases, 31 TEXAS L. REv. 809 (1953), in which the author points out the over-
whelming ignorance of most attorneys in the intricacies of obtaining, evaluating,
and presenting evidence in aircraft litigation. As was indicated in Williams v.
United States, 115 F. Supp. 386 (N. D. Fla. 1952), where military aircraft are in-
volved recourse may be had to Congress for legislative relief. For some of the
difficulties involved in obtaining Congressional relief where the judiciary offers
none see Gellhorn and Lauer, Congressional Settlement of Tort Claims against the
United States, 55 Cok. L. REv. 1 (1955).
2 Section 5 of the Uniform Aviation Act was adopted by North Carolina in
1927, as N. C. GEN. STAT. § 63-14 (1943). It was repealed in 1947 by c. 1069, § 3
of Session Laws of 1947. This statute is identical with that involved in the Praylou
and Prentiss cases cited in footnote 17 supra. This statute imposed strict liability
under precisely the same conditions as the Maryland statute set out in footnote 27
supra raises a prima facie presumption.I " Smith v. Whitley, 223 N. C. 534, 27 S. E. 2d 442 (1943). See Note, 28 N. C.
L. REv. 432 (1950).
3 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 63-18 (1953) makes it a misdemeanor to drop any object
from an aircraft other than water or loose sand.
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their power, tort actions for slander began to creep into the common law
courts. Thus arose a conflict over jurisdiction, which led the common
law courts to hold that oral defamation was a spiritual matter to be dealt
with by the spiritual court unless "temporal" damages could be proved.'
However, as the common law courts strengthened their position, they
assumed jurisdiction over three classes of oral defamation declaring that
these were of such serious character that malice and temporal damages
would be conclusively presumed. These three favored classes were oral
charges (1) imputing the commission of a crime, (2) imputing a loathe-
some disease, or (3) tending to prejudice one in his trade, profession, or
calling.2 Modern statutes have added a fourth class to this group. 3
It was not until much later, after the introduction of printing, that
a separate set of rules was worked ont for written and printed defama-
tion by the Court of Star Chamber. With the abolition of the Star
Chamber, jurisdiction over written and printed defamation passed to
the common law courts. All written or printed statements tending to
injure one's reputation and expose him to hatred, contempt, or ridicule
were considered defamatory and actionable without the necessity of prov-
ing special damages. Perhaps there are three reasons why proof of
special damages was not required in cases of written defamation: (1)
originally, written defamation was a crime as well as a tort, (2) it was
considered much more serious to put down deliberately on paper a lasting
memorial of a lie against a person's good reputation, and (3) there was
no jurisdictional conflct over these actions. 4
Therefore, at common law oral defamations were divided into two
groups-those which came within the favored classes, and all others.
The former were called slander per se, i.e., actionable without proof of
special damages. The latter were called slander per quod, i.e., actionable
only with allegation and proof of special damages. Within the favored
classes, constituting slander per se, it made no difference whether the
spoken words were slanderous on their face or whether resort to ex-
trinsic evidence was necessary to show that the oral statements were
slanderous. On the other hand, libelous statements were not separated
into classes. Any written or printed statements that were defamatory were
actionable without proof of special damage. Thus it is obvious that the
phrase "slander per se" merely had reference to the three favored classes
which were actionable in themselves, and that it did not mean slander "on
its face" as one might use the term "per se" today. As libel was not
divided into classes which required proof of special damages and classes
PROSSER, TORTS 793-799 (1941); McCoRMIcK, DAMAGES 415-419 (1935) ; Note,
14 CALIF. L. REv. 61 (1925).
2 PROSSER, TORTS 793-799 (1941); McCoRMIcK, DAMAGES 415-419 (1935).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. § 99-4 (1953). (Dealing with charges of incontinency against
an innocent woman).
' Supra, note 2.
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which did not, there was no place in the law for such a corresponding
phrase as "libel per se." Any libelous statement was actionable in
itself. However-and herein lies the root of the confusion today-the
courts did begin to use the phrase "libel per se," but they used it simply
to distinguish between written or printed statements which were clearly
libelous on their face and those in which resort to extrinsic evidence was
necessary in order to reveal their defamatory meanings. Their use of
the phrase carried no implication with respect to special damages.6
The courts of the United States accepted the common law rule that
any libel was actionable without the necessity of pleading and proving
special damages, and in the minority of the American jurisdictions this
is the rule today, not only as to written or printed publications which
are defamatory upon their face, but also as to those which require ex-
trinsic evidence to establish their defamatory meaning.0 However, a
greater number of courts hold that where extrinsic evidence is necessary
to establish the defamatory meaning, libel is not actionable without proof
of special damages, i.e., if the words are not libelous "per se" (on their
face), they are not actionable without proof of special damages.7 This
majority rule clearly is the product of confusion. It differs from the
corresionding rule of slander in only one respect-the difference between
the meaning of "slander per se" and libel "per se." The courts have
tripped over their own ambiguous device, confused the dual use of
"per se," and, in their confusion, imported the concept of special dam-
ages from the field of slander into the field of libel. An illustration will
point out the difference in the two views. If the written or printed pub-
lication stated that X was a Negro, when in fact X was a white man, the
minority would and do hold that the publication is libelous and actionable
without proof of special damages even though the publication is not
.I.PROSSER, TORTS 793-799 (1941); POLLOcic, TORTS 238-239 (12th ed. 1923);
9CCoRMIcK, DAMAGES 415-419 (1935) ; NEWELL, SLANDER AND LIBEL §§ 5, 6, 20,
21 (4th ed. 1924) ; Note, 14 CALIF. L. REv. 61 (1925) ; Note, MicH. L. REV. 253
(1939).
' SMITH AND PROSSER, CASES ON TORTS 1022 (1952); Merchants' Ins. Co. v.
Buckner, 98 Fed. 222 (6th Cir. 1899) ; Ervin v. Record Pub. Co., 154 Cal. 79, 97
P. 21 (1908); Hughes v. Samuels Bros., 179 Iowa 1077, 159 N. W. 589 (1916);
Courier Journal Co. v. Noble, 251 Ky. 527, 65 S. W. 2d 703 (1933) ; Sydney v.
MacFadden Newspaper Pub. Corp., 242 N. Y. 208, 151 N. E. 209 (1926); Marr
v. Putnam, 196 Ore. 1, 246 P. 2d 509 (1952) ; Reiman v. Pacific Development Soc.,
132 Ore. 82, 284 P. 575 (1930).
7 SMITH AND PROSSER, CASES ON TORTS 1025 (1952); Rose v. Indianapolis
Newspapers, 213 F. 2d 227 (7th Cir. 1954) ; Landstrom v. Thorpe, 189 F. 2d 46
(8th Cir. 1951) ; Ilitzky v. Goodman, 57 Ariz. 216, 112 P. 2d 860 (1941) ; Shaw
Cleaners and Dyers, Inc., v. Des Moines Dress Club, 215 Iowa 1130, 245 N. W. 231
(1932) ; Jerald v. Houston, 124 Kan. 657, 261 P. 851 (1927) ; Del Rico Co. v. New
Mexican, Inc., 56 N. M. 538, 246 P. 2d 206 (1953) ; Wiley v. Oklahoma Press Pub.
Co., 106 Okla. 52, 233 P. 224 (1924) ; Lana v. Seattle Times Co., 186 Wash. 618,
59 P. 2d 753 (1936). Also see dissent in Sydney v. MacFadden Newspaper Pub.
Corp., 242 N. Y. 208, 151 N. E. 209 (1926).
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libelous on its face, or libel "per se."8  On the other hand, the majority
would hold that as the publication is not libelous on its face and as the
defamatory meaning is not shown until the plaintiff proves that he is a
white man, the publication is not actionable without proof of special
damages. 9
It is impossible to determine accurately North Carolina's position on
the question prior to 1937. Oddly enough, only one case, Harrison v.
Garrett, arose in this state prior to that year in which the issue was
directly raised. 10 Perhaps this is due to the fact that the definition of
libel is so broad that practically all defamatory publications prompting
suits are libelous on their face. In that case the defendant did not raise
the question until on appeal. Instead of deciding the point, the court
said, "The defect alleged in this case is that the matter contained in the
letter is not libelous per se and that the plaintiff does not allege special
damages. If the words of the letter are not libelous per se and could
only become actionable if special damages be alleged, the complaint, if
there has been a failure to allege special damages, would only be a de-
fective statement of a cause of action as distinguished from the statement
of a defective cause of action, and the defect was waived or cured when
the defendant answered the complaint."" Another opportunity to decide
the issue did not present itself until 34 years later.'2  In the cases in
which the question was not directly presented during the intervening
period, the court repeatedly used the phrase "libel per se,"' Is but since the
point was not directly in issue in these cases, the court apparently did
not think it necessary to render any definitive decision. As a result the
question lay in doubt for years, the assumption being that the common
law rules would apply.' 4
In 1937 the controversial Flake case' 5 was decided. Speaking as if
Upton v. Times-Democrat Pub. Co., 104 La. 141, 28 So. 970 (1900) ; Flood v.
News and Courier Co., 71 S. C. 112, 50 S. E. 637 (1905).
o Ilitzky v. Goodman, 57 Ariz. 216, 112 P. 2d 860 (1941). However, if this
statement were spoken instead of written, all jurisdictions would hold that as it is
not within one of the favored classes of slander per se, the statement is not action-
able without proof of special damages. PRossEm, TORTS 798-807 (1941) ; McCoR-
mICIc, DAmAGES 415-419 (1935); Deese v. Collins, 191 N. C. 749, 133 S. E. 92
(1926).
10132 N. C. 172, 43 S. E. 594 (1903).
SId. at 177, 43 S. E. at 596.
12 Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N. C. 780, 195 S. E. 55 (1937).
" Davis v. Askin's Retail Stores, 211 N. C. 551, 191 S. E. 33 (1937) ; Harrel
v. Goerch, 209 N. C. 741, 184 S. E. 489 (1936); Oates v. Wachovia Bank and
Trust Co., 205 N. C. 14, 169 S. E. 869 (1933) ; Pentuff v. Park, 194 N. C. 146,
138 S. E. 616 (1927) ; Hedgepeth v. Coleman, 183 N. C. 309, 111 S. E. 517 (1922) ;
Hall v. Hall, 179 N. C. 571, 103 S. E. 136 (1920) ; Brown v. Elm City Lumber Co.,
167 N. C. 9, 82 S. E. 961 (1914).
"" Wettach, Recent Developments in Newspaper Libel, 7 N. C. L. REv. 3 (1928);
Brandis and Trotter, Some Observations on Pleading Damages in North Carolina,
31 N. C. L. REv. 249, 269 (19S3).
' 
0 Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N. C. 780, 195 S. E. 55 (1937).
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it had been the law in this state from time immemorial, the court said,
"In publications which are libelous per quod the innuendo and special
damages must be alleged and proved."' 6 Here, for the first time in
North Carolina, the court directly stated that special damages must be
alleged and proved if a publication is not libelous "per se" (on its face).
This case divides libel into three classes: (1) publications which are
obviously defamatory and which are termed libel per se; (2) publications
which are susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, one of which is
defamatory and the other is not; and (3) publications which are not
defamatory without the aid of explanatory circumstances and which are
called libel per quod. If the publication constitutes libel per se, special
damages need not be alleged and proved, but if it constitutes libel per
quod, they must be. The status of the second class is left somewhat in
doubt. Prior to this case it was held that if the publication were sus-
ceptible of two interpretations, one defamatory and the other not, the
jury should decide the meaning understood, and the court said nothing
about special damages.17 The Flake case seems to indicate that special
damages need not be alleged if the complaint alleges that the defamatory
meaning was intended and understood.' 8
The only North Carolina authority relied on for holding the special
damages must be alleged and proved in publications which are libelous
per quod was Oates v. Wachovia Bank and Trust Co.,19 a slander case
concerned with the question of whether the charge came within one of
the four classes of slander per se. Not only is this a slander case, but
the court also clearly indicated that extrinsic evidence could be used to
bring the charge within one of the classes of slander per se, eliminating
the necessity of proving special damages. As a slander case, it would
seem not to be controlling in a libel decision. Additionally it would seem
that its use in the Flake case as supporting authority for the proposition
that in libel special damages must be alleged and proved where extrinsic
evidence is necessary, was a result of a misinterpretation of the deci-
sion.20 It is also worthy of note that the Flake case cites the same out-
side authority for its distinction between libel per se and per quod that
the Oates case cites for its distinction between slander per se and per
quod. That authority is a slander case also. 21
So it is seen that the North Carolina court has lost sight of the dis-
1 Id. at 785, 195 S. E. at 58.
1 Oates v. Wachovia Bank and Trust Co., 205 N. C. 14, 169 S. E. 869 (1933);
Castelloe v. Phelps, 198 N. C. 454, 152 S. E. 163 (1930).
1" Brandis and Trotter, Some Observations on Pleading Damages in North
Carolina, 31 N. C. L. REv. 249, 269 (1953).1205 N. C. 14, 169 S. E. 869 (1933).
10 Brandis and Trotter, Some Observations on Pleading Damages in North Caro-
lina, 31 N. C. L. REv. 249, 269 (1953).
21 Walker v. Tucker, 220. Ky. 362, 295 S. W. 138 (1927).
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tinction between "slander per se" (charges within the four classes action-
able in themselves without proof of special damages) and libel "per se"
(on its face) and has brought the special damage concept over from the
field of slander into the field of libel. Instead of the original rule that
the existence of damages is conclusively presumed from the publication
of the libel, North Carolina now divides libel into two broad classes.
As to the first, libel per se, the original rule is still applied; but as to the
second, libel per quod, the existence of damages is no longer presumed,
but proof thereof is required. Why? Because long ago a judge used
the phrase "libel per se" simply to indicate that the publication was
libelous without need of extrinsic evidence. Had he simply said "this
publication is not actionable without extrinsic evidence to show its
defamatory meaning," perhaps the confusion would never have arisen.
In 1928 it was pointed out in this Law Review that the confusion existed
in other states.22  It is difficult to determine whether the court in the
Flake case was merely confused, whether it deliberately adopted what it
considered the best view, or both.
Since the Flake case, there has been only one North Carolina decision
having any implications as to this problem a.2  This case arose on de-
murrer to test the sufficiency of a complaint, and, while not decisive of
the issue, it seems that the court clearly recognized that publication of
any libel is actionable in itself-irrespective of whether any special dam-
age has been caused to plaintiff's reputation or otherwise. At least it
cites authority to that effect. On the other hand, it is a sound presump-
tion that the court was aware of the Flake case; especially since it cites
it for its broad definition of libel "per se."
Thus it appears that the law in North Carolina as regards libel re-
mains confused. It seems that the clarity expressed in the Flake case
was short lived. Of course, it remains to be seen whether the court, in
subsequent decisions, will follow the majority rule clearly set out in the
Flake case, or adopt the minority rule as indicated by the court in the
Kindley case.
Prior to the Flake case, the court had consistently allowed extrinsic
evidence to show that spoken charges were within one of the four cate-
gories of slander per se without requiring allegation and proof of special
damages, although on their face they were not within any of them. 24 As
to whether the court will require allegation and proof of special damages
in such cases today by analogy to the rule laid down in the Flake case,
" Wettach, Recent Developments in Newspaper Libel, 7 N. C. L. REv. 3 (1928).
.Kindley v. Privette, 241 N. C. 140, 84 S. E. 2d 660 (1954).
"2 See for example: Oates v. Wachovia Bank and Trust Co., 205 N. C. 14, 169
S. E. 869 (1933) ; Hurley v. Lovett, 199 N. C. 793, 155 S. E. 875 (1930) ; Castelloe
v. Phelps, 198 N. C. 454, 152 S. E. 163 (1930); Simmons v. Morse, 51 N. C. 6
(1858) ; Watts v. Greenlee, 13 N. C. 115 (1829).
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quaere. A case closely following the Flake case implies that it would
not be necessary.25
On the surface the majority rule may seem to be a good one. How-
ever, if a departure from the common law is deemed desirable, instead
of bringing the special damage concept over from slander into libel, it
would seem far better to abolish the special damage concept altogether
in the field of defamation. There was no legal reason nor logic for the
original common law rule that in all cases of slander special damages had
to be alleged and proved. There was even less reason for making ex-
ceptions as to the three narrow categories of slander per se. All defama-
tion should either be actionable or not actionable. When proof of special
damages is required where extrinsic evidence is necessary to show the
defamatory meaning, the court is, in effect, holding that the defamatory
meaning was understood only by those who understood the innuendo and
knew the circumstances, and that this is not sufficient to make it action-
able unless the plaintiff has suffered pecuniary damages because of it.
Yet it is among those who understood the defamatory meaning that
plaintiff's reputation has been damaged-and it is for damages to reputa-
tion that an action for defamation lies.
ALEXANDER H. BARNES.
Conflict of Laws-Residence or Domicile-Non-Resident
Motorist Statutes
In a recent decision' the defendant was served with summons under
the North Carolina Non-Resident Motorist Statute.2 He moved to set
aside the service of process as invalid on the ground that at the time of
the accident he was a resident of North Carolina.3
It appeared from the facts that some time prior to November, 1952,
the defendant was assigned to active duty in the armed services at Camp
Lejeune, near Jacksonville, North Carolina. The accident occurred in
January 1954, and nine days later the defendant was transferred to
" Scott v. Harrison, 215 N. C. 427, 2 S. E. 2d 1 (1939).
'Hart v. Queen City Coach Co., 241 N. C. 389, 85 S. E. 2d 319 (1955).
2 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-105 (1953). All forty-eight states and the District of
Columbia have now enacted non-resident motorist statutes. For a complete list of
citations as of 1947 see, Knoop v. Anderson, 71 F. Supp. 832 (W. D. Iowa 1947).
' Unless otherwise provided, it is the residence of the defendant at the time of
the accident which controls in the application of statutes authorizing constructive
service on non-resident motorists. Rompza v. Rucas, 337 Il1. App. 106, 85 N. E. 2d
467 (1949) (One of the basic jurisdictional facts is the non-residence of the de-
fendant at the time of the accident.) ; Netter v. King, 331 Ill. App. 619, 73 N. E.
2d 798 (1947) ; Welsh v. Ruopp, 228 Iowa 70, 289 N. W. 760 (1940) (Non-resi-
dence at the time of the accident cannot be assumed.) ; Bigham v. Foor, 201 N. C.
14, 158 S. E. 548 (1931). Contra: Hendershot v. Ferkel, 144 Ohio St. 112, 56
N. E. 2d 205 (1944) (Act applies to residents who subsequently became non-resi-
dents or who conceal their whereabouts.)
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Portsmouth, Virginia, where he was on duty at the time process was
served on the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles. It also appeared that
before entering the armed services his home was in Virginia. The court
held that the defendant was a "non-resident" and was amenable to service
of process under the statute.
The court, it is believed, based its decision primarily on the fact that
the defendant was a member of the armed services.. It is stated as an
accepted view that members of the armed services stationed in this state
under military orders do not acquire residence here. However, in sup-
port of this view the court cited and quoted from a recent decision of
the Supreme Court of Arkansas, which concerned the acquisition of an
Arkansas domicile by a serviceman.5
This raises the question as to what is meant by "non-resident" as
used in the North Carolina Non-Resident Motorist Statute. The court
said: "What constitutes non-residence under G. S. 1-105 has not been
the subject of direct judicial review." 6  The issue is whether the term
"non-resident" requires domicile or merely actual residence.7 Stating
'For cases under the non-resident motorist statutes in accord see: Briggs v.
Superior Court of Alameda County, 81 Cal. App. 2d 240, 183 P. 2d 758 (1947)(defendant from New York held not to have become a resident of California while
stationed there in the Navy, the court defining a non-resident as one who has not
established actual residence, irrespective of domicile). In Hughes v. Lucker, 233
Minn. 207, 213, 46 N. W. 2d 497, 501 (1951), speaking of the effect of entering
the armed services, the court said: "His military service, without regard to where
he was stationed from time to time, did not of itself, without more, preclude or effect
any change of residence." United States Automobile Ass'n v. Harman, 151 S. W.
2d 609 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) (A former resident and domiciliary of Texas con-
tended that he became a resident of Maryland by his assignment there in the Army.
The court rejected the contention saying in effect that his lack of volition and his
living in the barracks made it impossible for him to establish a residence in Mary-
land.) Cf: De Pier v. Maddow, 87 Cal. App. 2d 460, 197 P. 2d 87 (1948) (resi-
dent of Alabama stationed in the Marines in California held to have become a resi-
dent by living off the base for five years) ; Suit v. Shailer, 18 F. Supp. 568 (D. Md.
1937) (California defendant lived with husband who was stationed in Maryland.
They lived off the base. The court said the wife definitely became a resident and
that it would be difficult to see how the husband could be classed as a non-resident.)
The facts in the principal case do not indicate where the defendant lived, whether
in government housing or off the base. As illustrated by the decisions in this note,
this is sometimes the controlling factor in a determination of a serviceman's resi-
dence.
I "The domicile of a soldier or sailor in the military or naval service of his
country generally remains unchanged, domicile being neither gained nor lost by
being stationed in the line of duty at a particular place, even for a period of years."
Central Manufacturer's Mut. Ins. Co. v. Friedman, 213 Ark. 9, 11, 209 S. W. 2d
102, 104 (1948).
' Hart v. Queen City Coach Co., 241 N. C. 389, 391, 85 S. E. 2d 319, 320 (1955).
' Domicile is said to be that place where a man has his true, fixed and perma-
nent home and principal establishment, and to which whenever he is absent he has
the intention of returning. It re Stabile, 348 Pa. 587, 36 A. 2d 541 (1944).
Residence indicates merely a factual place of abode; the living in a particular
locality. Zimmerman v. Zimmerman, 175 Ore. 585, 155 P. 2d 293 (1945).
As domicile and residence are usually in the same place, they are sometimes used
as if they had the same meaning, but they are not identical terms, for a person may
have more than one place of residence, but only one domicile. Residence means
living in a particular locality, but domicile means living in that locality with intent
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the problem in another way, is one required to have his domicile in a
state other than North Carolina to be a non-resident and thus make the
Commissioner of Motor Vehicles his agent for the purpose of service of
process?
In Baker v. Varser,8 the plaintiff sued to compel the North Carolina
Board of Law Examiners to permit him to take the Bar Examination.
One of the requirements was that the applicant have been a resident of
North Carolina for one year. It was established that the plaintiff's
domicile -was not in North Carolina. The supreme court said, in up-
holding the Board's refusal to allow him to take the examination: "In
our opinion, the term resident as used in Rule Five, means that residence
is synonymous with domicile." 9 The test used by the court in reaching
this conclusion was: "Whether the term residence . . . is synonymous
with domicile depends on the purpose of Rule Five, the nature of the
subject matter, as well as the context in which the term is used."' 0
It would seem to follow, then, that whether the term residence is
synonymous with domicile in the North Carolina Non-Resident Motorist
Statute depends on the purpose of the act," the nature of the subject
matter,12 and the context in which the term is used.' 3
In Ewing v. Thompson,14 the plaintiff and defendant were involved
in an automobile accident on a North Carolina highway. The plaintiff
proceeded under the non-resident motorist statute and served the de-
fendant with process through the statutory agent, the Commissioner of
Motor Vehicles. The defendant, a resident of Canada, made a special
appearance and moved to set aside the service of process as invalid on
the ground that he was not such a non-resident as was contemplated by
to make it a fixed and permanent home. Residence simply requires bodily presence
as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that
place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. In re Riley, 148 Misc. 588,
266 N. Y. S. 209 (Surr. Ct. 1933).
8 240 N. C. 260, 82 S. E. 2d 90 (1954).
9 Id. at 269, 82 S. E. 2d at 97. Residence has been held to mean domicile in
rules concerning admission to the state bar in several other jurisdictions. In re
Benedetto, 196 Ind. 323, 148 N. E. 413 (1925) ; Re Horowitz, 276 App. Div. 918,
94 N. Y. S. 2d 490 (3d Dep't 1950) ; Re McGrath, 243 App. Div. 803, 278 N. Y. S.
135 (3d Dep't 1935); In re Pierce, 189 Wis. 441, 207 N. W. 966 (1926); In re
Mosness, 39 Wis. 509, 20 Am. St. Rep. 55 (1876).
1 Baker v. Varser, 240 N. C. 260, 267, 82 S. E. 2d 90, 96 (1954).
'x "The broad purpose of the statute is to enable an injured resident of this state
to bring back to answer for his tort a non-resident motorist who has inflicted injury
while using the state's highways and by the time suit can be instituted would
otherwise be beyond this jurisdiction." Hart v. Queen City Coach Co., 240 N. C.
389, 391, 85 S. E. 2d 319, 320 (1955).
12 The subject matter of the non-resident motorist statutes seems primarily to
be "the non-resident transient motorist who is here today and gone tomorrow."
Johnson v. Jacoby, 195 F. 2d 563, 565 (D. C. Cir. 1951).
" That the term expresses different concepts according to the context in which
it is used, see: Chapman v. Davis, 233 Minn. 62, 45 N. W. 2d 822 (1951) ; Note, 33
N. C. L. Rav. 692 (1955) ; notes 27 through 31 infra.
24 233 N. C. 564, 65 S. E. 2d 17 (1950).
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the statute and, therefore, was not amenable to the substituted service.
The court refused to set aside the process. In construing the term non-
resident, the court turned to other statutes in which that term is used.
"The word non-resident, as used in the Motor Vehicle Act... is defined
by the General Assembly as every person who is not a resident of this
state. The trend of decisions in this court in matters pertaining to
attachment proceedings is of like tenor."'15
The court's reference to the definition in the Motor Vehicle Act and
to decisions pertaining to attachment proceedings could be said to be two
very strong arguments that would support the conclusion that residence
as used in the North Carolina Non-Resident Motorist Statute is not used
synonymously with domicile.
In Chapter 20 of the General Statutes of North Carolina (the Motor
Vehicle Act), non-resident is defined in three different places: (1) legal
residence,16 (2) bona fide resident,17 and (3) resident. 18 The supreme
court in choosing the latter definition in Ewing v. Thompson, seems to
indicate that the purpose of the non-resident motorist statute will be
accomplished by a requirement, not of domicile, but of actual residence.
By making the reference to attachment proceedings in the Ewing
case, it would seem safe to assume that the court would construe "non-
resident" in the non-resident motorist statute as it has been construed
in foreign attachment proceedings. In Brann v. Hanes,"' the trial court
had held that the defendant was a non-resident, upholding the clerk's
order for service of summons and warrant of attachment. It was clear
that the defendant had his domicile in North Carolina but he had been
at Saranac Lake, New York, for health purposes for about eleven
months. In affirming the trial court's holding, the supreme court said:
"Whether or not the defendant has retained his domicile in this state is
not determinative of the question here presented for decision." 20  The
court added:
"In Wheeler v. Cobb, 75 N. C. 21, it is said that one may be a
non-resident without losing his domicile or rights of citizenship in
I51d. at 568, 65 S. E. 2d at 20.
1N N. C. GEN. STAT. § 20-6 (1953) (Uniform Driver's License Act): "'Non-
resident' shall mean any person whose legal residence is in some state other than
North Carolina or in a foreign country."
A distinction exists between legal and actual residence, since a person may have
his legal residence in one place and his actual residence in another. A person's
legal residence is his domicile. Roof v. Tiller, 195 S. C. 132, 10 S. E. 2d 333
(1940).
17 N. C. GEN. STAT. §20-279.1 (1953) (Motor Vehicle Safety and Financial
Responsibility Act) : "'Non-resident' means every person who is not a bona fide
resident of this state."
S2' N. C. GEN. STAT. § 20-38 (1953) : "Non-resident-Every person who is not a
resident of this state." (This is the definition quoted by the court in Ewing v.
Thompson.)
10 194 N. C. 571, 140 S. E. 292 (1927).
20Id. at 574, 140 S. E. at 294.
1955]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the state of his origin or gaining a domicle in another state. It is
there held that one may have his domicile in North Carolina and
his residence elsewhere, and that, therefore where one voluntarily
removes from this to another state, for the purpose of discharging
the duties of an office of indefinite duration, which requires his
continued presence there for an unlimited time such person is a
non-resident of this state for the purpose of attachment."'2
In construing the term "non-resident" in the non-resident motorist
statutes, courts of other jurisdictions22 have made the same comparison
with their attachment proceedings as did North Carolina in the Ewing
case. Those jurisdictions, however, made it clear that residence was
not to be treated as synonymous with domicile. 23  Yet as previously
pointed out, without reference to the Ewing case the court said in the
principal case that "non-residence" under G. S. 1-105 had not been the
subject of direct judicial review.24
The meanings given to residence in other statutes have also varied
according to the purpose, the nature of the subject matter, and the con-
text in which the term is used. For example, in the chattel mortgage and
conditional sales recordation statutes the word is said to mean only actual
residence, 25 while in the divorce 2 6 and voting27 statutes the term is treated
21 Ibid. Residence as the term is used in attachment statutes does not normally
mean domicile but merely actual residence. Hanson v. Graham, 82 Cal. 631, 23
Pac. 56 (1890); Union National Bank v. Finely, 180 Ind. 470, 103 N. E. 110
(1913); Mahoney v. Tyler, 136 N. C. 40, 48 S. E. 549 (1904) ; Howland v.
Marshall, 127 N. C. 427, 37 S. E. 462 (1900) ; Carden v. Carden, 107 N. C. 214,
12 S. E. 197 (1890) ; Raymond v. Leishman, 243 Pa. 64, 89 Ati. 791 (1914).2 E.g., Colon v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 27 N. J. Super. 280, 99
A. 2d 181 (1953) ; Chapman v. Davis, 233 Minn. 62, 45 N. W. 2d 822 (1951).
2 See notes 32 and 36 infra.
", Hart v. Queen City Coach Co., 241 N. C. 389, 391, 85 S. E. 2d 319, 320
(1955).
2 Sheffield v. Walker, 231 N. C. 556, 560, 58 S. E. 2d 356, 359 (1950) ("It
thus appears that under these statutes 'residence' means something more than a
mere physical presence in a place and something less than a domicile.") ; Industrial
Discount Corp. v. Rodesky, 205 N. C. 163, 165, 170 S. E. 640, 641 (1933) ("The
word signifies the actual residence of the mortgagor and not his domicile or legal
residence."); it re Watson, 99 F. Supp. 49 (W. D. Ark. 1951) ; Commercial Bank
of Crawford v. Pharr, 75 Ga. App. 364, 43 S. E. 2d 439 (1947). Contra: Petition
of McLauchlan, 1 F. 2d 5 (1st Cir. 1924) (equivalent to domicile) ; Fidelity and
Deposit Co. v. First National Bank, 113 S. W. 2d 622 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938)
(equivalent to domicile).
2' Such statutes ordinarily provide that in order to secure a divorce the plaintiff
must have been a resident of the state for a prescribed period of time, and the
courts interpret this to mean domicile. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287
(1942) (one of the parties must be domiciled in the state before the court can have
jurisdiction) ; Stewart v. Stewart, 185 F. 2d 436 (D. C. Cir. 1930) ; Snyder v.
Snyder, 240 Iowa 239, 35 N.'W. 2d 32 (1948) ; Wray v. Wray, 149 Neb. 376, 31
N. W. 2d 228 (1948); Welch v. Welch, 226 N. C. 541, 39 S. E. 2d 457 (1946);
Lynch v. Lynch, 210 Miss. 810, 50 So. 2d 378 (1951) ; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICr OF
LAWS § 111 (1934).
"2 Residence in a state, or a local subdivision thereof, is a normal statutory re-
quirement for eligibility to vote. The term is usually synonymous with domicile.
State v. Carter, 194 N. C. 293, 296, 139 S. E. 604, 606 (1927) ("Residence as the
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as synonymous with domicile. Statutes that accord jurisdiction to the
courts on the basis of residence are frequently treated as referring to
domicile, as in the case of statutes for the probate of a will28 or the
appointment of an administrator.29
Several states have faced this issue squarely and have made it clear
how the term "non-resident" should be construed in their non-resident
motorist statutes. In Colon v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc.,30
the defendant at the time of the accident was domiciled outside the state
of New Jersey but resided therein. He was living with his wife's family
while serving in the Army. Before service of process was completed he
had moved out of the state. The court, after deciding that the statute
refers to residence at the time of the accident, said: "The statute is not
concerned with domicile. In our opinion the word 'resident' is to be
taken to refer to a person who has a dwelling place or usual place of
abode . . . at which a summons can be served. Thus the defendant
cannot be served with process under the statute."31
In Northwestern Mortgage and Security Co. v. Noel Construction
Co.,32 the defendant and his wife left their home in North Dakota with
the intention of establishing themselves in Washington. While still in
North Dakota, he had an automobile accident with the plaintiff. Shortly
after the collision, he resumed his journey and later established a perma-
nent residence in the state of Washington. The plaintiff attempted sub-
stituted service of process on the defendant under the North Dakota
non-resident motorist statute. The court found that at the time of the
accident the defendant still retained his domicile in North Dakota and
because of this could not be served with process under the statute. "The
term residence as employed by the legislature in this statute is synony-
mous with domicile."33
The Minnesota court in Chapman v. Davis,3 4 had to decide the
word is used in this section in defining political rights, is, in our opinion, essentially
synonymous with domicile.") ; Vanderpool v. O'Harlon, 53 Iowa 246, 5 N. W. 119
(1880) ; Everman v. Thomas, 303 Ky. 156, 197 S. W. 2d 58 (1946); Berry v. Wil-
cox, 44 Neb. 82, 62 N. W. 249 (1895) ; Hannon v. Grizzard, 89 N. C. 115 (1883)
In re Stabile, 348 Pa. 587, 36 A. 2d 541 (1944).
"Ford v. Pack, 116 Kan. 74, 225 Pac. 1054 (1924) ; Johnson v. Harvey, 261
Ky. 522, 88 S. W. 2d,42 (1935) ; In re Ellis, 187 N. C. 840, 123 S. E. 82 (1924)
In re Strobel's Estate, 264 Pa. 552, 107 Atl. 888 (1919).
" Sherton v. Abbott, 178 Md. 526, 15 A. 2d 906 (1940) ; In re Webber's Will,
187 Misc. 135, 64 N. Y. S. 2d 281 (Surr. Ct. 1950); Reynolds v. Lloyd Cotton
Mills, 177 N. C. 412, 99 S. E. 240 (1919).
" 27 N. J. Super. 280, 99 A. 2d 181 (1953).
3 Id. at 281, 99 A. 2d at 182.
71 N. D. 256, 300 N. W. 28 (1941).
Id. at 261, 300 N. W. at 31. The same result would have been reached if the
court had used a test of actual residence rather than domicile because the defendant
was probably also not a non-resident at the time of the accident. However, this
construction will likely be followed in subsequent decisions even when the defendant
is residing outside the state but proves a retention of his domicile within.
" 233 Minn. 62, 45 N. W. 2d 822 (1951).
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applicability of the non-resident motorist statute to the defendant, a
school teacher in Minnesota, who returned each summer to her home in
Missouri. The plaintiff contended that the defendant was a non-resident
at the time of the accident and served her through the statutory agent,
the Secretary of State. Speaking generally of the term non-residence,
the court said that it expresses different concepts according to the con-
text in which it is used and could mean either a legal domicile or an
actual residence. In accepting the latter concept as the desired one, the
court said: "if the first concept of residence, namely, legal domicile, is
adopted and no one is to be deemed a non-resident ... whose domicile is
in the state, the purpose of the statute would to a great extent be de-
feated. For example, a motorist could leave this state with the intent
of returning; as a result his domicile would still be in the state, although
he no longer maintained a place of abode in it. An man may have a
residence in one state and his domicile in another." 5
In a later case, 6 the same court said, when speaking of the concept
of residence as used in the non-resident motorist statute, that: "it was
not intended to be synonymous with legal domicile and that if actual
residence within the state at the time of the accident on the highways
were established the provisions of the statute relative to service upon
non-residents would be inapplicable. 8 7
What constitutes residence under the non-resident motorist statutes
of several other jurisdictions has been the subject of direct judicial review
and those jurisdictions have all decided that it should not be construed
as being synonymous with domicile. 8  Thus, an examination of the de-
cisions has revealed only one jurisdiction 9 interpreting residence to be
the equivalent of domicile. It is believed that such a construction will
defeat the purposes for which the statutes have been enacted.
Another problem arising frequently under the non-resident motorist
statutes is illustrated by a decision from Oklahoma. 40  There the plaintiff
Id. at 68, 45 N. W. 2d at 825-826.
Hinton v. Peter, 238 Minn. 48, 55 N. W. 2d 422 (1952).37 Id. at 51, 55 N. W. 2d at 424.
" Johnson v. Jacoby, 195 F. 2d 563, 565 (D. C. Cir. 1951) ("one may be a
resident of the District for the purposes of the Act, even though domiciled else-
where") ; Suit v. Shailer, 18 F. Supp. 568 (D. Md. 1937) ; De Pier v. Maddox, 87
Cal. App. 2d 460, 179 P. 2d 87 (1948); Briggs v. Superior Court of Alameda
County, 81 Cal. App. 2d 240, 183 P. 2d. 758 (1947) ; Warwick v. District Court
of City and County of Denver, 269 P. 2d 704 (Colo. 1954) ; Carlson v. District
Court of City and County of Denver, 116 Colo. 330, 180 P. 2d 525 (1947) ; Sease
v. Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. of New York, 281 App. Div. 192, 118 N. Y. S.
2d 433 (3d Dep't 1952) (The term residence is not synonymous with domicile. A
person who is domiciled in New York may nevertheless be a resident of another
state within the meaning of the non-resident motorist statute.) ; Uslan v. Woronoff,
173 Misc. 693, 18 N. Y. S. 2d 222 (N. Y. City Ct. 1940).
" Northwestern Mortgage and Security Co. v. Noel Construction Co., 71 N. D.
256, 300 N. W. 28 (1941).
"' Clendening v. Fitterer, 261 P. 2d 896 (Okla. 1953).
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attempted substituted service upon the defendant alleging that he (the
defendant) was a resident of Texas. The defendant proved that he was
a resident of Oklahoma at the time of the accident. The court, in con-
struing the statute, said that it did not apply to a resident who later left
the state, and the service of process was set aside. A North Carolina
example of this problem is seen in Foster v. Holt,41 where the defendant,
a resident, left the state after the accident to return to duty in the armed
services and he court held that the statute was inapplicable to him.
The New Mexico court, in Fisher v. Terrell,42 was faced with the
same problem when the plaintiff alleged that the defendant was a non-
resident, but it was shown that at the time of the accident the defendant
was a resident of New Mexico. The court after holding that for the
service to be valid the defendant must have been a non-resident at the
time of the accident and not at the time the suit was filed, said: "It is
unfortunate that we do not have a statute .. . where service may be had
on the Secretary of State when a resident is involved in a motor car
accident and leaves the state before suit is filed, or process served on
him, or where after diligent search he cannot be found in the state even
though he does not leave." 43
As these statutes were enacted for the purpose of enabling the in-
jured plaintiff to serve the defendant who has inflicted injury on him
while using the state's highways and who, by the time suit can be insti-
tuted, would otherwise be beyond the jurisdiction of the courts, it is
evident that some provision is needed to remedy such an apparent gap.
This defect has been corrected in several states44 by making the non-
resident motorist statute applicable to residents of the state, who, after
the accident, cannot with due diligence be found in the state, and to
residents who have, after the accident, left the state and remained away
for a specified period.
45
"237 N. C. 495, 75 S. E. 2d 319 (1953).
-251 N. M. 427, 187 P. 2d 387 (1947).
4"Id. at 428, 187 P. 2d at 388. Other cases reaching the same result are: War-
wick v. District Court of City and County of Denver, 269 P. 2d 704, 706 (Colo.
1954) ("the fact that the resident left the state after the accident was immaterial.")
Cassan v. Fern, 109 A. 2d 482 (N. J. Super. 1954).
11 ARIZ. CODE ANN. § 66-266 (1949) ("The provisions of this section shall also
apply to a non-resident defendant who was a resident of the state at the time of
the accident or occurrence which gave rise to the cause of action sued on.") ; ILL.
R-v. STAT. c. 951/2, § 23 (1953); IOWA CODa ANN. §§321.498, 321.499 (1953); ME.
REv. STAT. c. 22, § 70 (1954); MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS art. 662, § 113(h)
(1953); MINN. STAT. ANNOTATIONS § 170.55 (1949); Mo. Rv. STAT. § 506.220
(1949); MONT. Ray. CODES ANN. §§ 53-202, 53-203 (1947); N. H. REV. LAWS C.
116, §§ 42 through 45 (1942) ; N. Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW §§ 52, 52a ("The
provisions of section fifty-two of this chapter shall also apply to a resident who
departs from the state subsequent to the accident or collision and remains absent
therefrom for thirty days continuously, whether such absence is intended' to be
temporary or permanent.") ; OHIO GEN. CODE ANN. § 2703.20 (1953) ; PA. STAT.
tit. 75, §§ 1201 through 1206 (Purdon's 1953).
" MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS, art. 66y/ § 113(h) (1953) (six months) ; MINN.
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The General Assembly of North Carolina in the 1955 session, in-
corporated such a provision into the North Carolina statute.40 Decisions
from other jurisdictions interpreting and applying such a provision have
demonstrated its usefulness.47
It is believed that the recent amendment to the North Carolina statute
will aid in the accomplishment of the purposes for which it was enacted
by making the absent resident amenable to the substituted service. It is
also believed that the amendment will eliminate, to a great extent, the
issue raised in the principal case, but for one possible exception. This
would arise when a motorist, who is an actual resident of North Carolina
but has his domicile in another state, has an accident in North Carolina,
and the plaintiff attempts to serve him under the non-resident motorist
statute. If the defendant claims to be a resident of North Carolina and
thus not amenable to service under the statute, a "direct judicial review"
of the meaning of "non-resident" would be required.
Because of the fact "that the holdings as to what constitutes residence,
domicile, etc., vary according to the purposes of the statutes," 48 the
legislature should make it clear what meaning is to be given "non-resi-
dent" as used in the North Carolina Non-Resident Motorist Statute.
ROBERT L. SPENCER.
Taxation-Tax Fraud Cases-Use of Net Worth Method
In December of 1954, the United States Supreme Court handed down
four decisions involving the use of the net worth method of discovering
unreported income in prosecutions for attempted evasion of income
taxes.' This note is an effort to examine the state of the law as it exists
in the lower federal courts and to determine what effect the decisions
of the Supreme Court will have upon the rules as laid down by the lower
courts.
STAT. ANNOTATIONS § 170.55 (1949) (six months); N. Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC
LAw § 52a (thirty days).
" N. C. Sess. Laws (1955) c. 232. See, Survey of Statutory Changes, p. -,
sup ra.
" Ogdon v. Granakos, 415 Ill. 591, 114 N. E. 2d 686 (1953); State ex rel.
Thompson v. District Court, 108 Mont. 362, 91 P. 2d 422 (1939) ; Reed v. Lombardi,
266 App. Div. 44, 44 N. Y. S. 2d 382 (2d Dep't 1943).
"' Hart v. Queen City Coach Co., 241 N. C. 389, 391, 85 S. E. 2d 319, 321 (1955).
'Holland v. United States, 348 U. S. 121; Friedburg v. Unoted States, 348
U. S. 142; Smith v. United States, 348 U. S. 147; United States v. Calderon,
348 U. S. 160.
In Sullivan v. United States, 348 U. S. 170, decided at the same time, the Gov-
ernment had used the net worth method in prosecuting the case, but the issues
raised on appeal were whether a federal district attorney could prosecute a tax
case without the sanction of the Department of Justice and whether the trial court
erred in denying defendant's post-sentencing motion to withdraw pleas of nolo
contendere. Since no issues as to the use of the net worth method were raised on
appeal, the case will not be considered.
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Essentially, the use of the net worth method involves the calculation
of the net worth of the taxpayer at the beginning and end of each year
in question. The difference between these figures plus non-deductible
expenses during the same year is calculated to be taxable income.
Originally, the method was used against racketeers, 2 to corroborate
specific proof of unreported income from sources not disclosed by the
taxpayer's income tax returns.3 Today, it is frequently employed to
test the accuracy of the income tax returns of business and professional
men.4 By its use, the United States is realizing revenue it would other-
wise be unable to collect and prosecuting tax evaders who otherwise
might never be apprehended.
The instances in which the government can prove undisclosed in-
come by direct evidence are rare indeed. Therefore, it is necssary that
the government have available means of proving its case indirectly. This
is the reason and justification for the use of the method. There is,
however, reason to think that upon occasion the net worth method is
used even though direct evidence is available.5 Its use under such cir-
cumstances should not be allowed since the method involves great danger
to the rights of the taxpayer, as hereinafter discussed. Zealousness in
the collection of the revenue is highly commendable but should not lead
to unethical practices.
The authority for the use of indirect proof of unreported income is
given by the Internal Revenue Code (1954) Section 446 (b).6 There
has been no limitation of this authority to civil cases as evidenced by
the fact that all four of the cases presently under discussion are criminal
prosecutions.
Dangers in Use
The consideration which should serve as a limitation on the use of
" Report of the Assistant Attorney General, 4 P-H 1955 FED. TAX SERv. 1 34,013
(1955).
'In United States v. Johnson, 319 U. S. 503 (1943), its use was approved to
support the inference that income of a substantial amount had been received from
a vast network of gambling houses during the years in which there was no income
reported from this source. The four cases decided in December of last year, how-
ever, all concern income from the same source that produced the taxpayer's re-
ported income.
'See note 2 supra.
' In United States v. Riganto, 121 F. Supp. 158, 159 (E. D. Va. 1954), Judge
Hutcheson states that, "Basing my observation upon a number of cases during the
past few years, it would seem that the use of one or both of these methods [net
worth method and bank deposits and expenditures method] has been employed
through preference at times when direct evidence is available."
* "Exceptions-If no method of accounting has been regularly used by the
taxpayer, or if the method used does not clearly reflect income, the computation of
taxable income shall be made under such method as, in the opinion of the Secretary
or his delegate, does clearly reflect income." This prerequisite to the use of in-
direct methods of proof, that the taxpayer's method of accounting must be such
that it does not clearly reflect his income, seems to demand only that the agents
of the government so state. This problem is discussed later in this note.
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the method is that it is fraught with danger to the taxpayer.7 The jury
may assume that once the government has established its computation,
the crime of tax evasion automatically follows. Though it sounds plau-
sible to say that the taxpayer should be able to explain the "bulge" in
his net worth, he may be honestly unable to recount his financial history.
As a practical matter, to force the taxpayer to explain such a "bulge"
would tend to shift the burden of proof to the defendant, despite the
recognized rule that the burden may not be shifted in criminal prosecu-
tion or civil fraud cases.8
Specific Problems
From these general considerations in the use of the net worth method,
we turn to a consideration of specific problems involved in its use. A
criminal conviction does not prevent the imposition of a civil penalty
nor does a previously imposed civil penalty prevent a criminal convic-
tion.9 Therefore, both types of action will be considered.
a. Adequacy of Records
One of the most frequent defenses offered by taxpayers has been that
indirect methods of proof could not be used when the taxpayer's books
were, on their face, complete and accurate, unless the government showed
specific omissions or inaccuracies. A number of lower courts had con-
sidered this contention justified.10 In the Holland case, the Supreme
Court ruled that the Internal Revenue Code, (1939) Section 4111 did
not so limit the Commissioner. It held that when the use of the method
seems to disclose unreported income not reflected on the taxpayer's
records, the records have been shown to contain false entries or to have
serious omissions. Skillful concealment should not be an invincible
barrier to proof.'
2
"[T]here is danger of the case being tried on a theory which, keeping to the
ear the promise that a defendant is presumed innocent until his guilt is established
beyond a reasonable doubt, breaks it to the hope by allowing a series of theoretical
estimates and computations as to defendant's income to take the place of proof of
it." Demetree v. United States, 207 F. 2d 892, 893 (5th Cir. 1953).
' Holland v. United States. The Court also said: "Were the taxpayer compelled
to come forward with evidence to explain the "bulge" in his net worth, he might
risk lending support to the Government's case by showing loose business methods
or losing the jury through his apparent evasiveness." 348 U. S. 121, 128 (1954).
See also Demetree v. United States, 207 F. 2d 892 (5th Cir. 1953).
' Spies v. United States, 317 U. S. 492 (1943) ; Slick v. United States, 1 F. 2d
897 (7th Cir. 1924).
"0 United States v. Riganto, 121 F. Supp. 158 (E. D. Va. 1954) ; Ragsdale v.
Paschal, 118 F. Supp. 280 (E. D. Ark. 1954); Talley v. Commissioner, 20 T. C.
715 (1953) ; Booker W. Evans, P-H 1954 MEM. DEc. 54,014 (1954).
"
1 Now INT. REv. CODE § 446 (1954).
" There were cases in the lower courts which had adopted the same view. The
Court of Claims speaking in Jacobs v. United States, 54-2 U. S. T. C. 9740 (1954),
said: "The law allows the Commissioner to use another method if the taxpayer's
method loes not clearly reflect income. To determine this question itself involves
computation of. income by some alternative method. Another method of accounting
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In two cases the lower courts have allowed the use of the method13
even though the taxpayer's books have appeared adequate. One of these
cases14 even held that the taxpayer had no right to have the question of
the sufficiency of his records submitted to the jury as the government
had a right to use the net worth method whether his records were ade-
quate or not. If this rule is limited to the adequacy of the records, there
is nothing wrong with this statement of the law. It would, however, be
unjustifiable to extend this rule to accuracy because the very thing which
the government is attempting to show by the use of the net worth method
is that the books are not accurate, i.e., that they are false or incomplete.
b. Burden of Proof
Having thus established the right to make use of the net worth
method, the government faces the problem of proving its case through
the use of that method. The government usually presents evidence
showing, by an itemized list, the assets of the taxpayer at the beginning
and end of each year in question. It also presents itemized lists of non-
deductible expenses of the taxpayer for each of those years. Then, the
calculations made from these figures and the results achieved are pre-
sented. The general rule in civil cases is that once the government has
so established its net worth calculations the accuracy of those calculations
is presumed subject to rebuttal by the taxpayer.' 5 But the burden of
proof remains upon the government to prove fraudulent intent in civil
fraud cases and to prove willful intention to evade income taxes in crimi-
nal cases. 16 The use of the net worth method involves the use of cir-
cumstantial evidence, but it is not necessary that such circumstantial
evidence exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than guilt;
"[T]he better rule is that where the jury is properly instructed
on the standards for reasonable doubt, such an additional instruc-
tion on circumstantial evidence is confusing and incorrect.' 17
may not be used unless one can show by use of that method that the taxpayer's own
method does not clearly state income." The Tax Court also limited its pronounce-
ment that the net worth method cannot be used when the taxpayer's books are
complete and accurate. "And when the increase in net worth is greater than that
reported on the taxpayer's returns or is inconsistent with such books and records
as are maintained by him, the net worth method is cogent evidence that there is
unreported income or that the books and records are inadequate, inaccurate or
false."
"1 Dupree v. United States, 218 F. 2d 781 (5th Cir. 1955) ; Earl Kite, 22 P-H
MEmo T. C. 53-865 (1953).
14 Dupree v. United States, supra note 13.
'
5
BALTER, FRAUD UNDER FEDERAL TAX LAw 177 (2d ed.; Chicago: Commerce
Clearing House, 1953).
10 Holland v. United States; United States v. Skidmore, 123 F. 2d 604 (7th Cir.
1941).
17 Holland v. United States, 348 U. S. 121, 139 (1954).
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c. Opening Net Worth
To establish the offense or penalty by the use of the net worth
method, the government must prove with "reasonable certainty" that its
opening net worth figure is accurate, that is, that the value of the assets
of the accused at the beginning of the prosecution period was as repre-
sented by the government's net worth statement.'8 Even though the
government's case shows an increase of the taxpayer's assets, if the
opening net worth figure is wrong, then all of the caluculations are
wrong. The Court does not fully discuss what it means by the phrase
"reasonable certainty." In the Holland case, the government introduced
evidence of extreme economic hardship in the taxpayer's past financial
history. The taxpayer's past income tax returns were also introduced to
show that his reported income had been practically nil. The purpose of
this evidence was to prove that the taxpayer could not have had $113,000
in cash on hand at the beginning of the period as he maintained.
While it is not contended that this evidence was insufficient to refute
the taxpayer's claim, there seems to be a failure on the part of the Court
to discuss what evidence is necessary to show the accuracy of the govern-
ment's opening net worth statement with "reasonable certainty" in the
first instance. The burden upon the government in fraud and civil cases
should be to show that it has made an extensive investigation of the tax-
payer's records and has made inquiries of the banks and other financial
institutions and agencies with which he deals, his business associates,
his family, his attorney, etc., without being able to discover any assets
other than the ones included in its statement of opening net worth. Fur-
ther, the government should show the past financial history of the tax-
payer in order to ascertain the range within which the assets of the tax-
payer can be expected to fall. Such evidence will not prove beyond any
doubt that its figures are correct, but it is all that reasonably can be
expected of the government.
To place any greater burden upon the government would be to im-
pose an impossible task.19 The taxpayer has more and better knowledge
of his assets at any particular time than anyone else. So it will not be
impossible for him to show any inaccuracies in the government's figures
which may occur.2 0  Any less proof by the government should not be
considered as sufficient evidence of the accuracy of the opening net worth
figures to allow the government's case to go to the jury.
's Holland v. United States, 348 U. S. 121, 132 (1954).
Bryan v. United States, 175 F. 2d 223, 227 (5th Cir. 1949) (dissenting opin-
ion). For examples of the type of evidence used in the past to establish the gov-
ernment's opening net worth statement see Friedburg v. United States, 348 U. S.
142 (1954) ; Schauerman v. United States, 174 F. 2d 985 (8th Cir. 1951).
"Still we must be careful that in the application of the rule, the burden of
proof is not shifted to the taxpayer. See United States v. Riganto, 121 F. Supp.




The Holland case establishes one rule upon which it is to be hoped
the taxpayer may rely. If he furnishes "relevant leads" as to the source
of assets claimed to be on hand at the opening date, it is incumbent upon
the government to check such leads. 21 "Relevant leads" may be defined
as those which are not too far removed and not impossible of being
checked, and which if true would establish the innocence of the taxpayer.
Failure to check such leads may be interpreted by the trial court to mean
that the leads would have verified such sources and that the government's
case is too weak to go to the jury. Unfortunately, this rule is watered
down by the Court's holding that though the government did fail to
track down leads given it in the Holland case, the showing made by the
government of the financial history of the taxpayer was conclusive proof
that he could not have had on hand at the opening date the hoard of
cash which he claimed. Therefore, the taxpayer must not assume that
the government is compelled under all circumstances to track down leads
which he provides.
e. Admissions
One type of proof frequently offered by the government in order to
prove its opening net worth figure is the introduction of books and
records of the accused and admissions made by him, i.e., extra-judicial
statements made after the fact to agents of the government charged with
investigating the offense. This raises the vitally important question of
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. As in the usual crimi-
nal case, the taxpayer has this privilege in tax evasion prosecutions, but
it may be waived if not seasonably claimed.2 2  Of course, a claim alone
does not establish the privilege. The government is entitled to a pro-
ceeding to compel testimony and so have the claim tested out.
28
2 Holland v. United States, 348 U. S. 121, 127 (1954).
-" United States v. Murdock, 284 U. S. 141 (1931); Hanson v. United States,
186 F. 2d 61 (8th Cir. 1950) ; Nicola v. United States, 72 F. 2d 780 (3d Cir. 1934) ;
United States v. Lawn, 115 F. Supp. 674 (S. D. N. Y. 1953). The taxpayer must
make the claim of constitutional privilege to the revenue agent when asked for
books or testimony. Nicola v. United States, supra. There is no requirement that
the taxpayer be warned of his constitutional privilege before information is elicited.
Power v. United States, 223 U. S. 303 (1911) ; Wilson v. United States, 162 U. S.
613 (1895) ; United States v. Block, 88 F. 2d 618 (2d Cir. 1927).
_ United States v. Murdock, supra note 22. As to the power of the Commis-
sioner to compel testimony and to examine books, see INT. REv. CODE §§ 7602,
7604(a), 7605, 6501(a) (1954). The Constitutional privilege attaches to personal
records and partnership records since they, too, are considered personal records.
Hanson v. United States, 186 F. 2d 61 (8th Cir. 1950) ; Nicola v. United States,
72 F. 2d 780 (3d Cir. 1934) ; United States v. Lawn, 115 F. Supp. 674 (S. D. N. Y.
1953). But no privilege attaches to corporate or public records. There is a pos-
sible argument that since all records are required to be kept by the provisions of
INT. IEv. CODE §§ 446(a) and 446(c) (1954), they thereby become public records
and have no privilege. Such an argument was sustained under the similar provi-
sions of the Emergency Price Control Act. Shapiro v. United States, 333 U. S. 1
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Assuming that the taxpayer does waive his constitutional immunity,
of what value are his admissions to the government? The Smith case
holds that they may be used as evidence but must be corroborated as in
other criminal cases.2 4  All admissions made after the fact, to a person
charged with investigating the possibility of wrong-doing and which
embrace an element vital to the government's case, must be corrobo-
rated.2 5  Any time a fact is sufficiently important for the government to
adduce extra-judicial statements of the accused bearing on its existence,
and it is relied upon to sustain the defendant's conviction, there is need
for corroboration. 26
The corroboration required is independent proof of the corpus delicti.
This requirement is recognized by the Court to force the government to
prove not only the commission of the crime, but who committed it. How-
ever, this is true in any crime involving scienter.2 7  It is not necessary
that the corroborative evidence prove the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt, or by a preponderence of the evidence, as long as it is substantial
and the evidence as a whole is sufficient for a jury to find that the de-
fendant is guilty.28 The independent evidence may bolster the admissions
and thus prove the offense "through" the statments of the accused. 20
f. Source of Income
Once the government has proven that there is unreported income, it
must prove that the source of it is one that produces taxable income.
Some lower courts had taken the view that in order to do this, the gov-
ernment had to negate all possibilty of there being sources of non-taxable
income.30 Others had refused to place this "impossible burden" upon
(1947). So far, it has not been sustained under the Internal Revenue Code. For
an excellent discussion of this whole problem, see Norman Redlich, Searches,
Seizures, and Self-Incrimination in Tax Cases, 10 TAx L. Ray.-191, 192 (1955).
24 Admissions are universally held to be admissible in evidence against the party
making them in civil cases. WIGM RE, EVIDENCE § 1048 (1940). Therefore civil
cases are not included in this discussion.25 But the Court in the Holland case does leave the door open to the possibility
that the admissions may be made under such circumstances as to lend to them a
great degree of credibility, citing State v. Saltzman, 241 Iowa 1373, 44 N. W. 2d
24 (1950).
"0 Smith v. United States, 348 U. S. 147 (1954). The government had based its
finding of the value of the assets of the taxpayer at the opening date upon the tax-
payer's past financial history, which history was reconstructed from statements
made by the taxpayer.27 Forte v. United States, 94 F. 2d 236 (D. C. Cir. 1937).
"I Smith v. United States, 348 U. S. 147, 150 (1954) ; Heasley v. United States,
218 F. 2d 872 (9th Cir. 1953) ; Bell v. United States, 185 F. 2d 302 (4th Cir.
1950) ; Forte v. United States, 94 F. 2d 236 (D. C. Cir. 1937) ; Daeche v. United
States, 250 Fed. 566 (2d Cir. 1918). See also Pearlman v. United States, 10 F. 2d
460 (9th Cir. 1926).
29 Smith v. United States.
20 United States v. Fenwick, 177 F. 2d 397 (8th Cir. 1949); Bryan v. United
States, 175 F. 2d 223 (5th Cir. 1949).
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the government.31 Other courts went further, holding that when a dis-
crepancy between increased net worth and reported income was shown,
the burden of explanation shifted to the taxpayer.3 2
The Supreme Court, in the Holland case, held that proof of a likely
source from which the income could have arisen is sufficient to go to the
jury. But if the taxpayer supplies the government with relevant leads,
it is incumbent upon the government to track them down. 33
So the Court's view seems to be the intermediate one. The govern-
ment need show only that there is a source of income which is probably
capable of producing the alleged unreported taxable income. It is not
necessary for it to go further and disprove the possibility of there being
any sources of non-taxable income. It has made out its prima facie case
upon showing the likely source of the unreported taxable income, which
income it claims is proven to exist through the employment of the net
worth method.
g. Willfulness
To sustain the imposition of the penalty for attempt to evade income
taxes, it must be shown that there was such an attempt.34 In order to
sustain a conviction for such an attempt, it must be shown that the at-
tempt was willful. 35  Merely establishing unreported taxable income is
not sufficient to show either.36 Willfulness is not proved by a mere
intentional act or omission, but there must be a corrupt intent to do the
wrong.37  A consistent pattern, over a number of years, of substantial
"
1 Bell v. United States, 185 F. 2d 302 (4th Cir. 1950) ; Brodella v. United States,
184 F. 2d 823 (6th Cir. 1950).
2 174 F. 2d 391 (8th Cir. 1949) end cases cited in United States v. Caserta, 199
F. 2d 905, 907 (3d Cir. 1952).
" One wonders how much the taxpayer may rely upon this rule in view of the
rule previously discussed concerning leads furnished as to possible sources of income
from which a cache of mony could have arisen and the qualification to that rule
that the government may not have to trace down even relevant leads if its case is
strong enough. However, notwithstanding the fact that the government's proof
in the Holland case was quite strong, the Court intimated that it would have re-
quired checking of leads had the taxpayer provided any which were relevant.
Though the taxpayer had given leads to the government as to the source of the
hoard of cash he claimed to have had at the opening date, he gave none as regards
a possible source of non-taxable income in the subsequent years.
The court remarked in Dupree v. United States, 218 F. 2d 781 (5th Cir. 1955),
that it had waited for the decisions in the four cases here under consideration in
order to receive guidance therefrom. It then held that the government, by affirma-
tive evidence, must negative all sources of non-taxable income before it has estab-
lished its prima facie case. For a statement of the law on this point in civil tax
fraud cases see, BALTER, FRAUD UNDER FEDERAL TAX LAW 175 (2d ed.; Chicago:
Commerce Clearing House, 1953).
" Morris Lipsitz, 21 T. C. 917 (1950).
" Holland v. United States, 348 U. S. 121, 139 (1954) ; United States v. Sulli-
van, 274 U. S. 255 (1927) ; United States v. Skidmore, 133 F. 2d 604 (7th Cir.
1941).
" Holland v. United States; 10 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INcOzE TAXATION
55.58 (Supp. Jan. 1955).
" United States v. Murdock, 290 U. S. 389 (1933) ; 27 A-m. JuR., Income Taxes§ 250 (1940). Willfulness has been defined as "an act done with a bad purpose"
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understatements of income is enough to sustain a criminal conviction
if coupled with a showing of a lack of records or exclusion of income from
the records, or other indirect evidence.38
h. Annual Accounting Period
It is further clear that proof of an understatement in some but not
all of the prosecution years will sustain a conviction only for those years
in which an understatement is proved. 0 There is a surprising tendency
on the part of the courts in both civil and criminal cases to allow the
government to allocate the income it has discovered by use of the net
worth method equally over the years in question. Then the taxpayer-is
obliged to come forward and show that this is an improper allocation.4"
Conclusion
just what effect the four cases will have upon the proceedings in
lower courts is problematical. Except for those few rules previously
accepted in some lower courts and rejected in these cases, it is doubtful
that the decisions will cause much change in the holdings of the lower
courts. The rules formulated for the guidance of the lower courts are
unfortunately too nebulous and shadowy to be of much practical help,
except that the lower courts are now on notice that the Supreme Court
does think cases involving the use of the net worth method should be
regarded with some suspicion and so should be closely scrutinized to
protect the rights of the taxpayer.
The opinions of the Court do apparently cast a greater burden upon
the government to establish its prima facie case, but just how great a
burden this turns out to be will have to await the light of later decisions
of the lower courts interpreting these opinions, or possibly even further
decisions of the Supreme Court.
Until that time, it is hoped that the courts will closely scrutinize
cases involving the use of the net worth method and that the Department
or "without justifiable excuse" or with "careless disregard whether or not one has
the right so to act." 10 MERTENs, LAw oF FEDERAL INcomE TAxATioN 55.41(1948).
" Double sets of books, false entries or authorizations, false invoices or docu-
ments, destruction of books and records, concealment of assets or covering up
sources of income, handling of one's affairs in a manner to avoid the making of
records usual in such transactions, and any other conduct, the likely effect of which
would be to mislead or conceal. Spies v. United States, 317 U. S. 492 (1943);
United States v. Clark; 123 F. Supp. 608 (S. D. Cal. 1954).
"' Holland v. United States, 348 U. S. 121, 129 (1954).
"United States v. Ridley, 120 F. Supp. 530 (N. D. Ga. 1954) ; Estate of Bart-
lett, 22 T. C. No. 151 (1954). Another interesting case is Harry B. Mikelberg,
23 T. C. No. 41 (1954), where income of husband and wife, both physicians, who




of Justice and the Internal Revenue Service will not abuse the use of the
method.
NELsoN W. TAYLOR, III.
Statutes-Interpretation of "Residence"
The North Carolina Supreme Court was recently faced with the
problem of interpreting the word "residing" in what appears to be a
new setting. In Barker v. Iowa Mutual Insurance Company,' the court
determined that a minor and dependent son, though married and living
in another city while attending college, was "residing with" his father
within the meaning of the clause in a fire insurance policy covering per-
sonalty "belonging to the insured or any member of the family of and
residing with, the insured, while elsewhere than on the described prem-
ises."2 The court said that the term "residing with" was equivalent to
having a residence with the insured, construing the word residence to
mean domicile.
Whether or not a particular place is a person's residence or domicile
has long been a problem. This problem is always acute since a person
must have a residence or domicile in a particular place for many pur-
poses. Among these purposes for which a person's residence or domicile
is important are attachment,3 candidacy for office, 4 registration of chattel
mortgages and conditional sales contracts,5 as executor or administrator
of a decedent's estate,6 divorce,7 homestead,8 both petit and grand jury
service,9 in actions before a justice of the peace,'0 as a candidate for the
state bar examination," naturalization,' 2 service of process on nonresi-
1241 N. C., 397, 85 S. E. 2d 305 (1955).
'Id. at 399, 85 S. E. 2d at 306.
*E.g., Brann v. Hanes, 194 N. C. 571, 140 S. E. 292 (1927) ; N. C. GEN. STAT.
§1-440.3 (1953).
'E.g., Hannon v. Grizzard, 89 N. C. 115 (1883).
'E.g., Sheffield v. Walker, 231 N. C. 556, 58 S. E. 2d 356 (1950); Industrial
Discount Corp. v. Radecky, 205 N..C. 163, 170 S. E. 640 (1933); Weeks v. Adams,
196 N. C. 512, 146 S. E. 130 (1928) ; N. C. GEN. STAT. § 47-20.2 (1953).
' E.g., Branch Banking and Trust Co. v. Finch, 232 N. C. 485, 61 S. E. 2d 377
(1950).
'E.g., Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226 (1945) ; McLean v. McLean,
233 N. C. 139, 63 S. E. 2d 138 (1950) ; Henderson v. Henderson, 232'N. C. 1, 59
S. E. 2d 227 (1950) ; Bryant v. Bryant, 228 N. C. 287, 45 S. E. 2d 57 (1947);
N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-5 (4), 50-5 (6), 50-6 (1950 as amended 1953).
' E.g., Taylor v. Hayes, 172 N. C. 663, 90 S. E. 801 (1916) ; Cromer v. Self.
149 N. C. 164, 62 S. E. 885 (1908) ; Fulton v. Roberts, 113 N. C. 422, 18 S. E. 510
(1890) ; Munds v. Cassidey, 95 N. C. 558, 4 S. E. 353 (1887) ; N. C. CoIsT. Art. X,§ 1.
'E.g., State v. Wilcox, 104 N. C. 847, 10 S. E. 453 (1889); State v. Bullock,
63 N. C. 520 (1869) ; N. C. GEN. STAT. § 9-1 (1953).
" E.g., Austin v. Lewis, 156 N. C. 461, 72 S. E. 493 (1911); N. C. GEN. STAT.
§§7-138 and 7-142 (1953).
"E.g., Baker v. Varser, 240 N. C. 260, 82 S. E. 2d 90 (1954) ; Rule Five of
the Rules Governing Admission to Practice of Law in North Carolina, Vol. 4 N. C.
GEN. STAT. 65 et seq. (1943).
"E.g., Hantzopoulos v. United States, 20 F. 2d 146 (M. D. N. C. 1927).
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dent motorists,13 for purposes of some local ordinances, 14 for service of
process in general,15 for statute of limitation purposes, 10 tuition at col-
lege,'7 property taxes,' 8 inheritance taxes, 10 voting,20 legal settlement
for admission to the poor house,21 and venue.
22
It is well established that two essential things must concur to con-
stitute a domicile: there must be physical presence at a dwelling place
and an intent to make it a home.23 Domicile is defined as a person's
fixed, established, permanent dwelling place as distinguished from his
temporary, though actual, place of residence. 24 Residence has always
been the problem. In Watson v. North Carolina Railroad Company,2
the court said: "The word 'residence' has, like the word 'fixtures,' dif-
ferent shades of meaning in the statutes ... and even in the constitution,
according to its purpose and context." Generally, residence means some-
thing more than mere physical presence at a particular place and some-
thing less than a domicile.20 Isolated statements on residence, when
taken out of their context and compared, would seem to show confusion
and inconsistency on the part of the court.2 7 In one case there seems to
" E.g., Winborne v. Stokes, 238 N. C. 414, 78 S. E. 2d 171 (1953) ; Ewing v.
Thompson, 233 N. C. 564, 65 S. E. 2d 17 (1951) ; N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-105 (1953).
See also, Note 33 N. C. L. Rav. - (1955).
"E.g, Aydlett v. Elizabeth City, 121 N. C. 4, 27 S. E. 1002 (1897).
" E.g., Southern Mills v. Armstrong, 223 N. C. 495, 27 S. E. 2d 281 (1943);
Current v. Webb, 220 N. C. 425, 17 S. E. 2d 614 (1941); Greenleaf v. Peoples
Bank of Buffalo, 133 N. C. 292, 45 S. E. 638 (1903).
"
0 E.g., Hill v. Lindsay, 210 N. C. 694, 188 S. E. 406 (1936); Lee v. McKoy,
118 N. C. 518, 24 S. E. 210 (1896) ; Armfield v. Moore, 97 N. C. 34, 2 S. E. 347
(1887).
"E.g., N. C. GEN. STAT. § 116-144 (1952).
"
8 E.g., Texas Co. v. Elizabeth City, 210 N. C. 454, 187 S. E. 551 (1936);
Roanoke Rapids v. Patterson, 184 N. C. 135, 113 S. E. 603 (1922); N. C. GEN.
STAT. § 105-302 (1950).
"'E.g., Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Doughton, 270 U. S. 69 (1926),
reversing 187 N. C. 263, 121 S. E. 741 (1924).
2 E.g., Owens v. Chaplin, 229 N. C. 797, 48 S. E. 2d 37 (1948) ; Gower v. Carter,
195 N. C. 697, 143 S. E. 513 (1928) ; Groves v. Commissioners of Rutherford, 180
N. C. 568, 105 S. E. 172 (1920); N. C. CONsT. Art. VI, §2; N. C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 163-25 (f) and 163-26 (1952).
2 E.g., Commissioners of Burke v. Commissioners of Buncombe, 101 N. C. 520,
8 S. E. 176 (1888) ; N. C. GEN. STAT. § 153-159 (1952).22E.g., Howard v. Queen City Coach Co., 212 N. C. 201, 193 S. E. 138 (1937);
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-82 (1953).
" Home v. Horne, 31 N. C. 99 (1848); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS§§15, 16, 18 (1934).
2" Roanoke Rapids v. Patterson, 184 N. C. 135, 113 S. E. 603 (1922). In Granite
Trading Corp. v. Harris, 80 F. 2d 174, 176 (4th Cir. 1935), the court gave the
following simple definition of domicile: "No better practical concept of a man's
legal domicile can be obtained than from the untechnical definition of the Roman
law, i.e.. the place 'from which when he goes away he seems to be wandering from
home.'"22152 N. C. 215, 216, 67 S. E. 502, 503 (1910).
"0 Sheffield v. Walker, 231 N. C. 556, 58 S. E. 2d 356 (1950).
'Residence and domicile found to be synonymous: Hannon v. Grizzard, 89
N. C. 115, 120: "Residence as the word is used in this section in defining political
rights, is, in our opinion, essentially synonymous with domicile denoting a perma-
nent as distinguished from a temporary dwelling place." Similar statements are
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have been actual confusion.2 8  However, on close examination of the
cases, it becomes clear that in certain situations residence is always in-
terpreted to mean domicile, as in the divorce29 and voting3" cases; and
in other situations, residence is interpreted to mean actual residence, as
in the homestead 3' and attachment 32 cases. Whether residence is syn-
onymous with domicile in a particular connection depends upon the
nature of the subject matter, the context in which the word is used, and
the purpose of the legislation or writing in which the word is used.33
This principal is reiterated in the Barker case34 with great clarity.
The cases involving students have been primarily concerned with the
residence of students for voting purposes.35 As a general rule, a student
found in Owens v. Chaplin, 229 N. C. 797, 48 S. E. 2d 37 (1948) ; Gower v. Carter,
195 N. C. 697, 143 S. E. 513 (1928) Groves v. Commissioners of Rutherford, 180
N. C. 568, 105 S. E. 172 (1920) ; Roberts v. Canon, 20 N. C. 398 (1839). All of
these cases deal with residence requirements for voting or holding office.
Roanoke Rapids v. Patterson, 184 N. C. 135, 137, 113 S. E. 603, 604 (1922):
"When accurately used, 'domicile' and 'residence' are not convertible terms. Domi-
cile is a person's fixed, permanent, established, dwelling-place, as distinguished from
his temporary, although actual, place of residence." This case involved the re-
quirement of listing property for taxation in the township in which the taxpayer
resides.
Watson v. North Carolina R. R., 152 N. C. 215, 217, 67 S. E. 502, 503 (1910),
quoting with approval from Barney v. Oelrichs, 138 U. S. 529 (1891) : "Residence
is dwelling in a place for some continuance of time and is not synonymous with
domicile, but means a fixed and permanent abode or dwelling, as distinguished
from a mere temporary locality of existence; and to entitle one to the character
of a 'resident,' there must be a settled, fixed abode, and an intention to remain
permanently.. . ." The case involved the venue requirement of bringing suit in
the county in which the plaintiff resided, which was construed to mean domicile
although the court, in the above quotation, states that the words are not synony-
mous.
Residence and domicile not synonymous: Sheffield v. Walker, 231 N. C. 556,
559, 58 S. E. 2d 356, 359 (1950) : "'Residence' is sometimes synonymous with
'domicile.' But when the words are accurately and precisely used, they are not
convertible terms." This was a case involving recordation of a conditional sales
contract in the county where the conditional vendee resides. Residence was held
to mean actual, personal residence and not domicile.
" Howard v. Queen City Coach Co., 212 N. C. 201, 193 S. E. 138 (1937). The
court held that residence in the venue statute means a person's domicile, but the
opinion after stating that residence and domicile are not synonymous goes on to
define both terms as a person's fixed, permanent, and established abode.
"Cases cited note 7 supra.
20 Cases cited note 20 supra.
21 Cases cited note 8 supra.
2 Cases cited note 3 supra. The purpose of the attachment statute, for example,
is to protect domestic creditors against debtors who are out of the state and cannot
be served with legal process. Six months' absence may be sufficient to justify
attachment of the debtor's property although the debtor still retains his domicile in
the state for other purposes such as administration of his estate at his death. See
the discussion in RESTATEMENT, CONFLcr OF LAWS § 9, comment e (1934).
" Baker v. Varser, 240 N. C. 260, 82 S. E. 2d 90 (1954) ; Industrial Discount
Corp. v. Radecky, 205 N. C. 163, 170 S. E. 640 (1933).
24241 N. C. 397, 399, 85 S. E. 2d 305, 306, 307 (1955) : "Residence has been
variously defined by this court. The definitions vary according to the purposes of
the several statutes referring to residence and the objects to be accomplished by
them."
2 See 37 A. L. R. 134 (1925).
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who resides in a college town while seeking an education will not acquire
a legal residence or a domicile in that town even though he is an adult.30
An adult student may acquire a domicile in the college town while at-
tending school if he intends to remain there permanently or indefinitely
without any present intention of returning to his former home. 7 Thus
students who intend to remain in the college community only during the
time necessary to complete their education and then intending to locate
elsewhere are not residents for voting purposes.3 8 It has been said that
there must be a bona fide intent to make the city their home for a period
not limited by the length of time that would be required for their educa-
tional stay.3 9 It is to be noted that in these cases the word "residence"
is construed to mean "domicile."
Many other cases have arisen regarding residence of a child in a
school district for the purpose of obtaining a free public education. When
a minor leaves his father's home and goes to another place for the sole
purpose of seeking a free public school education, maintaining an intent
to return to his former home, he will not become a "resident" in the
school district.40 Generally, however, the courts have construed resi-
dence here as actual residence rather than domicile.41
In an interesting South Carolina case, 42 a student attending college
was held to be an "actual" resident of the university community for pur-
poses of a venue statute though his "legal" residence may have been
elsewhere. The dissent in this case vigorously attacked this conclusion,
stating that the student's residence was with his parents. This is another
example of "residence" meaning "actual residence."
A student who joined a National Guard unit in the state where he
attended college, his domicile being in another state, has been held to
be a resident of the state in which he attended school and therefore not
entitled to a discharge under a statute limiting membership in the militia
to residents of the state.43
"See 28 C. J. S., Domicile § 12(g) 3 (1941) and 17 Am. JUR., Domicile § 74
(1938), and cases cited therein.
" Baker v. Varser, 240 N. C. 260, 82 S. E. 2d 906 (1954) ; Berry v. Wilcox,
44 Neb. 82, 62 N. W. 249, 48 Am. St. Rep. 706 (1895).
" Chomeau v. Roth, 230 Mo. App. 709, 72 S. W. 2d 997 (1934); Goben v.
Murrell, 195 Mo. App. 104, 190 S. W. 986 (1916).
" Ptak v. Jameson, 215 Ark. 292, 220 S. W. 2d 592 (1949).
"o State v. School Dist. No. 12, Niobrara County, 45 Wyo. 365, 18 P. 2d 1010(1933); Mt. Hope School Dist. v. Hendrickson, 197 Iowa 191, 197 N. W. 47(1924). The court found in the Mt. Hope case that the children were emancipated
by their father, had no intention of returning to their Canadian home, and were,
therefore, residents of the school district.
"' People v. Hendrickson, 54 Misc. 337, 104 N. Y. S. 122 (Sup. Ct. 1907), aft'd,
196 N. Y. 551, 90 N. E. 1163 (1909). The court held that an orphan residing with
a resident of the school district was entitled to a free education since the legisla-
ture did not intend residence to be construed as domicile. See State v. School Dist.
No. 12, Niobrara County, 45 Wyo. 365, 376, 18 P. 2d 1010, 1013 (1933).
42 Roof v. Tiller, 195 S. C. 132, 10 S. E. 2d 333 (1940).
' Owens v. Huntling, 115 F. 2d 160 (9th Cir. 1940).
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Students have also been held to be nonresidents of the state of their
domicile for the purpose of service of process under the nonresident
motorist statutes of their home states.
4 4
Many states have statutes permitting their state universities to charge
higher tuition for nonresident students than that charged for resident stu-
dents.45 While there is a dearth of cases on the point possibly due to
the relatively small amounts involved, it seems that in the absence of
express rules governing this matter, those charged with the duty of
deciding who shall be assessed nonresident tuition fees rely on the com-
mon law rules of domicile. 46
In summation, the cases involving students and their "residence"
show that, as in the cases involving residence of those in other situations,
whether the student is a resident of the college community will be de-
termined by the purpose of the statute involved and the objects to be
accomplished by it.
The domicile of an unemancipated child ordinarily follows that of
the father.47 This domicile cannot be changed by the child on its own
volition since it is non sui juris.48 A child may, however, reside in one
place while its domicile is in another.49 Marriage may emancipate an
infant so that it may acquire a domicile of its own choice,50 but this does
not always follow as a matter of course. 51
In determining the meaning of residence in the Barker case, the court
said that under the tuition statutes in North Carolina a student does not
become a resident of the college community merely by attending classes;
that to say the son became a resident of Raleigh under the facts in the
case would be to give a narrow and restricted meaning to the words
"residing with the insured" which would be unjustified in view of the
principle of construing insurance policies liberally with respect to the
insured. Such a view seems to have been justified though the court came
close in result to saying that "residing with" meant "having his domicile
with" by its analogy to the tuition situation in which rules of domicile
"Uslan v. Woronoff, 173 Misc. 693, 18 N. Y. S. 2d 222 (New Rochelle City
Ct. 1940), aff'd inem., 259 App. Div. 1093, 21 N. Y. S. 2d 613 (2d Dep't 1940);
Hughes v. Luckner, 233 Minn. 207, 46 N. W. 2d 497 (1951).
" See e.g., N. C. GEN. STAT. § 116-144 (1952).
" Dykstra and Dykstra, Who Are Nonresident Students, 16 JouRNAL OF THE
AmERICAN AssocAION OF COIEGIATE REGismRARs 255 (1941).
' Allman v. Register, 233 N. C. 531, 64 S. E. 2d 861 (1951) ; Thayer v. Thayer,
187 N. C. 573, 122 S. E. 307 (1924) ; In re Means, 176 N. C. 307, 97 S. E. 39(1918).
"It re Blalock, 233 N. C. 493, 64 S. E. 2d 848, 25 A. L. R 2d 818 (1951);
Thayer v. Thayer, 187 N. C. 573, 122 S. E. 307 (1924).
" Allman v. Register, 233 N. C. 531, 64 S. E. 2d 861 (1951).
" Bonneau v. Russell, 117 Vt. 134, 85 A. 2d 569 (1952) ; Ex Parte O1cott, 141
N. J. Eq. 8, 55 A. 2d 820 (Ch. 1947); RESTATEMENT, Cou-scr OF LAws § 31
(193Qtx re Dawkins, 190 Misc. 995, 75 N. Y. S. 2d 546 (N. Y. Dona. Rel. Ct.
1947).
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are usually said to apply,52 and by relying on a similar case in which a
court said that a minor's residence was where his domicile was, since
domicile includes residence. 53
The important thing to be remembered is that the North Carolina
court will look to the nature of the subject matter, the purpose of the
statute or other instrument, and the context in which the word is used
in determining what "residence" means. An equally important corollary
is that cases interpreting the word "residence" in one connection do not
necessarily indicate the way in which that word will be interpreted when
it arises in another connection.
F. KENT BURNS.
Descent and Distribution-Homicide-Effect on Guilty
Party's Right to Inherit
A husband was acquitted of the unlawful homicide of his wife, whom
he killed while shooting at a man he suspected of being her lover. In a
subsequent suit by her son and her administrator for a declaratory judg-
ment debarring him from inheriting from his wife, the husband's right
to inherit was declared unchanged by the mere fact of the homicide.1 A
statute2 which provided that no one convicted of "unlawfully killing"
another should benefit from the death had no application, since the hus-
band had been acquitted of any unlawful killing.
The theory of the court in allowing the husband to inherit was that
the intent necessary to preclude a killer from benefiting by the death of
his victim is more than a mere general criminal intent, or an intent di-
rected at a third person. It must be an intent to kill unlawfully the
person by whose death the killer seeks to benefit. The evidence showed
that such intent had been absent in this case.
The problem of whether one who kills an ancestor, a testator, or a
joint tenant, may acquire property from his victim, thus benefiting by
virtue of his own homicidal act, has long been the subject of judicial and
legislative discord.3 A brief look at some of the decisions and statutes
may aid in understanding the problems raised by the principal case.
In the absence of statutes directly in point the courts have, in general,
fallen into one of three groups:
" Dykstra and Dykstra, supra note 46.
"' Central Manufacturers Mutual Ins. Co. v. Friedman, 213 Ark. 9, 12, 209
S. W. 2d 102, 103, 1 A. L. R. 2d 557, 559, 560 (1948) : "The domicile of Benno
was with his father ... Domicile includes residence. . .
1 Legette v. Smith, 85 S. E. 2d 576 (S. C. 1955).
* S. C. CODE § 19-5 (1952).
* See generally, 16 A-m. Jur., Desecent and Distribution §§ 74-78 (1938) ; Note,
39 A. L. R_ 2d 477 (1955) ; 3 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 477 (1946) ; Wade,
Acquisition of Property by Willfully Killing Another-A Statutory Solution, 49
HARv. L. R. 715 (1936) ; AmEs, LECTURES ON LEGAL HisToRy 310-312 (1913).
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(1) Those courts which have allowed inheritance despite the fact that
the property descends by virtue of the heir's felonious killing of the ances-
tor have done so on the theory that the statutes of wills and of descent
and distribution are clear and unambiguous, and make no provision for
such a situation, and that, until the legislature speaks again and deprives
a killer of his right to inherit, the courts are powerless to prevent the
property from going directly to the felon.4  In support of this view the
argument has been advanced that depriving an heir of his right to the
property would be a forfeiture of estate upon conviction of a crime, in
violation of express constitutional provisions.5
(2) Courts which have refused to allow the killer to benefit by his act
insist that statutes of wills and descent were passed subject to the com-
mon-law doctrine that one may not profit by his own wrong, and that
courts must read this principle into the statutes as being the intent of the
legislature.6 In answer to the contention that denying the right of in-
heritance to the killer is an unconstitutional forfeiture of his estate, these
courts point out that the estate never vested in the killer; thus, that there
is no forfeiture, but a mere exclusion of the killer from the group entitled
to inherit.7
(3) Still a third group of courts has held that the statutes of descent
and distribution control to the extent that the legal title passes to the
killer immediately upon the death of his victim, but that, in keeping
with principles of equity and good conscience, he becomes a constructive
trustee, or holder of the bare legal title, for the benefit of those who
' Carpenter's Estate, 170 Pa. 203, 32 Atl. 637 (1895) ; Crumley v. Hall, 202 Ga.
588, 53 S. E. 2d 646 (1947) ; Deem v. Milliken, 6 Ohio C. C. 357 (1892), aff'd, 53
Ohio St. 668, 44 N. E. 1134 (1895) ; Eversole v. Eversole, 169 Ky. 793, 185 S. W.
487 (1916) ; Gollnik v. Mengel, 112 Minn. 349, 128 N. W. 292 (1910) ; Hagan v.
Cone, 21 Ga. App. 416, 94 S. E. 602 (1917) ; Hill v. Noland, 149 S. W. 288, Tex.
Civ. App. (1912); Holloway v. McCormick, 41 Okla. 1, 136 Pac. 1111 (1913);
Owens v. Owens, 100 N. C. 240, 6 S. E. 794 (1888) ; McAllister v. Fair, 72 Kan.
533, 84 Pac. 112 (1906); Re Duncan's Estates, 40 Wash. 2d 850, 246 P. 2d 445
(1952); Shellenberger v. Ransom, 41 Neb. 631, 59 N. W. 935 (1894); Wall v.
Pfanschmidt, 265 Ill. 180, 106 N. E. 785 (1914) ; Wilson v. Randolph, 50 Nev. 371,
261 Pac. 654, rehearing denied, 50 Nev. 440, 264 Pac. 697 (1927).
Carpenter's Estate, 170 Pa. 203, 32 Atl. 637 (1895) ; Owens v. Owens, 100
N. C. 240, 6 S. E. 794 (1888); Wall v. Pfanschmidt, 265 Ill. 180, 106 N. E. 785
(1914).
0 Garwols v. Bankers' Trust Co., 251 Mich. 420, 232 N. W. 239 (1930) ; in re
Wilkin's Estate, 192 Wis. 111, 211 N. W. 652 (1927); McDonald v. Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 178 Iowa 863, 160 N. W. 289 (1916) (insurance case) ; Perry v. Straw-
bridge, 209 Mo. 621, 108 S. W. 641 (1908) ; Price v. Hitaffer, 164 Md. 505, 165
Atl. 470 (1933) ; Re Spark's Estate, 172 Misc. 642, 15 N. Y. S. 2d 926 (Surr. Ct.
1939) ; Re Tyler's Estate, 140 Wash. 679, 250 Pac. 456 (1926) (apparently over-
ruled by Re Duncan's Estates, supra note 4) ; Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N. Y. 506,
22 N. E. 188 (1889) ; Weaver v. Hollis, 247 Ala. 57, 22 So. 2d 525 (1945).
7 Garwols v. Bankers' Trust Co., 251 Mich. 420, 232 N. W. 239 (1930) ; Perry v.
Strawbridge, 209 Mo. 621, 108 S. W. 641 (1908) ; Weaver v. Hollis, 247 Ala. 57,
22 So. 2d 525 (1945).
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would have taken had he not been living.8 The North Carolina court
has unqualifiedly allied itself with this view.9
The decision in the principal case points up the tendency of courts
in jurisdictions which, by virtue of judicial construction or statutory
directive, have denied some killers the right to inherit, to inquire into
the "intent" of the killer in determining whether or not he shall be al-
lowed to benefit by the death of his victim. In the principal case the
South Carolina court refused to apply the criminal law theory that
"malice follows the bullet," saying: "But to invoke this fiction of the
criminal law against the right of inheritance in a civil case is, it seems to
us, extending the common law principle to encompass a factual situation
that was never intended to be within its purview."1 0  The husband
directed no malice toward his wife; thus, he did not forfeit his rights as
an heir.
That courts consider the killer's intent in determining his right to
inherit is made apparent in many ways. Clearly, no court would deny
inheritance to one who kills an ancestor negligently-who kills in the
commission of a mere tortious wrong," while, at the other extreme, a
court which denies the right to inherit to any killer would naturally deny
it to one convicted of murder in the first degree. It has been said that
if the killing was justified, as by self-defense, it would not preclude in-
heritance by the killer.' 2 Killers who were insane at the time they com-
mitted the homicide have been held capable of inheriting.'3  The theory
here seems to be that unless the killer has a inens rea, the common law
or statutory doctrine which precludes him from inheriting is not justi-
fiable.14  One court refused to deny a husband the right to inherit from
his wife, whom he killed while shooting at her alleged paramour, on the
theory that he did not kill with the intent to inherit from his wife. 1'
As a consequence of the refusal of courts in group (1) to "read into"
Neiman v. Hurff, 11 N. J. 55, 93 A. 2d 345 (1952) (joint ownership of stock) ;
Whitney v. Lott, 134 N. J. Eq. 596, 36 A. 2d 888 (Ch. 1944) ; Sherman v. Weber,
113 N. 3. Eq. 45, 167 Atl. 517 (Ch. 1933); Ellerson v. Wescott, 148 N. Y. 149,
42 N. E. 540 (1896) ; Van Alstyne v. Tuffy, 103 Misc. 455, 169 N. Y. S. 173 (Sup.
Ct. 1918).
" Garner v. Phillips, 229 N. C. 160, 47 S. E. 2d 845 (1948) ; Bryant v. Bryant,
193 N. C. 372, 137 S. E. 188 (1927). See also, advocating this view REsTATEMENT,
RESTITUTION § 187 (1937).
"0 Legette v. Smith, 85 S. E. 2d 576, 580 (S. C. 1955).
" In re Houghton, [1915] 2 Ch. 173, 176, where the court said: "Hitherto it has
never been suggested that there is any such incapacity or disqualification, where the
person guilty of the act of slaying the deceased was innocent of any crime, as where
the deceased was killed accidently or by misadventure, or his death was held to be
a case of justifiable homicide."
2 Floyd v. Franklin, 251 Ala. 15, 36 So. 2d 234 (1948).
" It re Houghton, supra note 11 ; Eisenhardt v. Siegel, 343 Mo. 22, 119 S. W.
2d 810 (1938) ; Petrillo v. Hanley, 29 Pa. D. & C. 512 (1936) ; In re Hoffman's
Estate, 39 Pa. D. & C. 208 (1940) ; In re Estate of Mason, 31 D. L. R. 305 (1916).
"In re Pitts [1931] 1 Ch. 546.
" In re Wolf, 88 Misc. 433, 150 N. Y. S. 738 (Surr. Ct. 1914).
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the statutes of descent and distribution any preclusion of murderers from
inheriting, statutes have been passed in many jurisdictions in an effort
to remedy this situation. 16 These statutes, however, are far from uni-
form. Almost as many different statutes have been enacted as there
are ways of describing the act which will bring about disinheritance of
the killer. Indirectly, they all have reference to the intent or state of
mind of the killer. Some hold that only a "murder" is sufficiently repre-
hensible to deprive the killer of his inheritance.' 7 Others refer to "mur-
der in the first or second degree."' s Still others apply only when there
has been a "felonious"' 19 or "willful"'20 causing of death, or an "unlaw-
ful"'21 or "criminal causing or procuring of death. 2 2  Several statutes
extend the doctrine beyond the actual act of killing, and disinherit one
who "conspires" 23 to kill, or "aids and abets"'24 the killing. One statute
comes into play only where the killing has been done with the intent
to obtain the property of the person killed.2 5 Whether or not one who
commits manslaughter is prevented from inheriting the property of the
deceased depends entirely on the wording of the individual statute . 2
The North Carolina statute on this point is even more limited than
most, applying only to husband-wife homicides.2 7  The North Carolina
court avoided the inequitable consequences of a strict construction of
the statute of descent in Bryant v. Bryant28 and Garner v. Phillips9 by
1 See 3 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 478 (1946), where these statutes are
catalogued.
,
T CAL. PROB. CODE § 258 (1949).
1 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §152-2-13 (1953) ; PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 20 §§ 136, 244
(1950).
" N. D. REv. CODE § 56-0423 (1943).
'0 Miss. CODE ANN. § 672 (1942).
"1 S. C. CODE § 19-5 (1952).
"'OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 231 (1951).
"' NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 30-119 and 30-120 (1943); KAN. GEN. STAT. § 59-513(1949).
2" IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-212 (1953).
2' VA. CODE § 64-18 (1950). This statute was strictly construed in Ward v.
Ward, 174 Va. 331, 6 S. E. 2d 664 (1940) and Blanks v. Jiggetts, 192 Va. 337, 64
S. E. 2d 809 (1951).
2 Thus, in Strickland v. Wysowatcky, 250 P. 2d 199 (Colo., 1952), the courtheld that one who was convicted of voluntary manslaughter of his wife was not
precluded from inheriting from her by a statute (CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 152-2-13
(1953)) which provided that "any person convicted of murder in the first or second
degree . .. shall not take . . . any of the estate of deceased." In Hamblin v.
Marchant, 103 Kan. 508, 175 Jac. 678 (1918), where the statute denied the right of
inheritance in the decedent's estate to anyone convicted of "killing" decedent, it was
held that a wife who was convicted of manslaughter in the third degree was pre-
cluded from inheritance.
21 N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 28-10, 30-4, 52-19 (1953). Since the North Carolina
statutes deny the right of one spouse to succeed to the property of the other whom
he has "feloniously slain," and since manslaughter, both voluntary and involuntary,
is a felony in North Carolina (see State v. Dunn, 208 N. C. 333, 180 S. E. 708(1935)), it seems that, under the statute, even manslaughter would preclude one
spouse's inheriting from the other.
-s 193 N. C. 372, 137 S. E. 188 (1927). Husband and wife were tenants by the
entirety. Husband killed wife and the court denied him the benefits of the land on
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the device of the constructive trust. But, necessarily, the law in this
area is still in a nebulous state, since these decisions have set out the law
in only two of a myriad of possible fact situations. Inevitably these
situations will arise, and even granting that the court will feel justified
in applying a constructive trust in every case, a comprehensive statute
would seem vastly preferable. The result would be a much more pre-
dictable law in this area, relieving the necessity for litigation and for
employing such a legal fiction each time an even slightly different set of
facts arises.
DAVID M. CLINARD.
Trade Regulation-Exclusive Dealing Arrangements-Effect on
Competition Required by Section 3 of the Clayton Act
Congress enacted Section 3 of the Clayton Act' in 1914. The intent
of Congress was to apply a narrower standard of legality to exclusive
dealing arrangements than was employed by the Sherman Act rule of
reason approach.2 The Act3 was designed to eliminate unreasonably
restrictive practices in their incipiency.4
Section 3 covers both tying clauses and exclusive dealing contracts.5
"equitable principles," expressly reserving the question of whether or not N. C.
GEN. STAT. § 28-10 (1953) applied.2- 229 N. C. 160, 47 S. E. 2d 845 (1948). Son killed both parents. This case
was clearly not within N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 28-10, 30-4, or 52-19 (1953).
138 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. §14 (1946).
'In Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U. S. 231, 238 (1918).
Justice Brandeis stated the rule of reason as follows: "The true test of legality is
whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby pro-
motes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competi-
tion. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts pecu-
liar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after
the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or
probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for
adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all
relevant facts."
238 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 14 (1946). Section 3 of the Clayton Act
provides that: "It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the
course of such commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods...
whether patented or unpatented, for use, consumption, or resale . .. on the condi-
tion, agreement, or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use
or deal in the goods . . . of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where
the effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agreement, or
understanding may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monop-
oly in any line of commerce."
' Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U. S. 346, 356 (1922):
"The Clayton Act sought to reach the agreements embraced within its sphere in
their incipiency, and in the section under consideration to determine their legality
by specific tests of its own which declared illegal contracts of sale made upon the
agreement or understanding that the purchaser shall not deal in the goods of a
competitor or competitors of the seller, which may 'substantially lessen competition
or tend to create a monopoly.'"
' North Carolina has a statute declaring such practices illegal per se, since there
is no qualifying clause therein. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 75-5(b) (Supp. 1953). See
also Note, 29 N. C. L. REv. 316 (1951).
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An example of a tying clause is where a manufacturer leases a tabulating
machine to a lessee, and as a condition of the lease, requires the lessee to
use in the machine only cards manufactured by the lessor.' On the
other hand, an exclusive dealing contract has a direct exclusionary effect
in the form of either a total requirements or an exclusive supply contract.
A total requirements contract compels a dealer to buy or lease his full
requirements of a product from the seller or lessor; the obvious result
is that all other competitors are foreclosed from doing business with the
dealer. An exclusive supply contract has the same effect by virtue of
a specific provision that the dealer will handle certain goods of the
supplier only and is forbidden to deal in goods of competitors of that
supplier.
Although Section 3 makes no distinction between tying clauses and
exclusive dealing contracts, courts have developed different standards of
legality for them. The primary purpose of tying restrictions is to sup-
press competition, 7 but there are many economic advantages attributed
to exclusive dealing contracts.8  Consequently, tying restrictions have
been held illegal per se,9 whereas exclusive dealing contracts have been
accorded more liberal treatment.
In applying Section 310 the meaning to be given the qualifying clause
presents the most difficult problem. The first case involving exclusive
dealing contracts to reach the United States Supreme Court was Stand-
ard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co." In a private suit by a manu-
facturer of dress patterns to enjoin a dealer from violating an "agency"
contract, the Court found that the contract was an exclusive dealing
restriction. 1 2  In view of the fact that the manufacturer controlled ap-
International Business Machines Corp. v. United States 298 U. S. 131 (1936).
' Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U. S. 293, 305-306 (1949).
'Id. at 306; Stockhausen, The Commercial and Anti-Trust Aspects of Term Re-
quirements Contracts, 23 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 412, 413-14 (1948).
o International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U. S. 392 (1947).
10 Generally speaking, there are three methods by which a Section 3 suit arises:(1) Department of Justice prosecution in a federal district court:(2) Federal Trade Commission investigation and proceeding with right to
appeal from a Federal Trade Commission order direct to the United States
Court of Appeals; and(3) Private suit in the federal courts. A Section 3 case may arise on an
injunction petition against a restrictive practice, a defense to a restrictive con-
tract enforcement action, or in a suit for treble damages for injury sustained on
account of the restrictive practice.
In the field of private litigation under Section 3 no case has been discovered
where treble damages were allowed a small buyer or dealer because of restrictions
imposed by an exclusive dealing contract. To allow recovery there must be not
only proof of a public injury, but also a causal connection between the violation
charged and injury claimed in addition to proof of the nature and extent of that
injury. See Libman v. Sun Oil Co., 127 F. Supp. 52 (D. Conn. 1954); Hudson
Sales Corp. v. Waldrip, 211 F. 2d 268, 274 (5th Cir. 1954).
11258 U. S. 346 (1922).
12 Exclusive agency contracts, vertical integrations, allocations of exclusive ter-
ritories, and refusals to deal are not covered by Section 3 of the Clayton Act. Also,
exclusive buying arrangements that commit the seller to trade exclusively with the
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proximately 40 per cent of the 52,000 so-called pattern agencies in the
entire country, the Court concluded that such contracts came within the
prohibition of Section 3. The Court applied the "dominance" test, which
is to the effect that if the degree of domination of the market is sufficient
to justify the inference that competition had been or probably would be
lessened, then the alleged violator's exclusive dealing contracts are illegal
under the qualifying clause of Section 3. Twenty-seven years later came
the Standard Oil of California case 13 on a government prosecution,14
which laid down a narrower rule called the test of substantiality. This
test is met when a substantial portion of the industry's business is fore-
closed by the restrictive arrangement. 5 Conversely, if the amount of
business foreclosed by a restrictive arrangement is insufficient to ad-
versely affect a substantial amount of competition, such arrangement is
not a violation of Section 3.
Since the Standard Oil of California decision, there has been much
uncertainty as to whether exclusive dealing contracts are illegal per se
if the defendant is doing a substantial amount of business, or whether the
amount of business foreclosed by the contracts is the major factor. 10
There is also a contention that the courts are inconsistent in their hold-
ings. And further, it is contended that the Federal Trade Commission
orders are closer to the rule of reason approach than are the court deci-
buyer are not covered by Section 3. See Federal Trade Commission v. Motion Pic-
ture Advertising Service Co., 344 U. S. 392 (1953).
" Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U. S. 293 (1949). Here
the defendant corporation had exclusive dealing contracts with 6000 independent
dealers representing 16% of the retail gasoline outlets through which $58,000,000
worth of gasoline was sold in the western area comprising seven states. Defendant,
the largest seller in the area, also had 23% of the industry's business although only
6.7% of it was obtained through defendant's exclusive dealing contracts. Six other
competitors had similar arrangements which foreclosed a total of 42.5% of the
market to more than 70 smaller companies. The length of defendant's contracts
varied from specified terms in some cases to year-to-year terms in others. The
Supreme Court held that in view of the substantiality of the affected proportion of
retail sales and widespread adoption of such contracts by the other large competi-
tors, the contracts created such a potential clog on competition that Section 3 was
violated.
" An examination of the FTC Docket of Complaints, 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP.
(10th ed.) 40,021-406 (1954), reveals the fact that there has been a great increase
in Federal Trade Commission activities in this field against major companies in
various industries since the decision in Standard Oil Co. of California v. United
States, 337 U. S. 293 (1949).
1" For a discussion of the substantiality test applied in Standard Oil Co. of Cali-
fornia v. United States, 337 U. S. 293 (1949), see Note, 28 N. C. L. REv. 188
(1949).
1" See Sunderland, Antitrust Developments: A New Era for Competitive Pric-
ing, 41 A. B. A. J. 113 (1955) ; 18 FORD. L. RiV. 306 (1949) ; 35 IOWA L. RaV. 131
(1949) ; 19 U. OF Cix. L. REv. 163 (1950).
But see McLaren, Related Problems of "Requirements" Contracts and Acquisi-
tions in Vertical Integration under the Anti-Trust Laws. 45 ILL. L. Ray. 141
(1950) ; Schwartz, Potential Impairment of Compelition--The Impact of "Standard
Oil Co. of California v. United States" on the Standard of Legality under the
Clayton Act, 98 U. OF PA. L. Rv. 10 (1949).
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sions.' 7 A study of the cases reveals that a pattern is developing which
tends to show that the substantiality test laid down in the Standard
Oil of California case is being consistently applied by both the courts
and the Federal Trade Commission. That test has been universally
adopted even though a bare majority of the Supreme Court adhered to
it.' In testing for substantiality the inquiry goes beyond an ascertain-
ment of the amount of business done by the alleged violator and includes
such matters as a determination of the amount of business foreclosed by
the restrictive arrangement. Other economic factors are also of impor-
tance on the issue of substantiality. 19
The Richfield Oil case20 involved one of the big producers in the
western area. In 1950 Richfield did $36,000,000 worth of gasoline busi-
ness2 1 plus $3,650,000 worth of business in tires, batteries, and acces-
sories. Of the 2965 stations involved, there were over 4500 written
agreements of indefinite length and 3000 oral stipulations found to have
exclusionary effects. First of all, the exclusive dealing arrangements
had to be proved before substantiality of foreclosure of competition could
be determined. Richfield had two main types of stations which were
called leased out (L-O) stations and dealer stations. It was contended
that the L-O stations were created by Richfield and therefore were
agencies in fact. But the lease provisions containing fifteen clauses were
so elaborate and so worded as to make the lessees independent. A legal
estate of at least a tenancy at will was found to exist.2 2 Superimposed
upon these leases were oral requirements restrictions which, combined
with the leases, had the effect of establishing exclusive dealing arrange-
ments with the 1343 L-O stations. Dealer stations operated under 80
per cent requirements contracts which, without more, would not have
been fully exclusive dealing arrangements. Richfield further employed
restrictions in the form of painting agreements and restrictions against
" Sunderland, Antitrust Developments: A New Era for Competitive Pricing,
41 A. B. A. J. 113 (1955) ; 1 CCH TRADE REG. REP. (10th ed.) 14007 (1954).
"8 Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U. S. 293 (1949). The
lower court decision was affirmed by a 5-4 vote.
"o See, e.g., Dictograph Products, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 217 F. 2d
821 (2d Cir. 1954), and Anchor Serum Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 217
F. 2d 867 (7th Cir. 1954). Both cases will be discussed later in this note.
2O United States v. Richfield Oil Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280 (S. D. Cal. 1951), aff'd
per curiam, 343 U. S. 922 (1952).
See Kahn, A Legal and Economic Appraisal of the "New Sherman au Clay-
ton Acts," 63 YALE L. J. 293, 315 n. 123 (1954) : "This absolute volume probably
amounted to less than 3% of the total gasoline sales in the area, though a sub-
stantially higher proportion of the sales through service stations alone."
"United States v. Richfield Oil Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280, 290 (S. D. Cal. 1951):
"If we consider the provision for 24-hours' termination as valid, the lessee has, at
the worst, a tenancy at will.... And I am inclined to think that, because of the
conflict of the 24-hours' termination clause with the monthly rental provisions,
Courts would consider the tenancy created by the L-O agreements, at least, a
month-to-month tenancy terminable only upon the minimum notice required in such
cases."
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displaying unauthorized signs or operating unauthorized gasoline pumps.
These restrictions, together with their rigid enforcement by overwhelm-
ing coercion, precluded competitors from trading with the dealer stations.
Applying the substantiality test, the court, undoubtedly having in mind
that 55 per cent of the industry was tied up by restrictive arrangements
of the big producers, relied on the volume of business of Richfield under
the exclusive dealing arrangements, the number of such arrangements
employed by Richfield, and the coercion practiced in enforcing them, all
of which indicated that the objective was to restrain competition. There-
fore, the practices involved were held to violate Section 3 of the Clayton
Act.
In contrast to the finding of substantiality in the Richfield Oil case,
J. I. Case Co.2 3 is an example of a lack of substantiality. The defendant
in this case was the nation's third largest producer of farm machinery
doing a $108,000,000 business in 1948, which amounted to 7 per cent of
the total business in the industry. J. I. Case Co. required its 3738
dealers to handle its complete line of products24 under one year contracts
which were renewable. 1050 of the dealers handled J. I. Case Co.
products exclusively, but it was found that such arrangements were on
the dealers' own volition. 108 instances where pressure was applied to
restrict the dealers from trading with competitors were reported, but of
these only twenty-six instances were reported since 1946 and none in
1948. The court held that on the entire evidence there were no exclu-
sionary restrictions imposed on the dealers.
Thus, many facts had to be considered in both cases to determine
whether exclusive dealing practices were employed. In one case exclu-
sive dealing arrangements were proved, whereas in the other there were
no exclusionary understandings found except in 108 isolated instances.2 5
Two recent Court of Appeals decisions from different circuits have
applied the substantiality test. In the Dictograph Products case2 0 the
court in an opinion by Judge Medina stated that economic inquiry was
unnecessary after a finding of substantiality. But in determining the
question of substantiality, such facts were relied upon as the volume of
"
2United States v. J. I. Case Co., 101 F. Supp. 856 (D. Minn. 1951).
24 The policy employed by J. I. Case Co. and other producers in the farm ma-
chinery industry is that of full line forcing; its effect is to require a dealer to
handle the complete line of the producer's products as a condition of lease or pur-
chase of any of the producer's goods. Full line contracts are not restrictive under
Section 3 unless the dealer is precluded from handling competitors' products.
22 Proof of exclusive dealing agreements in most cases is not so difficult to
establish since the exclusionary provisions are usually incorporated in formal writ-
ten contracts. See Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U. S. 293
(1949); Dictograph Products, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 217 F. 2d 821
(2d Cir. 1954) ; Anchor Serum Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 217 F. 2d 867
(7th Cir. 1954).




business done under the defendant's written exclusive dealing contracts,
its third position in rank in the hearing aid industry, that it is one of three
large producers that use these contracts, that it controls 220 of the 1000
prime retail outlets, and that the defendant has maintained its position
during the post-war period of growth. Upon consideration of these
facts, probable adverse effect on competition was found.
In the other case, Anchor Serum Co. v. Federal Trade Conzmission9'
the court's opinion by Judge Major stated:
"There was no legal issue before the Commission as to whether
the contracts were illegal per se; the only legal issue before the
Commission, as it is here, was whether the contracts with their
restrictive provisions were calculated to have the proscribed effect
or consequences .... Only contracts which had the proscribed
effect were made unlawful [by Section 3].''28
The findings of the Federal Trade Commission were to the effect that de-
fendant had full requirements contracts with sixteen wholesalers, that it
was the largest producer of hog cholera serum and virus in the "lay"
producing group, and that the dollar volume of business with the sixteen
contract holders was substantial. In addition the Federal Trade Com-
mission found that $1,000,000 worth of business was done annually with
its two largest wholesale dealers who were the biggest distributors in the
enormous hog producing states of Iowa and Illinois; facts were shown
to prove that competition was completely stymied in certain instances
after the exclusive contracts were made in 1947. The inescapable in-
ference is that obligation of the dealers under the contracts caused it.
29
Here again the decision rests not only on volume of business done under
the restriction, but also leadership in the industry and number of outlets
foreclosed along with specific instances of eliminating competitors from
the market.
The fact that Federal Trade Commission orders are following the
substantiality pattern is illustrated by the Maico Co. case. 30 The Com-
mission remanded the case to the hearing examiner to determine the
substantiality of foreclosure of competition because he, in concluding that
Section 3 was violated, had found only the following: the petitioner's
rank in the hearing aid field, volume of business, and that there were
restrictive contracts with 123 distributors. Not a single case discussed
has held exclusive dealing contracts invalid on the meager evidence the
hearing examiner relied upon in the Maico Co. case. The Commission
217217 F. 2d 867 (7th Cir. 1954).
I8 d. at 870.20 Id. at 873.
"0 The Maico Co., Inc., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. (9th ed.) 11,577 (F. T. C.
1952).
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requires evidence of the same type as the courts require, except that due
to its specialized nature, it is better equipped to probe more deeply into
the same complex relevant economic facts that the courts consider in
order to determine whether competitidn has been or probably will be
substantially lessened.31
From the foregoing it is apparent that the mere doing of a substantial
amount of business by an alleged violator is not sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of the qualifying clause of Section 3. The major factor in
the substantiality test is the amount of business foreclosed by the exclu-
sive dealing arrangements. However, the courts do broaden an inquiry
to include such factors as the rank in the industry, practice in the indus-
try, number and per cent of outlets foreclosed, rigidity of enforcement
of the restrictive practices, alleged violator's share of the market, length
of the contracts, intent of the parties, availability of alternative ways of
obtaining an assured market, and the economic power and capacity of the
alleged violator to enforce restrictive provisions.
The fact that it is necessary to make an inquiry into the question of
substantiality makes it clear that exclusive dealing contracts or arrange-
ments are not legal per se. On the other hand, the fact that such inquiry
is made does not mean that the rule of reason is employed. The tech-
nique adopted to determine the question of substantiality is similar to
that in the rule of reason. But the analogy goes no further. Once sub-
stantiality is found to exist, these arrangements may be said to be illegal
per se because there is no further inquiry into the reasonableness or bene-
ficial effects that may, in fact, flow from such arrangements in a particu-
lar case. But it must be emphasized that the necessity of finding sub-
stantiality precludes such contracts from being per se illegal. Thus, it
appears that the courts and the Federal Trade Commission have carried
out the congressional intent in regard to exclusive dealing arrangements
by applying a test of legality that falls between the rule of reason and
illegality per se tests. JAMES R. STRICKLAND.
Trade Regulation-Robinson-Patman Act-Unjustified Price
Discrimination-Additional Requirements Necessary to
Constitute Violation of Section 2 (a).
Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Pat-
man Act,' prohibits an interstate seller from making certain price dis-
criminations. The section in part states:
3 Cf. Revlon Products Corporation, 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. (10th ed.)
25,184, notion to reopen denied, 125,249 (F. T. C. 1954); Beltone Hearing Aid
Co., 3 CCH TRADE RE. REP. (10th ed.) 125,397 (F. T. C. 1955) (Here the order
is not a final Commission order, but a hearing examiner's ruling.)
'38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U. S. C. §13 (19476), as amended, 49 STAT. 1526
(1938), 15 U. S. C. § 13 (Supp. 1952).
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"That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce,
in the course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to
discriminate in price between different purchasers or commodities
of like grade and quality, where either or any of the purchases
involved in such discrimination are in commerce, .... and where
the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen
competition qc tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce,
or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who
either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimi-
nation, or with customers of either of them...."
In addition to an unjustified price discrimination 2 this statute seems to
require that (1) the defendant be engaged in interstate commerce, (2)
the discrimination occur in the course of such interstate commerce, and
(3) the discrimination be of such a nature that the effect may be sub-
stantially to lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly in any line
of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition. This note
assumes the existence of a price discrimination3 and will deal only with
these additional requirements of Section 2(a).
With the exception of the "flow of commerce ' 4 and "bulk storage"'5
doctrines, courts find little trouble in determining whether the alleged
price discriminator was engaged in interstate commerce. 6 Since the
"affection doctrine"7 of the Sherman Act has been found inapplicable
to Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act,8 a defendant solely engaged in intra-
state commerce is not within the coverage of this section regardless of
any effect his discrimination may have on interstate commerce.9
' Certain defenses are available to the alleged discriminator in justification of
his price differences. They are contained in Subsections (a) and (b) of Section 2
of the Clayton Act. For a recent discussion see Fortas, Affirmative Legal De-fenses, How TO COMPLY WITH THE ANTITRUST LAWS 187 (Chicago Commerce
Clearing House, 1954).
For a discussion of this problem see Correa, Discrimination. in Prices, How To
COMPLY WITH THE ANTITRUST LAWS 152 (Chicago: Commerce Clearing House,
1954).
' This applies to products which after being produced or refined in one state are
transported across state lines and sold from storage facilities in another state.
Standard Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 340 U. S. 231 (1951); Midland
Oil Co. v. Sinclair Refining Co., 41 F. Supp. 436 (N. D. Ill. 1941).
' This doctrine refers to intrastate sales where the goods involved were stored
in bulk warehouses or storage tanks but had moved in interstate commerce prior
to the storage. Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U. S. 564 (1943) ; Alabama
Independent Service Station Ass'n v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 28 F. Supp. 386
(N. D. Ala. 1939).
o Austin, PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBINSON-
PATMAN AcT 14 (Philadelphia: American Law Institute, 1953).
' Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U. S. 219
(1948).8 Myers v. Shell Oil Co., 96 F. Supp. 670 (S. D. Cal. 1951); Spencer v. Sun
Oil Co., 94 F. Supp. 408 (D. Conn. 1950.)
'But see Bowamn Dairy Co v. Hedlin Dairy Co., C. C. H. TRADE REG. REP.
(10th ed.) 1167,959 (N. D. Ill. 1954). The defendant was an intrastate dealer and
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The requirement that the discrimination must have occurred in the
course of defendant's interstate commerce has caused difficulty. It has
been established that if defendant's goods are moving to him across state
lines, as in the "flow of commerce" cases, then any discriminatory prices
in his later sales will meet this requirement. This may be illustrated by
a case in which the defendant refines gasoline in Indiana, ships it to
storage tanks in Illinois, and competes with plaintiff, an intrastate dealer
who buys gasoline from an Illinois corporation and sells it in Illinois.
Defendant's discriminatory sales to customers of plaintiff would be in the
course of his interstate commerce.10 Section 2(a) may also be held
applicable even if only one of the discriminatory sales was made in inter-
state commerce."- On the other hand, most courts have taken the view
that a discriminatory act in intrastate commerce resulting in an injury
to an intrastate merchant is not deprived of its local character merely
because the same seller is conducting other transactions in interstate
commerce. For example, in Shlonmchik v. Hygrade Bakery Company"
the defendant manufactured bakery products and sold them in interstate
commerce. The plaintiff, an intrastate operator, sold similar products.
The defendant was charged with following plaintiff's salesmen and un-
derselling them while at the same time defendant was maintaining higher
prices elsewhere. In regard to the jurisdictional requirement that the
discrimination must occur in the course of defendant's interstate com-
merce, the court said:
"In order for the sales here involved to come under the Clayton
Act as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, they must have
been made in interstate commerce. The fact that the defendant
conducts other business across state lines is not enough, nor is the
additional fact that the effect of the discrimination may be to
lessen competition with the person [the defendant in this case]
who grants the benefit of such discrimination."' 3
The court further said that Congress plainly did not intend to regulate
the plaintiff was engaged in interstate commerce. The plaintiff alleged that the
defendant had by means of discriminatory prices taken customers away from the
plaintiff. The defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that none
of the alleged practices had occurred in interestate commerce. The court in denying
defendant's motion relied on Moore's Bakery v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U. S.
115 (1954). The parties in the Aead case represented the converse of this situation
with the defendant there being the party engaged in interstate commerce. How-
ever, the court said that since the plaintiff would be amenable to suit by the de-
fendant under the Mead decision, then the plaintiff must be accorded a correspond-
ing right.
"0 Midland Oil Co. v. Sinclair Refining Co., 41 F. Supp. 436 (N. D. Ill. 1941).
" The present language of Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act is that it covers
situations "where either of any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are
in commerce."
12 C. C. H. TRADE REG. REP. (1953 Trade Cas.) U 67,632 (E. D. Pa. 1953).1 Id at 68,992.
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every transaction of every business engaged in interstate commerce and
that the phrase "in the course of such commerce" indicates an intent to
limit the operation of the Act to interstate transactions and not to at-
tempt to regulate those which are wholly intrastate even though part of
the seller's business may be interstate. This action was dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction.' 4
Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court in Moore's Bakery
v. Mead's Fine Bread Company 5 reached a different result, deciding
that such a discrimination had occurred in the course of defendant's
commerce and was therefore within the scope of Section 2(a) of the
Clayton Act.' 6 Mead's the defendant, manufactured bread in New
Mexico and in one town in Texas. The plaintiff, Moore, was a local
baker making and selling his bread only in Santa Rosa, New Mexico.
Plaintiff and defendant were competitors in Santa Rosa. The defendant,
on learning of an agreement by the local merchants to buy exclusively
from the plaintiff, cut the price of his bread below cost and kept it low
until the plaintiff was forced out of business. During this time de-
"4 Accord, Myers v. Shell Oil Co., 93 F. Supp. 670 (D. C. Cal. 1951). The
defendant was engaged in interstate commerce but the discriminatory acts com-
plained of by the plaintiff were made wholly in California. The plaintiff was en-
gaged in intrastate commerce only. The court said the question here was whether
the discrimination was committed in the course of defendant's interstate commerce.
In denying relief under the Clayton Act the court said that Congress had not exer-
cised all of its power over interstate commerce but had dealt only with persons
who were not merely engaged in interstate commerce but who also practiced re-
straints in the course of the interstate commerce. See also Danko v. Shell Oil Co.,
115 F. Supp. 886 (E. D. N. Y. 1953); Lewis v. Shell Oil Co., 50 F Supp. 547(N. D. Ill. 1943).iG 348 U. S. 115 (1954). This case was begun March 10, 1949, in the United
States District Court for the District of New Mexico. It was dismissed at the
close of plaintiff's case on the ground that the plaintiff was "in pari delicto" with
the defendant. This was affirmed in Moore v. Mead Service Co., 184 F. 2d 338
(10th Cir. 1950). The Supreme Court, in Moore v. Mead Service Co., 340 U. S.
944 (1951), granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case/for
consideration in the light of Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340
U. S. 211 (1951). The district court in a new trial again dismissed the plaintiff's
complaint and rendered judgment for the defendant on the ground that the price
discrimination was justified under the fourth proviso in Section 2(a) of the Clay-
ton Act, allowing discriminatory prices to meet changed market conditions. This
was reversed and remanded for new trial in Moore v. Mead Service Co., 190 F. 2d
540 (10th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U. S. 902 (1952). The district court in a
new trial gave judgment for the plaintiff for $57,000 ($19,000 trebled) under Sec-
tion 4 of the Clayton Act. This was reversed in Mead's Fine Bread Co. v. Moore,
208 F. 2d 777 (10th Cir. 1953), cert. granted, 347 U. S. 1012, rev'd sub norn.
Moore's Bakery v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U. S. 115 (1954).
" A violation of Section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 STAT. 1528 (1936),
15 U. S. C. § 13a (1946), was also found. This section, also known as the Borah-
Van Nuys Act, prevents, inter alia, a person engaged in interstate commerce from
selling goods "in any part of the United States at prices lower than those exacted
by said person elsewhere in the United States for the purpose of destroying com-
petition, or eliminating a competitor in such part of the United States; or, to sell,
or contract to sell, goods at unreasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying
competition or eliminating a competitor"' This section was once thought to be
criminal only, but now it is conceded that it provides for treble damage actions also.
Note, 31 N. C. L. REV. 454 (1953)..
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fendant's bread prices in the other towns-including the one town in
Texas-remained unchanged. Regarding the jurisdictional requirement
of interestate commerce, the Supreme Court said:
"Respondent [Mead] is engaged in commerce, selling bread both
locally and interstate. In the course of such business, it made
price discriminations, maintaining the price in the interstate trans-
actions and cutting the price in the intrastate sales.... The vic-
tim, to be sure, is only a local merchant; and no interstate trans-
actions are used to destroy him."' 7
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court found an interstate connection on the
ground that the defendant, an interstate merchant, was the beneficiary
of the discrimination. He was financed from his interstate operations
and also from other interstate companies in the Mead organization.' 8
These sources enabled him to survive while his low prices forced the
local competitor out of business.
In this decision the Supreme Court seems to have made a reality of
Cyrus Austin's warning that:
"It is unsafe for a seller engaged in interstate commerce to assume
that his intrastate pricing policies are without the scope of the
[Clayton] Act, even where only intrastate competition appears to
be involved. There is always the possibility that the lowering of
his intrastate prices will be held to be supported by the higher
prices charged interstate purchasers; and this would undoubtedly
be the case if such a seller should lower his price throughout an
intrastate area to meet (or beat) local competition."' 0
The qualifying clause of Section 2 (a) which requires a showing that
the effect of such discrimination may be substantially (1) to lessen com-
petition or (2) tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or
(3) to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who
either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination
also has presented difficulty in interpretation. The first two of these
"effects" were part of the original Clayton Act,20 and the third was added
by the Robinson-Patman Act. Protection to individual competitors was
" Moore's Bakery v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U. S. 115, 118 (1954).
's Defendant was affiliated with an interlocked chain of bakeries operating in
southwest United States. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit said the fact
that the stockholders and officers of the Mead Company in New Mexico were also
stockholders and officers of other Mead organizations would not prove that the
price war affected interstate commerce in the absence of a showing that the inter-
locking corporate ownership was related to the price war. Mead's Fine Bread Co.
v. Moore, 208 F. 2d 777, 779 (10th Cir. 1953).
" Austin, PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBIN-
SON-PATMAN ACT 17 (Philadelphia: American Law Institute, 1953).
2038 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 13 (1946).
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intended by this language,21 but the problem remains whether injury to
an intrastate operator will fulfill the requirement.
In cases brought by the Federal Trade Commission public policy is
of primary importance, and some probability must exist that interstate
commerce will suffer one of the proscribed effects.2 2 However, private
damage actions under the third possible effect involve no general public
policy,23 but the question remains whether the commerce or competition
injured must be interstate. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit took the view in Moore v. Mead that it was still neces-
sary for the plaintiff to prove an effect on interstate commerce.2 4 How-
ever, the Supreme Court's decision in the Mead case 25 appears to take
the view that an injury caused by price discriminations of one engaged
in interstate commerce against an individual merchant competing locally
will come under the prohibition of the Clayton Act regardless of the
resulting effect on conditions in interstate commerce. The argument
that the destroyed competition did not have to be interstate was sub-
mitted to the Supreme Court in the Mead case2 6 and was apparently
accepted by the following language in the Court's opinion: "The de-
struction of competition was plainly established as required by Section
2(a) of the Clayton Act." The only competition involved was that
between Moore and Mead in Santa Rosa, New Mexico-which seems
entirely intrastate. Therefore, it appears that in treble damage actions
under Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act,2 7 so long as the jurisdictional
21 The original Clayton Act was "too restrictive, in requiring a showing of
general injury to competitive conditions in the line of commerce concerned; whereas
the more immediately important concern is an injury to the competitor victimized
by the discrimination." SEN. REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1936).
"2 Federal Trade Commission v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U. S. 37 (1948) ; Corn
Products Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 324 U. S. 726 (1945) ; Samuel
H. Moss Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 148 F. 2d 378 (2d Cir. 1945) ; Min-
neapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 191 Fed. 2d 786
(7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 344 U. S. 206 (1952).
2'3 Reid v. Doubleday and Co., 109 F. Supp. 354 (D. Ohio 1952) ; Myers v. Shell
Oil Co., 96 F. Supp. 670 (S. D. Cal. 1951).
"2 Moore v. Mead Service Co., 184 F. 2d 338 (10th Cir. 1950), rev'.d on other
grounds, 340 U. S. 944 (1951).
" Moore's Bakery v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U. S. 115 (1954).
2" Brief of Petitioner, Moore's Bakery v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U. S. 115
(1954).
"' This is also true under Section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act. See note 14
mspra. The Supreme Court, in disposing of the added requirement in Section 3-
"for the purpose of destroying competition, or eliminating a competitor"-which
replaces the qualifying clause of Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, said there was
ample evidence to support a finding that defendant's purpose in the price war was
to eliminate a competitor. Again an intrastate competitor appears sufficient. Other
cases involving violations of Section 3 are: Atlantic Co. v. Citizens Ice and Cold
Storage Co., 178 F. 2d 453 (5th Cir. 1949) ; Spencer v. Sun Oil Co., 94 F. Supp.
408 (D. Conn. 1950); Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 94 F. Supp. 796
(S. D. Cal. 1950); Hipps v. Bowman Dairy Co., C. C. H. TRADE REG. RE'. (1950-
51 Trade Cas.) 62,859 (N. D. Ill. 1951).
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requirement is met, any destruction of a competitor-in either intrastate
or interstate competition-will per se satisfy the qualifying clause.
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Moore v. Mead
extends coverage of Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the
Robinson-Patman Act, beyond any previous interpretation. This is in
keeping with the original intentions of the proponents of the Robinson-
Patman amendment to provide more protection to small business. 28
"AUSTIN, PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND -RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBIN-
SoN-PATMAN ACT 1 (Philadelphia: American Law Institute, 1953); Evans, Anti-
Price Discriminationt Act of 1936, 23 VA. L. Rxv. 140 (1936).
